

FIVE ESSAYS BY DEAN INGE

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INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SERVICE

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ESSAYS BY DEAN INGE

INTRODUCTION

As it is unlikely that the majority of Indian readers are familiar with Dean Inge's life and work, the following summary, which is taken from *Who's Who*, is here given as providing the necessary information in the briefest possible space :—

" Inge, the Very Rev. William Ralph, D.D., C.V.O., 1918; F.B.A. 1921; Dean of St. Paul's since 1911; born Crayke, Yorkshirc, 6th June, 1860; eldest son of late Rev. William Inge, D.D., Provost of Worcester College, Oxford, and Mary, daughter of the Venerable Edward Churton, Archdeacon of Cleveland; married 1905, Mary Catherine, daughter of the Venerable H. M. Spooner, Archdeacon of Maidstone, and grand-daughter of Bishop Harvey Goodwin; three sons, two daughters. *Educated*: Eton; King's College, Cambridge. Bell Scholar and Porson Prizeman, 1880; Porson Scholar, 1881; Craven Scholar and Browne Medallist, 1882; Senior Chancellor's Medallist, 1883; 1st class Classics, 1882 and 1883; Hare Prizeman, 1885; Assistant Master at Eton, 1884-1888; Fellow of King's, 1886-1888; Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford, 1889-1904; Select preacher at Oxford, 1893-1895, 1903-1905, 1920-1921; Cambridge, 1901, 1906, 1910, 1912, 1913, 1920; Bampton Lecturer, 1899; Hon. D.D., Aberdeen, 1905; Paddock Lecturer, New York, 1906; Vicar of All Saints', Ennismore Gardens, S.W., 1905-1907; Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, 1907-1911; Hon. Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and of Hertford College, Oxford; Academic Committee of Royal Society of Literature; Gifford Lecturer.

St. Andrew's, 1917-1918; Romanes and Hibbert Lecturer, 1920; Hon. D.Litt. Durham, 1920; Rede Lecturer, 1922; *Publications*: Society in Rome under the Cæsars, 1886; Eton Latin Grammar (with F. H. Rawlins), 1889; 3rd Edition, 1900; Christian Mysticism, 1899; two essays in *Contentio Veritatis*, 1902; Faith and Knowledge, 1904; Selections from the German Mystics, 1904; Studies of English Mystics, 1906; Truth and Falsehood in Religion, 1906; Personal Idealism and Mysticism, 1907; Faith, 1909; Speculum Animæ, 1911; The Church and the Age, 1912; Types of Christian Saintliness, 1915; The Philosophy of Plotinus, 1918; Outspoken Essays, 1919; The Idea of Progress (Romanes Lecture), 1920; Outspoken Essays, Second Series, 1922; and some school books."

A glance at the above will show that it is a record of the highest distinction. Putting aside the quite exceptional list of honours in the realm of classical literature won by Dr. Inge as a young man, we note that in his maturer years he has not only received the rare honour of a Fellowship at both the great Universities and has taught as a tutor at Oxford and as a Professor at Cambridge, but that he has been selected for almost all the chief lectureships of the day. To have been at various times the Bampton, the Romanes, the Hibbert and the Rede Lecturer—honours which are open to the whole academic world—is a remarkable testimony to Dr. Inge's intellectual distinction; while to have been nominated as Select Preacher for no less than eight years at Oxford and six years at Cambridge points equally to his authority as a theologian and exponent of Christian teachings.

But distinguished though this record be, it is far, as a matter of fact, from explaining the remarkable position which the Dean of St. Paul's has come to occupy in the world of contemporary thought.

The record, as it stands, is almost entirely academic and ecclesiastical; and, curiously enough, it is in neither of these fields that Dr. Inge has won the fame which has made his name in recent years a household word among the English-speaking peoples. Had he continued simply along the lines indicated in the greater part of the record, he

would undoubtedly have been destined to a life-time of quiet and valuable work which would have won him the growing respect and admiration of a limited few. But it would never have gained for him the position which he now holds. It would not, that is to say, have made him a man whose pronouncements on current events and current problems are the property of the whole reading public; whose latest utterances are eagerly reported by the Press and as eagerly read by the Man in the Street; a speaker who, in the professional jargon of the hour, is one of the greatest "draws" on the lecture platform to-day; and a writer, an article from whose pen is capable, like Macaulay's eighty years ago, of sending up the sale of the current issue of any of the great reviews.

The purely academic life, in spite of the great qualities by which it is frequently adorned, is a sheltered life, shut off by its very circumstances from the hurly-burly of the world. Its votaries, moreover, tend to be specialists, and to be specialists along lines which make little appeal to the ordinary man or woman; and this is coming to be more particularly so at the present time, when the old traditions of classical culture are slowly dying out and the gulf between the professional scholar and the ordinary educated public is becoming wider year by year. Nor can it be said that ecclesiastical office is nowadays a high road to public influence. Rightly or wrongly, people to-day have ceased to expect guidance and illumination on secular matters from the clergy. It is felt that the clergyman is, by virtue of his office, and of the dogmas to which he has to subscribe on ordination, precluded from the larger and more unprejudiced purview of life which provides the only light in which the world's affairs can profitably be studied. The fact has to be recognized also that few of the present-day clergy possess the necessary equipment or the necessary catholicity of interests to make their pronouncements on current events either valuable or interesting.

The truth is that Dr. Inge has become what he is by a kind of negation of his own antecedents; and the influence which he now wields may be dated back to the change which converted him, some ten years ago, from the simple

scholar and ecclesiastic into a publicist and critic of modern life. The immediate cause of this change was the Great War. To Dr. Inge, as to many others, the War came as a ghastly revelation. It seemed to shatter the very foundations upon which our modern life had been built up. Not only was it felt to be an arraignment of our civilization, but it seemed to call in question every belief and every generalization which the world of our time had become accustomed to take complacently for granted. Obviously there was something profoundly wrong in the whole structure of temporary life, something which called urgently for remedy. What was needed was an entire revision of our postulates, a probing of assumptions which had up till then been regarded as necessary axioms, and an endeavour to find some surer standard of life for the future, in the light of which civilization might be re-fashioned and re-ordered.

It was under the shock of this revelation that Dr. Inge's activities took a new turn. If we glance once more at the record in *Who's Who*, we shall see that up to the time of the War Dr. Inge's writings had all been either on academic subjects or on various aspects of Mysticism. It was only after the outbreak of war that he turned to other subjects, and in a series of notable papers in the *Quarterly* and *Edinburgh Reviews* and the *Hibbert Journal* began his task of examining current conditions in the social, religious and economic life of the age and their bearing upon the future of the race. The various Lectureships which he held between 1917 and 1922 gave him further opportunities of developing his theme, and the two volumes of *Outspoken Essays*, published respectively in 1919 and 1922, have given to the world, in collected form, the more important of these critical studies.

It is as yet too early to predict the place which these two remarkable volumes will hold in the estimation of posterity; but about one thing there can be no possible doubt, namely, that we have in the Dean of St. Paul's a critic of almost unique equipment for the many-sided nature of his task. Not only has he a mass of erudition which covers the whole range of ancient life, literature and thought, but he has kept himself abreast of modern scientific dis-

coveries and is widely read in that great and rapidly increasing department of modern letters which, under the heads of sociology, anthropology and economics, deals with the chief problems of organized social, racial, national and international life. In addition to this, he has made a deep study of the new science of Eugenics, which forms, and justly forms, the basis of much of his criticism. It has to be confessed, however, that even with this equipment many a book might have been written which would have been too ponderous and too dull in treatment to capture the ear of the public. What is required in effective criticism, especially where such criticism is intended as propaganda, is a telling style; and it is just the possession of the right kind of style which has enabled Dr. Inge to make so astonishingly successful a use of his gifts. Not only is every page that he writes alive with attractive allusiveness,¹ but there are few which do not contain mordant strokes of wit, flashes of irony, and gnomic sayings well worthy of quotation. The very structure of the style, moreover, makes for trenchancy and power; for Dr. Inge habitually writes in short, sharp sentences, rarely using any other punctuation but commas and full-stops. The result is that his work has a nervous and sinewy quality which never permits difficulty or abstruseness to degenerate into dulness. Finally, he possesses that most important qualification for a critic, absolute fearlessness. No writer of the day, not even Mr. Bernard Shaw, has been bolder or more resolute than Dr. Inge in the expression of unpopular views. There is hardly a popular movement which he has not challenged, hardly a popular idol which he has not subjected to the hammer of merciless logic. For the loose views, the unsound generalizations and the shallow sentimentalities of the unthinking, he has, and has never attempted to disguise, a whole-hearted contempt. Among the quotations which he has inserted on the fly-leaf of the first volume of his *Outspoken Essays* is one from Euripides: "Dost thou wish that I should tell thee soft falsehoods or harsh truths?"

¹ In the *Essay on Progress* alone there are allusions to or quotations from no less than seventy different writers—novelists, poets, scientists, historians, politicians, etc.

Speak, for thine is the choice." Dr. Inge has not waited for the public to make its choice, but has decided from the first that his business is to tell people what they ought to hear, and not what they want to hear. Of all writers of the day he is the most insistent purveyor of uncomfortable truths.

What is it then that this erudite, gifted and courageous critic has to tell us about the age in which we are living?

It is an age, he tells us quite definitely, which he views with profound disquiet. "I have, I suppose," he says at the conclusion of his essay on *Our Present Discontents*, "made it clear that I do not consider myself specially fortunate in having been born in 1860 and that I look forward with great anxiety to the journey through life which my children will have to make." We are reaping the fruits, according to Dr. Inge, of the false philosophy of life which began with the Industrial Revolution of a hundred and fifty years ago, and of which we have only in the last few years begun to see the logical consequences. The extraordinary outward prosperity of the Victorian era, due to special causes and conditions which can never recur, blinded us for the time being to these consequences. The high-water mark of that era was reached in the Diamond Jubilee year of 1897 and the re-action began with the Boer War in 1900. But it needed the World War of 1914-1918 to strip away the last veil from the illusions of the nineteenth century. Then, at last, we came to see how very wrong things were and how short-sighted had been the complacency of that time. That boasted age of progress, viewed in the light of later developments, is now seen to have been, in the words of the present Prime Minister, "an age of anyhow," and it is the mistakes so lightly made in that period of self-intoxication that the nation is now called upon to remedy. Dr. Inge would perhaps agree with the opinion expressed in a leading article in the *Sunday Times* of June 7th, 1925 :—

"In that Age of Anyhow, industry and population expanded with a rapidity which defied any kind of check or control; the industrial revolution had taken the country

unawares and swept it headlong into a disorder from which it is only now emerging. Every step we take to alleviate the social and industrial ills of our own age is but an act of recovery from the mistakes of the last. There is a very real relationship between nineteenth-century chaos and twentieth-century discontent."

The only point where, perhaps, he would not agree is the suggestion that we are "now emerging" from the disorders bred by that epoch. The general view of Dr. Inge is that the maladies from which we are suffering are of a kind which must get worse before they can get better. The poison of Industrialism has entered too deeply into the system of our present civilization to be lightly thrown off. Indeed, it would seem to be a case where a constructive critic can, for the time being, have very little to say. Practically all that can be attempted at present is diagnosis, which, Dr. Inge tells us, "is not the same as cure; but in some diseases it is more than half of the physician's task." We need to learn, that is to say, first of all, where precisely it is that the preceding age went wrong, in what respects its philosophy was a false one, and hence how many of our present ills are to be directly attributed to wrong thinking. The next step is to learn to think rightly, even though right thinking may not be able all at once to undo the harm that has been done and to check the enormous momentum already set up. The third and last step, which under existing circumstances must remain rather a hope than a definite goal, will be to establish such right thinking as a directive force in life and to use it for the building of a saner and healthier civilization in the time that is coming.

In his two volumes of *Outspoken Essays*, Dr. Inge confines himself for the most part to the first of these tasks. His aim is to show us how very little foundation there is, in fact, for the assumptions which the Victorians took for granted and which still play a powerful part in popular thought. He singles out three of these assumptions for special treatment, all of them accepted as axiomatic by the nineteenth century. One of these is the belief in a natural law of progress, carrying mankind automatically,

as the centuries pass by, to higher and higher levels of being. Another is the complacent conviction that our modern, mechanical civilization, in virtue of its many undoubted triumphs over Nature and its vast development of all which belongs to the external environment of mankind, is therefore a higher and truer civilization than those of the pre-mechanical ages. The third is the universal faith in democracy, as representing a more advanced stage in the government of society than those of aristocracy or monarchy, and as the political goal towards which the world is necessarily advancing.

(1) The belief in a Law of Progress, Dr. Inge points out, is, in its present form, quite a recent one. The popular thought of the ancients accepted the tradition that the world had degenerated from an ideal past; while the deepest thinkers of the ancient world inclined rather towards a theory of cyclic recurrence (i.e. of alternate progress and retrogression) than to any theory of advance. The belief, as it now stands, has, as Dean Inge very clearly shows, no support in any of the main departments of human thought. It is unconfirmed by evolutionary science; indeed science in general tells us a very different story. History certainly does not bear out the idea, unless, in the manner of too many historians, we distort plain facts to suit our preconceptions. In political science the doctrine of continuous progress, as usually understood, must inevitably mean that whatever is later in time is a real advance upon what is earlier. But, says Dr. Inge, to attempt to apply this postulate to political history will lead to a whole host of absurdities which have only to be mentioned in order to be perceived as such. If we turn to biology we are led to a similar conclusion; for there is no justification for the belief that, in body or brain-equipment, the human being of to-day is superior to the earliest specimens of humanity known to scientific research: while as for moral improvement, the Great War affords sufficient proof that, given the necessary conditions, the modern man can be just as savage and as bloodthirsty as his rudest ancestors. "Absence of temptation," writes Dr. Inge, "may produce an appearance of improvement; but this is hardly what we

mean by progress, and there is an old saying that the Devil has a clever trick of pretending to be dead. It seems to me very doubtful whether when we are exposed to the same temptations we are more humane, or more sympathetic, or juster, or less brutal than the ancients."

(2) In dealing with our mechanical civilization, Dr. Inge has no very difficult task in showing that the evils which it has produced are out of all proportion to the benefits which it has conferred upon the race. For one thing, it has entirely destroyed the old self-contained life of the pre-mechanical village community. It has drained the rural districts of their population and concentrated this in large unsanitary towns where people are herded together under conditions which are fatal to any kind of human well-being. The result has been, in every country, a perceptible race deterioration. The factories have peopled our cities with "sub-men" who, in the opinion of experts, are, as a type, markedly inferior in several respects to the African negro, and who, in Dr. Inge's words, "are condemned to a troubled and stunted existence which would fill a savage with horror." But the mischief does not end here. The effect of the machine has been to rob human labour itself of all its elements of joy and artistry. The man who can manufacture a complete article with his own hands has ceased to exist. We are left with a horde of mechanized labourers, whose whole business consists in manufacturing one special part of one special part of an article. "Not a man in a boot factory," says Dr. Austin Freeman, quoted by Dean Inge, "is able to make a pair of boots." With this disappearance of the creative side of labour has come, in Dr. Inge's opinion, a disgust with work which is one of the most ominous features in the labour problem of our time. If we add to this a similar revolt against the sordid and unnatural conditions of life, as it is lived in an industrial town, we have in these two things a human problem of the first magnitude, which may well fill with despair anyone who has the future of our civilization at heart. Both of them Dr. Inge regards as the inevitable protests of outraged nature. Man needs the soil and he needs congenial work. Strip him of these two elements of healthy

and natural life and we get inevitably a condition of *malaise*—of blind and inarticulate revolt against a state of things dimly apprehended and yet felt to be wrong—which is the real secret of modern industrial unrest. Unknown to themselves, the factory workers of to-day are leading an unnatural life, cut off from the country and the wholesome influences of nature, surrounded by squalor and ugliness; a life, moreover, with no traditions, no legends, no culture, and no religion. "We seldom reflect," he remarks, "on the strangeness of the fact that the modern working man has few or no superstitions. At other times the masses have evolved for themselves some picturesque nature-religion, some pious ancestor-worship, some cult of saints or heroes, some stories of fairies, ghosts, or demons, and a mass of quaint superstitions genial or frightening. The modern town-dweller has no God and no Devil; he lives without awe, without admiration, without fear."

As for the economic results of the mechanizing of labour, the ruthless competition which it sets up, the precarious dependence of prosperity upon markets and the fluctuations of prices, and the consequent instability of the workers' lot, all these come into Dr. Inge's purview, but are more familiar ground and need not detain us here.

(3) No less ill founded, when impartially examined, is the modern belief in Democracy. The curious fact here, Dr. Inge points out, is that, while everybody feels it incumbent upon him to profess this belief, nobody really has a good word to say for democracy and no nation or class in a nation has ever yet attempted to put it into practice. Indeed, the more violent the professions of democracy, the less of true democracy are we likely to find. Nothing, for example, could be less democratic in spirit than the modern socialistic movement, which aims at the grabbing of privileges and emoluments for a particular class, at the expense of all other classes in the community; while as for revolutions, the successful revolution is always an oligarchy or a monarchy in disguise, and a tyranny much harsher than any which it displaces. What passes for democracy to-day is largely materialistic individualism

at war with the general body of the community. "True socialism," says Dr. Inge, "if such a thing were realizable, would closely resemble what we now call patriotism." It would be, that is to say, a subordination of the individual to the good of the whole and a willingness on the part of each man to perform such work as he was best fitted to contribute to the general well-being. Instead of this, the demand which is nowadays being put forward by advanced democracy is for more rewards and less work. There is visible every year a tendency on the part of the labouring classes to become more and more parasitic on the community. For some time past we have been witnessing what can only be called a system of successful blackmail, by which Trade Unions have extorted further and further privileges for themselves under the threat of disorganizing the national life. That successive governments have found themselves unable to resist these demands, is only, says Dr. Inge, in his essay on *Our Present Discontents*, one of the inevitable penalties of a democratic régime. "A democratic government," he says, "is almost necessarily weak and timid. A democracy cannot tolerate a strong executive for fear of seeing the control pass out of the hands of the mob. The executive must be unarmed and defenceless. The result is that it is at the mercy of any violent and anti-social faction."

These are unpalatable statements, but few impartial students of the age will deny that they needed to be made. The great fault of much of our thinking, says Dr. Inge (in reference to the English race), is not so much that it is ignorant as that it is infected with a deep-seated intellectual insincerity. We allow ourselves to be made the prey of catch-words and shibboleths, to which we pay outward allegiance, even though in our heart of hearts we know that they are not true. It is time, in the opinion of the Dean of St. Paul's, that we should learn to face the truth; and we have ample opportunities of doing this nowadays, not merely by referring to the best thought of our times on the problems of economics and sociology, but by a study of the official statistics by which such reasoned conclusions are confirmed. We have to get away from sentiment and

loose thinking and realize that the fate of nations and civilizations is purely and simply a matter of natural law. "Dame Nature cares nothing for the babble of politicians and trade union regulations." "The fate of races is decided, not in the Council Chamber or on the battle-field, but by the same laws of nature which determine the distribution of the various plants and animals of the world." Human life can only rescue itself from the chaos into which it has fallen, and become once more sane and healthy, when it has learnt to bring itself into harmony with Nature—that silent Goddess who, "like the Sphinx of old, destroys all who cannot read her riddles." Even though, as Dr. Inge suggests, we may not live to see the birth of a really scientific civilization, yet such a civilization is not impossible and there may yet come a new Renaissance under which the life of reason will at last be the life of mankind.

Meanwhile, what can be done to effect some improvement in things as they are at the moment? It is possible, he thinks, that the natural course of events may automatically do something to bring about better conditions. There must come a time, for example, when the process of spoliation, which is the present policy of the Labour movement, will be automatically checkmated by the fact that there is nothing more left to loot. When that happens, the modern industrial system will definitely collapse; and then the crowded life in large towns, which is the source of so many evils to-day, will come to an end, for the simple reason that the large industrial town is an integral part of the system which the Labour movement is out to destroy. The result will be that we shall then in all probability revert to the simpler life of the pre-mechanical era, with agriculture as our staple employment. Such a consummation, remote though it may seem at first sight, is probably not so distant as we imagine, for, says Dr. Inge, "the cancer of industrialism has begun to mortify and the end is in sight. Within two hundred years, it may be—for we must allow for backwashes and cross-currents which will retard the flow of the stream—the hideous new towns which disfigure our landscape may have departed and their sites may have been reclaimed for the plough." The truth of the matter

is that "the working man is sawing at the branch on which he is seated. He may benefit for a time a minority of his own class, but only by scaling the doom of the rest. A densely populated country, which is unable to feed itself, can never be a working man's paradise, a land of short hours and high wages." The time will come when people will learn the truth of this by actual experience. The "bundle of economic fallacies," which are the present equipment of the popular democratic movement, must inevitably stultify themselves just because they are fallacies. "The foolish," wrote the Roman poet, Claudian, "learn by the hard teaching of events," and our modern doctrinaires will be no exception to the rule. Every economic law in nature declares against parasitism. The consequence must be that all attempts at parasitism on a large scale will defeat themselves and that the world will eventually learn the first of all lessons of social life, namely, that *he who would truly and wisely live must pay his way.*

Closely connected, too, with economics is another set of laws which it is equally imperative for civilization to learn and apply. These are the laws which are beginning to be revealed by the new science of Eugenics. Every civilization must ultimately be judged, as Ruskin long ago pointed out, by the type of human being which it produces. It is essential, therefore, that there should be a generally diffused knowledge as to the more important of the laws which determine the improvement or deterioration of type. Thus men have to learn that perhaps the most important of all these determining things is the relation of the birth-rate to the available means of subsistence. Excess of population is the root-cause of most of our modern troubles, since its logical consequence is that there must exist in any such over-swollen community a surplus for which natural and economic conditions have made no provision. Hence there must needs follow a struggle for survival in its acutest form, with all its concomitants of discontent and unrest. No civilization can achieve stability until a rational equilibrium is reached between the birth-rate and the sustaining capacity of the country in question. In this connection, Dr. Inge makes no concealment of his advocacy

of the somewhat daring doctrine of birth-control. But the chief remedy which he suggests, in the case of the British Empire, is a wholesale policy of colonization. The more sparsely populated countries, such as Canada and Australia, are capable, he thinks, of finding room for quite two hundred million British subjects. If this policy were resolutely taken up by the Government, his opinion is that the population question of the Empire would be solved for a very long time to come.

But there is another law of Eugenics which is just as important as the above and which is being just as freely sinned against at the present time. The essential condition of a flourishing civilization is that the higher types of its humanity should be perpetuated and the propagation of its lower types, as far as possible, restricted. Unfortunately, at the present moment, we are witnessing the reverse process. The higher types are becoming more and more sterile, while the largest birthrate is to be found among the dregs of the population. The reasons for this are largely economic. Owing to the better standards of life which are demanded by the superior types, families are restricted within the limits which shall make it possible for such standards to be maintained. Our slum populations, on the other hand, make no such demands on their environment. The consequence is that they breed recklessly and that the general quality of the nation is being rapidly lowered by the infusion of these inferior elements. It is ominous also to learn that by far the most prolific section of the modern community is to be found in the feeble-minded. Add to this that the latest development of official policy is, in Dr. Inge's words, first to create unemployment and then to endow it, and we have what is rightly stigmatized as the very extreme of "cacogenics," viz., an absolute suspension of natural selection.

The gradual recognition and application, therefore, of the elementary laws of economics and eugenics is essential for the reconstruction of society. But there is something which, in Dr. Inge's view, is just as essential, and which might produce the desired results very much more swiftly and simply; and that is a true revival of religion. Speak-

ing as a high official of the Church, Dr. Inge naturally thinks of Christianity when he speaks of religion, but what he has to say would apply equally to religions in general. He points out that the ideal of life held up in the Gospels is not merely a spiritually true ideal, but one which, if generally followed, would solve automatically most of our secular problems. The real malady of our age is that its values are all wrong. Nearly all our present problems are due to the fact, not that we pursue the right things in the wrong way, but that we pursue the wrong things. The essence of Christianity is that it corrects these values. It introduces, as it were, a new currency which demonetizes the old. It gives us "a new scale of prices in which the cheapest things are the dearest and the dearest the cheapest." The world's standards are quantitative, those of Christianity are qualitative; and being qualitative, spiritual gains are unlimited; "they are increased by being shared; and we rob nobody by taking them." It requires no great ingenuity, on Dean Inge's part, to show how pronounced would be the change in our civilization if we were to accept the transvaluation of values offered us by Christianity. We should then perceive that, in life, it is not the external things but the internal which are important. In the words of the text, "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." An acceptance of this truth would, it will readily be seen, immediately put an end to the bitter competition of our times and would, at one stroke, solve most of our economic difficulties. Not only this, but by infusing into labour the ideal of love and service, religion would strike at the root of a problem which is recognized as one of the most desperate which civilization has to face to-day, namely, the irksomeness and distastefulness of most of our present-day work. "Work is irksome," says Dr. Inge, "not only when it is arduous and ill-paid but when the worker is lazy, selfish, envious or discontented." One thing only can cure this, and that is when such work is done from love or unselfish affection. In a truly religious civilization there would be in all work a desire to render social service or to do God's will, and this would diminish to an incalculable extent its

"human cost." A religious civilization, moreover, would make for simplicity of life. Man's needs would grow less, and consequently much of the energies which are at present employed in supplying unnecessary demands would be released for higher activities. People would recover their lost happiness by discovering, what all sages have ever known to be the secret of life, namely, that happiness depends upon what is within and not upon what is without. In fine, what civilization really needs is a complete change of heart. It has worshipped false gods too long. The time has come when it should turn to a truer and purer faith.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Inge considers such a change of heart to be by no means impossible. "The time," he says, "seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life, which may remould society as no less potent influence would have the strength to do."

Readers who are interested in what he has to say on this point should refer to the concluding part of the essay on *Our Present Discontents*, which is not included in this volume. Dr. Inge thinks that secularism has had its day, and that it is a creed which, as time will show, has heavy disappointments in store for its worshippers. When these disappointments have been fully realized, then, he thinks, the human race, "having taken in succession every path except the right one, may pay more attention to the narrow way that leadeth unto life."

The above brief summary gives but a very imperfect idea of the closely reasoned and richly documented criticism which this remarkable writer brings to bear upon the civilization of the age. It is, indeed, one of the difficulties in dealing with Dr. Inge that his own work is so compact and so closely knit that it is in itself almost its own summary. It is perhaps for this reason that there is hardly any writer of to-day who can be re-read so many times with greater advantage and with so little diminution of pleasure. A hundred years ago the poet Keats gave to his brother-poet Shelley the celebrated advice to "load every rift with ore." Something of this loading is a characteristic of all Dr. Inge's writings. They have none of the looseness of texture which marks too many contributions to *Reviews*.

Every sentence is a definite addition to the argument and is never, as we find in so many writers, merely the same thing said over again in different words. For these reasons, no summary can be satisfactory, least of all to the summarizer; and the advice of the present writer to all those who may find the essays in this little volume stimulating and instructive is that they should take an early opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the two series of *Outspoken Essays* which contain the main body of Dr. Inge's critical writings.

It remains to say a word or two on one point. The Dean of St. Paul's has been accused of undue pessimism. Indeed it is as a "pessimist" that he is usually thought of by the Man in the Street. This is due, we think, largely to the fact that it is his more pessimistic utterances upon which the popular Press is accustomed to seize, in order to supply sensational matter to its readers. A closer acquaintance with Dr. Inge's writings serves, however, in our opinion, entirely to dispel the impression. It is true that his analysis of modern life is not a flattering one. But may not the reason for this be merely that he has had the courage to tell us the truth about ourselves? Such plain speaking could only be justly called pessimistic if it were to go wilfully beyond the actual facts of the case. But there will probably be few thoughtful readers who will accuse him of exaggeration. Our civilization is sick, and we know it. The future for most of us is dark with ominous possibilities. We make no secret of this in our conversation with our friends. Why then should we charge with undue pessimism a writer and thinker who has had the courage to proclaim what we most of us believe, and who has had the penetration to pierce through the outward shows of power and prosperity to the lurking malady within? In one respect Dr. Inge is far less pessimistic than the majority of those who will agree with his diagnosis. The ordinary man or woman gives up the problem of the age as insoluble with a shrug of despair. Dr. Inge, on the contrary, has lost his faith neither in the future nor in the recuperative power of the race. So far from sitting down under our present problems, he is in favour of every possible experiment being tried which may

hold out the smallest promise of relief. He is careful, moreover, to point out that, however wrong things may be with mankind in the mass, there is always an opening for progress so far as the individual is concerned. He tells us, in his essay on *The Future of the English Race*, "that although the consideration of mankind in the mass and the calculation of tendencies based on figures and averages must lead to somewhat pessimistic and sordid views of human nature, there is no reason why individuals . . . should conform themselves to the low standards of the world about them"; and he definitely records his conviction that "there are materials, though far less abundant than we could wish, for a spiritual reformation, which would smooth the transition to a new social order, and open to us unfailing sources of happiness and inspiration which would not only enable us to tide over the period of dissolution but might make the whole world our debtor." These are not the words of a pessimist; nor, we think, will there be found in the whole range of Dr. Inge's review of modern conditions any disquieting diagnosis or uncomfortable prognostication of the future which is not balanced and corrected by some hopeful statement and some expression of faith in the fundamental sanity of human nature. If the remedies which he proposes are somewhat exacting, it has to be confessed that they only resemble in this respect the problems which they are called upon to solve.

The truth is that, in judging of Dr. Inge's writings, the shallow critic has too often failed to realize the special type of mind with which he is dealing. The Dean of St. Paul's, as he has so often told us himself, is a Platonist. This means, in a technical and philosophical sense, that he holds certain views about life and about the ultimate realities which lie behind life. But it means also, in a more general way, that his habit of mind is essentially Greek. Dr. Inge is, in the typical Greek sense, an intellectualist. To Plato, virtue was knowledge and vice ignorance. To act rightly, it was first necessary to think rightly. The foundation of all human well-being and happiness, therefore, was to be sought in truth of thought. Any false idea or ill-based reasoning was automatically bound to lead to misery and

disaster. This is precisely Dr. Inge's way of looking at things. The evil and the unhappiness, which he sees about him, he regards merely as symptoms of a more deeply seated disease. They are all the results of ignorance, of wrong thinking. The task of the critic and the reformer is, therefore, not to potter about with the external symptoms—a task which may be left to the politicians—but to probe to the root of the matter and to disclose the real causes of the distemper. It is, in other words, to show where our habitual thinking is wrong and where it needs to be put right. If this could be done in such a way as to change the general thought of the age, then the outward evils would automatically right themselves.

What is too often forgotten is that the type of mind which sees things in this way must necessarily show the qualities which belong to the type. For the pure intellectualist there can be none of the emotional softness, none of the warmth and tenderness, which belong to a different, and frequently a more influential, type of thinker. The light by which he sees is what Bacon called a "dry light." His task, like that of the surgeon, is to lay bare the seat of the disease. He must pierce into the most sensitive depths of the popular thought of his contemporaries, utterly regardless of the wincing, or even of the cries of pain, when some deeply-hidden prejudice or complacency feels the touch of the steel. Nor must he allow any sort of compassion to deflect the directness of his thrust. Pity—an emotion admirable enough in itself—must influence him just as little as it does the surgeon in the operating theatre. He has one aim, and one only—to cut out the offending tissue, and to be merciless in order to be kind. Life has many of these apparently ruthless offices, which are yet essential to human well-being. It has to be recognized that the intellectual critic's task is one of these; and sensible people must cease to demand of him amenities which are incompatible with his special function.

When, therefore, we find in many of Dr. Inge's criticisms of our age a certain stecly hardness and an apparent lack of considerateness, we are ill-advised if we reckon it to him for blame. If it be true that, in his attitude towards labour

problems, he seems to show but little compassion for suffering ignorance, struggling against its lot; if his general view of most modern social idealism be one of an almost undisguised intellectual contempt; if he exhibit, in some places, what seems like a sardonic pleasure in exposing soft illusions and in pricking the bubble of a conceit which is often only an innocent hopefulness spoilt in the dressing; if he seem to display a certain sombre satisfaction in presenting the less attractive view of human possibilities and human prospects;—it would be more sensible, on our part, neither to take offence nor to mock, but to accept it as part of his peculiar office.

The "pessimism," with which Dr. Inge has been charged, is, in a word, nothing more than the unswerving penetration of an eye which refuses to have its vision blurred by sentiment or prejudice, or by the temptation to spare the feelings of others, and resolutely sets itself to see things as they are. It reflects the stony impartiality of those great laws of Nature, which, in all his writings, are Dr. Inge's final court of appeal. And since, in the last resort, human happiness depends, and must always depend, upon the degree in which man's life is brought into harmony with natural law, to take one's stand uncompromisingly upon such law, even in defiance of popular inclinations and popular delusions, is not merely not to be unkind, but is really the truest of all kindness. What is the use, it may well be asked, of flattering this or that current idealism, when every known law of human social and economic life declares that, in the long run, it must lead to disaster? Why expend conventional pity, when the lines along which conventional pity most commonly manifests itself tend ultimately but to aggravate the evil which is deplored? Evils which spring from unscientific living and thinking can only be cured in one way—and that is by a reversion to more scientific methods of thought and life. The true analogy here, as already suggested, is that of the physician and the surgeon. The doctor who compromises with a patient's desire for comfort and good living, who is afraid to insist upon the treatment which his knowledge tells him is necessary, confers no real benefit upon that patient.

On the contrary, he is false to his trust. So is it also with the intellectual critic. He knows no allegiance save that imposed upon him by fact and law. He is the servant of the truth, and the more rigidly he adheres to it, the more faithfully is he fulfilling his duty.

In a well-known passage in his poem, *Memorial Verses*, Matthew Arnold speaks of the great German poet, Goethe, as the physician of his times :—

“Physician of the Iron Age,
Goethe has done his pilgrimage.
He took the suffering human race,
He read each wound, each weakness clear—
And struck his finger on the place
And said—*Thou ailest here, and here.*”

Different, in all kinds of ways, though the two men be, yet the words here applied to Goethe may be not inappropriately applied to Dr. Inge. He has established himself as the foremost diagnostician of our age of unrest. If anyone, conscious of what the Dean of St. Paul's has called the *malaise* of our time, seeks for an explanation of this phenomenon, he has only to open the two volumes of *Outspoken Essays* to receive the answer: “*Thou ailest here, and here.*” And the diagnosis will be supported by such masses of facts and statistics, by such lucid exposition of laws and principles, by such calm dispassionateness of judgment, that he will be but a foolish reader who will refuse to take some of it at least to heart, or to be grateful that, in this age of shallow journalism and shallow politics, we have at any rate one man amongst us who is able to see clearly and who is courageous enough to declare, with the utmost plainness and candour, that which he sees.

PATRIOTISM

(1915)

THE sentiment of patriotism has seemed to many to mark an arrest of development in the physical expansion of the individual, a half-way house between mere self-centredness and full human sympathy. Some moralists have condemned it as pure egoism, magnified and disguised. "Patriotism," says Ruskin, "is an absurd prejudice founded on an extended selfishness." Mr. Grant Allen calls it "a vulgar vice—the national or collective form of the monopolist instinct." Mr. Havelock Ellis allows it to be "a virtue—among barbarians." For Herbert Spencer it is "reflex egoism—extended selfishness." These critics have made the very common mistake of judging human emotions and sentiments by their roots instead of by their fruits. They have forgotten the Aristotelian canon that the "nature" of anything is its completed development (ἡ φύσις τέλος ἑαυτῆς). The human self, as we know it, is a transitional form. It had a humble origin, and is capable of indefinite enhancement. Ultimately, we are what we love and care for, and no limit has been set to what we may become without ceasing to be ourselves. The case is the same with our love of country. No limit has been set to what our country may come to mean for us, without ceasing to be our country. Marcus Aurelius exhorted himself—"The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; shall not I say, Dear city of God?" But the city of God in which he wished to be was a city in which he would still live as "a Roman and an Antonine." The citizen of heaven knew that it was his duty to "hunt Sarmatians" on earth, though he was not obliged to imbrue his hands with "Cesarism."

Patriotism has two roots, the love of clan and the love of home. In migratory tribes the former alone counts; in settled communities diversities of origin are often forgotten. But the love of home, as we know it, is a gentler and more spiritual bond than clanship. The word home is associated with all that makes life beautiful and sacred, with tender memories of joy and sorrow, and especially with the first eager outlook of the young mind upon a wonderful world. A man does not as a rule feel much sentiment about his London house, still less about his office or factory. It is for the home of his childhood, or of his ancestors, that a man will fight most readily, because he is bound to it by a spiritual and poetic tie. Expanding from this centre, the sentiment of patriotism embraces one's country as a whole.

Both forms of patriotism—the local and the racial, are frequently alloyed with absurd, unworthy or barbarous motives. The local patriot thinks that Peebles, and not Paris, is the place for pleasure, or asks whether any good thing can come out of Nazareth. To the Chinaman all aliens are “outer barbarians” or “foreign devils.” Admiration for ourselves and our institutions is too often measured by our contempt and dislike for foreigners. Our own nation has a peculiarly bad record in this respect. In the reign of James I the Spanish ambassador was frequently insulted by the London crowd, as was the Russian ambassador in 1662; not, apparently, because we had a burning grievance against either of those nations, but because Spaniards and Russians are very unlike Englishmen. That at least is the opinion of the sagacious Pepys on the later of these incidents. “Lord! to see the absurd nature of Englishmen, that cannot forbear laughing and jeering at anything that looks strange.” Defoe says that the English are “the most oburlish people alive” to foreigners, with the result that “all men think an Englishman the devil.” In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Scotland seems to have ranked as a foreign country, and the presence of Scots in London was much resented. Cleveland thought it witty to write:

"Had Cain been Scot, God would have changed his doom;
Not forced him wander, but confined him home."

And we all remember Dr. Johnson's gibes.

British patriotic arrogance culminated in the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth century; in Lord Palmerston it found a champion at the head of the Government. Goldsmith describes the bearing of the Englishman of his day :

"Pride in their port, defiance in their eye,
I see the lords of human kind pass by."

Michelet found in England "human pride personified in a people," at a time when the characteristic of Germany was "a profound impersonality." It may be doubted whether even the arrogant brutality of the modern Prussian is more offensive to foreigners than was the calm and haughty assumption of superiority by our countrymen at this time. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers were quite of Milton's opinion, that, when the Almighty wishes something unusually great and difficult to be done, He entrusts it to His Englishmen. This unamiably characteristic was probably much more the result of insular ignorance than of a deep-seated pride. "A generation or two ago," said Mr. Asquith lately, "patriotism was largely fed and fostered upon reciprocal ignorance and contempt." The Englishman seriously believed that the French subsisted mainly upon frogs, while the Frenchman was equally convinced that the sale of wives at Smithfield was one of our national institutions. This fruitful source of international misunderstanding has become less dangerous since the facilities of foreign travel have been increased. But in the relations of Europe with alien and independent civilizations, such as that of China, we still see brutal arrogance and vulgar ignorance producing their natural results.

Another cause of perverted patriotism is the inborn pugnacity of the *bête humaine*. Our species is the most cruel and destructive of all that inhabit this planet. If the lower animals, as we call them, were able to formulate a religion, they might differ greatly as to the shape of the beneficent Creator, but they would nearly all agree that

the devil must be very like a big white man. Mr. McDougall¹ has lately raised the question whether civilized man is less pugnacious than the savage; and he answers it in the negative. The Europeans, he thinks, are among the most combative of the human race. We are not allowed to knock each other on the head during peace; but our civilization is based on cut-throat competition; our favourite games are mimic battles, which I suppose effect for us a "purgation of the emotions" similar to that which Aristotle attributed to witnessing the performance of a tragedy: and, when the fit seizes us, we are ready to engage in wars which cannot fail to be disastrous to both combatants. Mr. McDougall does not regret this disposition, irrational though it is. He thinks that it tends to the survival of the fittest, and that, if we substitute emulation for pugnacity, which on other grounds might seem an unmixed advantage, we shall have to call in the science of eugenics to save us from becoming as sheeplike as the Chinese. There is, however, another side to this question, as we shall see presently.

Another instinct which has supplied fuel to patriotism of the baser sort is that of acquisitiveness. This tendency, without which even the most rudimentary civilization would be impossible, began when the female of the species, instead of carrying her baby on her back and following the male to his hunting-grounds, made some sort of a lair for herself and her family, where primitive implements and stores of food could be kept. There are still tribes in Brazil which have not reached this first step towards humanization. But the instinct of hoarding, like all other instincts, tends to become hypertrophied and perverted; and with the institution of private property comes another institution—that of plunder and brigandage. In private life, no motive of action is at present so powerful and so persistent as acquisitiveness, which, unlike most other desires, knows no satiety. The average man is rich enough when he has a little more than he has got, and not till then. The acquisition and possession of land satisfies this desire in a high degree, since land is a visible

¹ In his *Introduction to Social Psychology*.

and indestructible form of property. Consequently, as soon as the instincts of the individual are transferred to the group, territorial aggrandizement becomes a main pre-occupation of the State. This desire was the chief cause of wars, while kings and nobles regarded the territories over which they ruled as their private estates. Wherever despotic or feudal conditions survive, such ideas are likely still to be found, and to cause dangers to other states. The greatest ambition of a modern emperor is still to be commemorated as a "Mehrer des Reichs."

Capitalism, by separating the idea of property from any necessary connection with landed estate, and democracy, by denying the whole theory on which dynastic wars of conquest are based, have both contributed to check this, perhaps the worst kind of war. It would, however, be a great error to suppose that the instinct of acquisitiveness, in its old and barbarous form, has lost its hold upon even the most civilized nations. When an old-fashioned brigand appears, and puts himself at the head of his nation, he becomes at once a popular hero. By any rational standard of morality, few greater scoundrels have lived than Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. But they are still names to conjure with. Both were men of singularly lucid intellect and entirely medieval ambitions. Their great achievement was to show how under modern conditions aggressive war may be carried on without much loss (except in human life) to the aggressor. They tore up all the conventions which regulated the conduct of warfare, and reduced it to sheer brigandage and terrorism. And now, after a hundred years, we see these methods deliberately revived by the greatest military power in the world and applied with the same ruthlessness and with an added pedantry which makes them more inhuman. The perpetrators of the crime calculated quite correctly that they need fear no reluctance on the part of the nation, no qualms of conscience, no compassionate shrinking, no remorse. It must, indeed, be a bad cause that cannot count on the support of the large majority of the people at the *beginning* of a war. Pugnacity, greed, mere excitement, the contagion of a crowd, will fill the streets of almost any capital

with a shouting and jubilant mob on the day after a war has been declared.

And yet the motives which we have enumerated are plainly atavistic and pathological. They belong to a mental condition which would conduct an individual to the prison or the gallows. We do not argue seriously whether the career of the highwayman or burglar is legitimate and desirable; and it is impossible to maintain that what is disgraceful for the individual is creditable for the State. And apart from the consideration that predatory patriotism deforms its own idol and makes it hateful in the eyes of the world, subsequent history has fully confirmed the moral instinct of the ancient Greeks, that national insolence or injustice (*ὕβρις*) brings its own severe punishment. The imaginary dialogue which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian and Melian envoys, and the debate in the Athenian Assembly about the punishment of revolted Mitylene, are intended to prepare the reader for the tragic fate of the Sicilian expedition. The same writer describes the break-up of all social morality during the civil war in words which seem to herald the destruction not only of Athens but of Greek freedom. Machiavelli's *Prince* shows how history can repeat itself, reiterating its lesson that a nation which gives itself to immoral aggrandizement is far on the road to disintegration. Seneca's rebuke to his slave-holding countrymen, "Can you complain that you have been robbed of the liberty which you have yourselves abolished in your own homes?" applies equally to nations which have enslaved or exploited the inhabitants of subject lands. If the Roman Empire had a long and glorious life, it was because its methods were liberal, by the standard of ancient times. In so far as Rome abused her power, she suffered the doom of all tyrants.

The illusions of imperialism have been made clearer than ever by the course of modern history. Attempts to destroy a nationality by overthrowing its government, proscribing its language, and maltreating its citizens, are never successful. The experiment has been tried with great thoroughness in Poland; and the Poles are now

more of a nation than they were under the oppressive feudal system which existed before the partitions. Our own empire would be a ludicrous failure if it were any part of our ambition to Anglieize other races. The only English parts of the empire were waste lands which we have peopled with our own emigrants. We hauled down the French flag in Canada, with the result that Eastern Canada is now the only flourishing French colony, and the only part of the world where the French race increases rapidly. We have helped the Dutch to multiply with almost equal rapidity in South Africa. We have added several millions to the native population of Egypt, and over a hundred millions to the population of India. Similarly, the Americans have made Cuba for the first time a really Spanish island, by driving out its incompetent Spanish governors and so attracting immigrants from Spain. On the whole, in imperialism nothing fails like success. "If the conqueror oppresses his subjects, they will become fanatical patriots, and sooner or later have their revenge; if he treats them well, and "governs them for their good," they will multiply faster than their rulers, till they claim their independence. The Englishman now says, "I am quite content to have it so"; but that is not the old imperialism.

The notion that frequent war is a healthy tonic for a nation is scarcely tenable. Its dysgenic effect, by eliminating the strongest and healthiest of the population, while leaving the weaklings at home to be the fathers of the next generation, is no new discovery. It has been supported by a succession of men, such as Tenon, Dufau, Foissac, de Lapouge, and Richey in France; Tiedemann and Seeck in Germany; Guerrini in Italy; Kellogg and Starr Jordan in America. The case is indeed overwhelming. The lives destroyed in war are nearly all males, thus disturbing the sex equilibrium of the population; they are in the prime of life, at the age of greatest fecundity; and they are picked from a list out of which from 20 to 30 per cent. have been rejected for physical unfitness. It seems to be proved that the children born in France during the Napoleonic wars were poor and undersized—30 milli-

metres below the normal height. War combined with religious celibacy to ruin Spain. "Castile makes men and wastes them," said a Spanish writer. "This sublime and terrible phrase sums up the whole of Spanish history." Schiller was right; "Immer der Krieg verschlingt die besten." We in England have suffered from this drain in the past; we shall suffer much more in the next generation.

"We have fed our sea for a thousand years,
And she calls us, still unfed,
Though there's never a wave of all her waves
But marks our English dead.

"We have strawed our best to the weed's unrest,
To the shark and the sheering gull,
If blood be the price of admiralty,
Lord God, we ha' paid in full."

Aggressive patriotism is thus condemned by common sense and the verdict of history no less than by morality. We are entitled to say to the militarists what Socrates said to Polus :

"This doctrine of yours has now been examined and found wanting. And this doctrine alone has stood the test—that we ought to be more afraid of doing than of suffering wrong; and that the prime business of every man [and nation] is not to seem good, but to be good, in all private and public dealings."

If the nations would render something more than lip-service to this principle, the abolition of war would be within sight; for, as Ruskin says, echoing the judgment of the Epistle of St. James, "The first reason for all wars, and for the necessity of national defences, is that the majority of persons, high and low, in all European countries, are thieves." But it must be remembered that, in spite of the proverb, it takes in reality only one to make a quarrel. It is useless for the sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism, while the wolf remains of a different opinion.

Our own conversion to pacificism, though sincere, is

somewhat recent. Our literature does not reflect it. Bacon is frankly militarist :

" Above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most, that a nation do profess arms, as their principal honour, study, and occupation. For the things which we formerly have spoken of are but habilitations towards arms; and what is habilitation without intention and act? . . . It is so plain that a man profiteth in that he most intendeth that it needeth not to be stood upon. It is enough to point at it; that no nation, which doth not directly profess arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths."

A state, therefore, " ought to have those laws or customs, which may reach forth unto them just occasions of war." Shakespeare's *Henry V* has been not unreasonably recommended by the Germans as " good war-reading." It would be easy to compile a *catena* of belliose maxims from our literature, reaching down to the end of the nineteenth century. The change is perhaps due less to progress in morality than to that political good sense which has again and again steered our ship through dangerous rocks. But there has been some real advance, in all civilized countries. We do not find that men talked about the " bankruptcy of Christianity " during the Napoleonic campaigns. Even the Germans think it necessary to tell each other that it was Belgium who began this war.

But, though pugnacity and acquisitiveness have been the real foundation of much miscalled patriotism, better motives are generally mingled with these primitive instincts. It is the subtle blend of noble and ignoble sentiment which makes patriotism such a difficult problem for the moralist. The patriot nearly always believes, or thinks he believes, that he desires the greatness of his country because his country stands for something intrinsically great and valuable. Where this conviction is absent we cannot speak of patriotism, but only of the cohesion of a wolf-pack. The Greeks, who at last perished because they could not combine, had nevertheless a consciousness that they were the trustees of civilization against barbarism; and in their day of triumph over the Persians they were filled, for a time, with an almost Jewish awe in

presence of the righteous judgment of God. The *Persæ* of Æschylus is one of the noblest of patriotic poems. The Romans, a harder and coarser race, had their ideal of *virtus* and *gravitas*, which included simplicity of life, dignity and self-restraint, honesty and industry, and devotion to the State. They rightly felt that these qualities constituted a vocation to empire. There was much harshness and injustice in Roman imperialism; but what nobler epitaph could even the British empire desire than the tribute of Claudian, when the weary Titan was at last stricken and dying :

“ Hæc est, in gremium victos quæ sola recepit,
humanumquo genus communi nomine fovit
matris non dominæ ritu, civesque vocavit
quos domuit, nexuque pio longinquæ revinxit ? ”

Jewish patriotism was of a different kind. A federation of fierce Bedouin tribes, encamped amid hostile populations, and set in the cockpit of rival empires against which it was impossible to stand, the Israelites were hammered by misfortune into the most indestructible of all organisms, a theocracy. Their religion was to them what, in a minor degree, Roman Catholicism has been to Ireland and Poland, a consecration of patriotic faith and hope. Westphal says the Jews failed because they hated foreigners more than they loved God. They have had good reason to hate foreigners. But undoubtedly the effect of their hatred has been that the great gifts which their nation had to give to humanity have come through other hands, and so have evoked no gratitude. In the first century of our era they were called to an almost superhuman abnegation of their inveterate nationalism, and they could not rise to it. As almost every other nation would have done, they chose the lower patriotism instead of the higher; and it was against their will that the religion of civilized humanity grew out of Hebrew soil. But they gained this by their choice, tragic though it was, that they have stood by the graves of all the empires that oppressed them, and have preserved their racial integrity and traditions in the most adverse circumstances. The history of the Jews

also shows that oppression and persecution are far more efficacious in binding a nation together than community of interest and national prosperity. Increase of wealth divides rather than unites a people; but suffering shared in common binds it together with hoops of steel.

The Jews were the only race whose spiritual independence was not crushed by the Roman steam-roller. It would be unfair to say that Rome destroyed nations; for her subjects in the West were barbarous tribes, and in the East she displaced monarchies no less alien to their subjects than her own rule. But she prevented the growth of nationalities, as it is to be feared we have done in India; and the absence of sturdy independence in the countries round the Mediterranean, especially in the Greek-speaking provinces, made the final downfall inevitable. The lesson has its warning for modern theorists who wish to obliterate the sentiment of nationality, the revival of which, after a long eclipse, has been one of the achievements of modern civilization. For it was not till long after the destruction of the Western Roman Empire that nationality began to assume its present importance in Europe.

The transition from medieval to modern history is most strongly marked by the emergence of this principle, with all that it involves. At the end of the Middle Ages Europe was at last compelled to admit that the grand idea of an universal state and an universal church had definitely broken down. Hitherto it had been assumed that behind all national disputes lay a *ius gentium* by which all were bound, and that behind all religious questions lay the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, from which there was no appeal. The modern period, which certainly does not represent the last word of civilization, has witnessed the abandonment of these ideas. The change took place gradually. France became a nation when the English raids ceased in the middle of the fifteenth century. Spain achieved unity a generation later by the union of Castile and Aragon and the expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula. Holland found herself in the heroic struggle against Spain in the sixteenth century.

But the practice of conducting wars by hiring foreign mercenaries, a sure sign that the nationalist spirit is weak, continued till much later. And the dynastic principle, which is the very negation of nationalism, actually culminated in the eighteenth century; and this is the true explanation of the feeble resistance which Europe offered to the French revolutionary armies, until Napoleon stirred up the dormant spirit of nationalism in the peoples whom he plundered. "In the old European system," says Lord Acton, "the rights of nationalities were neither recognized by governments nor asserted by the people. The interests of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers; and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires." Marriage or conquest might unite the most diverse nations under one sovereign, such as Charles V.

While such ideas prevailed, the suppression of a nation did not seem hateful; the partition of Poland evoked few protests at the time, though perhaps few acts of injustice have recoiled with greater force on the heads of their perpetrators than this is likely to do. Poles have been and are among the bitterest enemies of autocracy, and the strongest advocates of republicanism and racialism, in all parts of the world. The French Revolution opened a new era for nationalism, both directly and indirectly. The deposition of the Bourbons was a national act which might be a precedent for other oppressed peoples. And when the Revolution itself began to trample on the rights of other nations, an uprising took place, first in Spain and then in Prussia, which proved too strong for the tyrant. The apostasy of France from her own ideals of liberty proved the futility of mere doctrines, like those of Rousseau, and compelled the peoples to arm themselves and win their freedom by the sword. The national militarism of Prussia was the direct consequence of her humiliation at Jena and Auerstädt, and of the harsh terms imposed upon her at Tilsit. It is true that the Congress of Vienna attempted to revive the old dynastic system. But for the steady opposition of England, the clique of despots might have reimposed the old yoke upon their subjects.

The settlement of 1815 also left the entire centre of Europe in a state of chaos and it was only by slow degrees that Italy and Germany attained national unity. Poland, the Austrian Empire, and the Balkan States still remain in a condition to trouble the peace of the world. In Austria-Hungary the clash of the dynastic and the nationalist ideas is strident; and every citizen of that empire has to choose between a wider and a narrower allegiance.

Europeans are, in fact, far from having made up their minds as to what is the organic whole towards which patriotic sentiment ought to be directed. Socialism agrees with despotism in saying, "It is the political aggregate, the State," however much they may differ as to how the State should be administered. For this reason militarism and State-Socialism might at any time come to terms. They are at one in exaggerating the "organic" unity of a political or geographical *enclave*; and they are at one in depreciating the value of individual liberty. Loyalty to "the State" instead of to "king and country" is not an easy or a natural emotion. The State is a bloodless abstraction, which as a rule only materializes as a drill-sergeant or a tax-collector. Enthusiasm for it, and not only for what can be got out of it, does not extend much beyond the Fabian Society. Caesarism has the great advantage of a visible head, as well as of its appeal to very old and strong thought-habits; and accordingly, in any national crisis, loyalty to the War-lord is likely to show unexpected strength, and doctrinaire socialism unexpected weakness.

But devotion to the head of the State in his representative capacity is a different thing from the old feudal loyalty. It is far more impersonal; the ruler, whether an individual or a council, is revered as a non-human and non-moral embodiment of the national power, a sort of Platonic idea of coercive authority. This kind of loyalty may very easily be carried too far. In reality, we are members of a great many "social organisms," each of which has indefeasible claims upon us. Our family, our circle of acquaintance, our business or profession, our church, our country, the comity of civilized nations,

humanity at large, are all social organisms; and some of the chief problems of ethics are concerned with the adjustment of their conflicting claims. To make any one of these absolute is destructive of morality. But militarism and socialism deliberately make the State absolute. In internal affairs this may lead to the ruthless oppression of individuals or whole classes; in external relations it produces wars waged with "methods of barbarism." The whole idea of the State as an organism, which has been emphasized by social reformers as a theoretical refutation of selfish individualism, rests on the abuse of a metaphor. The bond between the dwellers in the same political area is far less close than that between the organs of a living body. Every man has a life of his own, and some purely personal rights; he has, moreover, moral links with other human associations, outside his own country, and important moral duties towards them. No one who reflects on the solidarity of interests among capitalists, among hand-workers, or, in a different way, among scholars and artists, all over the world, can fail to see that the apotheosis of the State, whether in the interest of war or of revolution, is an anachronism and an absurdity.

A very different basis for patriotic sentiment is furnished by the scientific or pseudo-scientific theories about race, which have become very popular in our time. When the history of ideas in the twentieth century comes to be written, it is certain that among the causes of this great war will be named the belief of the Germans in the superiority of their own race, based on certain historical and ethnological theories which have acted like a heady wine in stimulating the spirit of aggression among them. The theory, stated briefly, is that the shores of the Baltic are the home of the finest human type that has yet existed, a type distinguished by blond hair, great physical strength, unequalled mental vigour and ability, superior morality, and an innate aptitude for governing and improving inferior races. Unfortunately for the world, this noble stock cannot flourish for very long in climates unlike its own; but from the earliest historical times it has "swarmed" periodically, subjugating the feebler peoples of the south, and elevating

them for a time above the level which they were naturally fitted to reach. Wherever we find marked energy and nobleness of character, we may suspect Aryan blood; and history will usually support our surmise. Among the great men who were certainly or probably Germans were Agamemnon, Julius Cæsar, the Founder of Christianity, Dante, and Shakespeare. The blond Nordic giant is fulfilling his mission by conquering and imposing his culture upon other races. They ought to be grateful to him for the service, especially as it has a sacrificial aspect, the lower types having, at least in their own climates, greater power of survival.

This fantastic theory has been defended in a large number of German books, of which the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, by the renegade Englishman Houston Chamberlain, is the most widely known. The objections to it are numerous. It is notorious that until the invention of gunpowder the settled and civilized peoples of Europe were in frequent danger from bands of hardier mountaineers, forest-dwellers, or pastoral nomads, who generally came from the north. But the formidable fighting powers of these marauders were no proof of intrinsic superiority. In fact, the most successful of these conquerors, if success is measured by the amount of territory overrun and subdued, were not the "great blond beasts" of Nietzsche, but yellow monsters with black hair, the Huns and Tartars.¹ The causes of Tartar ascendancy had not the remotest connection with any moral or intellectual qualities which we can be expected to admire. Nor can the Nordic race, well endowed by nature as it undoubtedly is, prove such a superiority as this theory claims for it. Some of the largest brains yet measured have been those of Japanese; and the Jews have probably a higher average of ability than the Teutons. Again, the Germans are not descended from a pure Nordic stock. The Northern type can be best studied in Scandinavia, where the people share with the Irish the distinction of being the handsomest

¹ The reasons of their irresistible strength have been explained in a most brilliant manner by Dr. Peisker in the first volume of the *Cambridge Medieval History*.

race in the world. The German is a mixture of various anatomical types, including, in some parts, distinct traces of Mongolian blood, which indicate that the raiding Huns meddled, according to their custom, with the German women, and bequeathed to a section of the nation the Turanian cheek-bones, as well as certain moral characteristics. Lastly, the German race has never shown much aptitude for governing and assimilating other peoples. The French, by virtue of their greater sympathy, are far more successful.

The French have their own form of this pseudo-science in their doctrine of the persistence of national characteristics. Each nation may be summed up in a formula: England, for example, is "the country of will." A few instances may, no doubt, be quoted in support of this theory. Julius Cæsar said: "*Duas res plerasque Gallia industriosissime prosequitur, rem militarem et argute loqui*"; and these are still the characteristics of our gallant allies. And Madamo de Staël may be thought to have hit off the German character very cleverly about the time when Bismarck first saw the light. "The Germans are vigorously submissive. They employ philosophical reasonings to explain what is the least philosophic thing in the world, respect for force and the fear which transforms that respect into admiration." But the fact remains that the characters of nations frequently change, or rather that what we call national character is usually only the policy of the governing class, forced upon it by circumstances, or the manner of living which climate, geographical position, and other external causes have made necessary for the inhabitants of a country.

To found patriotism on homogeneity of race is no wiser than to bound it by frontier lines. As the Abbé Noël has lately written about his own country, Belgium, "the race is not the nation. The nation is not a physiological fact; it is a moral fact. What constitutes a nation is the community of sentiments and ideals which results from a common history and education. The variations of the cephalic index are here of no great importance. The essential factor of the national consciousness resides in a

certain common mode of conceiving the conditions of the social life."

Belgium, the Abbé maintains, has found this national consciousness amid her sufferings; there are no longer any distinctions between French-speaking Belgians and Walloons or Flemings. This is in truth the real base of patriotism. It is the basis of our own love for our country. What Britain stands for is what Britain is. We have long known in our hearts what Britain stands for; but we have now been driven to search our thoughts and make our ideals explicit to ourselves and others. The Englishman has become a philosopher *malgré lui*. "Whatever the world thinks," writes Bishop Berkeley, "he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human soul, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthenware, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman." These words, which were quoted by Mr. Arthur Balfour a few years ago, may seem to make a large demand on the average citizen; but in our quiet way we have all been meditating on these things since last August, and we know pretty well what our *summum bonum* is for our country. We believe in chivalry and fair play and kindness—these things first and foremost; and we believe, if not exactly in democracy, yet in a government under which a man may think and speak the thing he wills. We do not believe in war, and we do not believe in bullying. We do not flatter ourselves that we are the supermen; but we are convinced that the ideas which we stand for, and which we have on the whole tried to carry out, are essential to the peaceful progress and happiness of humanity; and for these ideas we have drawn the sword. The great words of Abraham Lincoln have been on the lips of many and in the hearts of all since the beginning of the great contest: "With malice towards none; with charity for all: with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right—let us strive on to finish the work we are in."

Patriotism thus spiritualized and moralized is the true patriotism. When the emotion is once set in its right relations to the whole of human life and to all that makes

human life worth living, it cannot become an immoral obsession. It is certain to become an immoral obsession if it is isolated and made absolute. We have seen the appalling perversion—the methodical diabolism—which this obsession has produced in Germany. It has startled us because we thought that the civilized world had got beyond such insanity; but it is of course no new thing. Machiavelli said, “I prefer my country to the salvation of my soul”—a sentiment which sounds noble but is not; it has only a superficial resemblance to St. Paul’s willingness to be “accursed” for the sake of his countrymen. Devil-worship remains what it was, even when the idol is draped in the national flag. This obsession may be in part a survival from savage conditions, when all was at stake in every feud; but chiefly it is an example of the idealizing and universalizing power of the imagination, which turns every unchecked passion into a monomania. The only remedy is, as Lowell’s Hosea Biglow reminds us, to bear in mind that “our true country is that ideal realm which we represent to ourselves under the names of religion, duty, and the like. Our terrestrial organizations are but far-off approaches to so fair a model; and all they are verily traitors who resist not any attempt to divert them from this their original intendment. Our true country is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and west, by Justice, and when she oversteps that invisible boundary-line by so much as a hair’s breadth, she ceases to be our mother, and chooses rather to be looked upon *quasi noverca*.” So Socrates said that the wise man will be a citizen of his true city, of which the type is laid up in heaven, and only conditionally of his earthly country.

The obsession of patriotism is not the only evil which we have to consider. We may err by defect as well as by excess. Herbert Spencer speaks of an “anti-patriotic bias”; and it can hardly be disputed that many English men who pride themselves on their lofty morality are suffering from this mental twist. The malady seems to belong to the Anglo-Saxon constitution, for it is rarely encountered in other countries, while we had a noisy pro-Napoleonic faction a hundred years ago, and the Americans

had their "Copperheads" in the Northern States during the civil war. In our own day, every enemy of England, from the mad Mullah to the mad Kaiser, has had his advocates at home; and the champions of Boer and Boxer, of Afridi and Afrikander, of the Mahdi and the Matabele, have been usually the same persons. The English, it would appear, differ from other misguided rascals in never being right even by accident. But the idiosyncrasy of a few persons is far less important than the comparative insensibility of whole classes to the patriotic appeal, except when war is actually raging. This is not specially characteristic of our own country. The German Emperor has complained of his Social Democrats as "people without a fatherland"; and the cry "*À bas la patrie*" has been heard in France.

It is usual to explain this attitude by the fact that the manual workers "have no stake in the country," and might not find their condition altered for the worse by subjection to a foreign power. A few of our working-men have given colour to this charge by exclaiming petulantly that they could not be worse off under the Germans; but in this they have done themselves and their class less than justice. The anti-militarism and cosmopolitanism of the masses in every country is a profoundly interesting fact, a problem which demands no superficial investigation. It is one result of that emancipation from traditional ideas, which makes the most important difference between the upper and middle classes on the one side and the lower on the other. We lament that the working-man takes but little interest in Christianity, and rack our brains to discover what we have done to discredit our religion in his eyes. The truth is that Christianity, as a dogmatic and ecclesiastical system, is unintelligible without a very considerable knowledge of the conditions under which it took shape. But what are the ancient Hebrews, and the Greeks and Romans, to the working-man? He is simply cut off from the means of reading intelligently any book of the Bible, or of understanding how the institution called the Catholic Church, and its offshoots, came to exist. As our staple education

becomes more "modern" and less literary, the custodians of organized religion will find their difficulties increasing. But the same is true about patriotism. Love of country means pride in the past and ambition for the future. Those who live only in the present are incapable of it. But our working-man knows next to nothing about the past history of England; he has scarcely heard of our great men, and has read few of our great books. It is not surprising that the appeal to patriotism leaves him cold. This is an evil that has its proper remedy. There is no reason why a sane and elevated love of country should not be stimulated by appropriate teaching in our schools. In America this is done—rather hysterically; and in Germany—rather brutally. The Jews have always made their national history a large part of their education, and even of their religion. Nothing has helped them more to retain their self-consciousness as a nation. Ignorance of the past and indifference to the future usually go together. Those who most value our historical heritage will be most desirous to transmit it unimpaired.

But the absence of traditional ideas is by no means an unmixed evil. The working-man sees more clearly than the majority of educated persons the absurdity of international hatred and jealousy. He is conscious of greater solidarity with his own class in other European countries than with the wealthier class in his own; and as he approaches the whole question without prejudice, he cannot fail to realize how large a part of the product of labour is diverted from useful purposes by modern militarism. International rivalry is in his eyes one of the most serious obstacles to the abolition of want and misery. Tolstoy hardly exaggerates when he says: "Patriotism to the peoples represents only a frightful future; the fraternity of nations seems an ideal more and more accessible to humanity, and one which humanity desires." Military glory has very little attraction for the working-man. His humanitarian instincts appear to be actually stronger than those of the sheltered classes. To take life in any circumstances seems to him a shocking thing; and the harsh procedure of martial law and military custom is abhorrent

to him. He sees no advantage and no credit in territorial aggrandizement, which he suspects to be prompted mainly by the desire to make money unjustly. He is therefore a convinced pacifist, though his doctrine of human brotherhood breaks down ignominiously when he finds his economic position threatened by the competition of cheap foreign labour. If an armed struggle ever takes place between the nations of Europe (or their colonies) and the yellow races, it will be a working-man's war. But on the whole, the best hope of getting rid of militarism may lie in the growing power of the working class. The poor, being intensely gregarious and very susceptible to all collective emotions, are still liable to fits of warlike excitement. But their real minds are at present set against an aggressive foreign policy, without being shut against the appeals of a higher patriotism.

And yet the irritation which is felt against preachers of the brotherhood of man is not without justification. Some persons who condemn patriotism are simply lacking in public spirit, or their loyalty is monopolized by some fad or "cause," which is a poor substitute for love of country. The man who has no prejudices in favour of his own family and his own country is generally an unamiable creature. So we need not condemn Molière for saying, "*L'ami du genre humain n'est pas du tout mon fait*," nor Brunetière for declaring that "*Ni la nature ni l'histoire n'ont en effet voulu que les hommes fussent tous frères*." But French Neo-catholicism, a bourgeois movement directed against all the "ideas of 1789," seems to have adopted the most ferocious kind of chauvinism. M. Paul Bourget wrote the other day in the *Écho de Paris*, "This war must be the first of many, since we cannot exterminate sixty-five million Germans in a single campaign!" The women and children too! This is not the way to revive the religion of Christ in France.

The practical question for the future is whether there is any prospect of returning, under more favourable auspices, to the unrealized ideal of the Middle Ages—an agreement among the nations of Europe to live amicably under one system of international law and right, binding upon

all, and with the consciousness of an intellectual and spiritual unity deeper than political divisions. "The nations are the citizens of humanity," said Mazzini; and so they ought to be. Some of the omens are favourable. Militarism has dug its own grave. The great powers increased their armaments till the burden became insupportable, and have now rushed into bankruptcy in the hope of shaking it off. In prehistoric times the lords of creation were certain gigantic lizards, protected by massive armour-plates which could only be carried by a creature thirty to sixty feet long. Then they died, when neither earth, air, nor water could support them any longer. Such must be the end of the European nations, unless they learn wisdom. The lesson will be brought home to them by Transatlantic competition. The United States of America had already, before this war, an initial advantage over the disunited states of Europe, amounting to at least 10 per cent. on every contract; after the war this advantage will be doubled. It remains to be seen whether the next generation will honour the debts which we are piling up. Disraeli used to complain of what he called "Dutch finance," which consists in "mortgaging the industry of the future to protect property in the present." Pitt paid for the great war of a hundred years ago in this manner; after a century we are still groaning under the burden of his loans. We may hear more of the iniquity of "Dutch finance" when the democracies of the next generation have a chance of repudiating obligations which, as they will say, they did not contract. However that may be, international rivalry is plainly very bad business; and there are great possibilities in the Hague Tribunal, if, and only if, the signatories to the conference bind themselves to use force against a recalcitrant member. The conduct of Germany in this war has shown that public opinion is powerless to restrain a nation which feels strong enough to defy it.

Another cause which may give patriots leisure to turn their thoughts away from war's alarms is that the "swarming" period of the European races is coming to an end. The unparalleled increase of population in the first three-

quarters of the nineteenth century has been followed by a progressive decrease in the birth-rate, which will begin to tell upon social conditions when the reduction in the death-rate, which has hitherto kept pace with it, shall have reached its natural limit. Europe with a stationary population will be in a much happier condition; and problems of social reform can then be tackled with some hope of success. Honourable emulation in the arts of life may then take the place of desperate competition and antagonism. Human lives will begin to have a positive value, and we may even think it fair to honour our saviours more than our destroyers. The effects of past follies will then soon be effaced; for nations recover much more quickly from wars than from internal disorders. External injuries are rapidly cured; but "those wounds heal ill that men do give themselves." The greatest obstacle to progress is not man's inherited pugnacity, but his incorrigible tendency to parasitism. The true patriot will keep his eye fixed on this, and will dread as the State's worst enemies those citizens who at the top and bottom of the social scale have no other ambition than to hang on and suck the life-blood of the nation. Great things may be hoped from the new science of eugenics, when it has passed out of its tentative and experimental stage.

In the distant future we may reasonably hope that patriotism will be a sentiment like the loyalty which binds a man to his public school and university, an affection purged of all rancour and jealousy, a stimulus to all honourable conduct and noble effort, a part of the poetry of life. It is so already to many of us, and has been so to the noblest Englishmen since we have had a literature. If Henry V's speech at Agincourt is the splendid gasconade of a royal freebooter, there is no false ring in the scene where John of Gaunt takes leave of his banished son; nor in Sir Walter Scott's "Breathes there a man with soul so dead," etc. "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." We cannot quite manage to substitute London for Zion in singing psalms, though there are some places in England—Eton, Winchester, Oxford, Cambridge—which do evoke these feelings.

PATRIOTISM

These emotions of loyalty and devotion are by no means to be checked or despised. They have an infinite potency for good. In spiritual things there is no conflict between intensity and expansion. The deepest sympathy is, potentially, also the widest. He who loves not his home and country which he has seen, how shall he love humanity in general which he has not seen? There are, after all, few emotions of which one has less reason to be ashamed than the little lump in the throat which the Englishman feels when he first catches sight of the white cliffs of Dover.

THE GOD STATE

THE two main features of modern history are the development of nationalities and the growth of individual freedom. These two movements began rather suddenly and grew very rapidly; though Trotschky says truly that it was only the great struggles for freedom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which brought the Middle Ages definitely to an end. The idea of an European or Christian commonwealth, supernational and resting on ethical or religious sanctions, had faded away, and with it faded the ideal which the world is trying to revive in the League of Nations. It was succeeded by an era of fierce national competition, restrained, so far as it was restrained, by custom and the survival of vague traditions of international law, rather than by any clearly conceived principle; and these restraints, instead of growing stronger, almost disappeared whenever any State felt strong enough to disregard them.

The intestine struggles of Italy during the Renaissance demoralized the nation, and in a people of acute and logical intellect produced the same kind of cynicism which Thucydides notes as the result of the Peloponnesian War. This spirit lives for us in the writings of Machiavelli, who began to write the books which have made him famous when he was living in retirement near San Casciano, in the year 1513. In part, but not altogether, he deserves the obloquy which has clung to his name. It is true that he proclaimed that politics, as actually carried on, have nothing to do with ethics; it is not true that he attached no value to morality; but modern readers have neglected the ethical parts of his books. A few quotations will show what he really taught and thought. "Men never behave well unless they are obliged; whenever they are free to do as they like, everything is filled with confusion and disorder. A lawgiver must necessarily assume that all men are bad,

and that they will follow the wickedness of their hearts whenever they have the opportunity to do so" This resembles the Protestant doctrine of total depravity, it is overcoloured and rather too cynical. His theory of imitation is like that of the Frenchman Tarde "Men almost always walk in the paths that others have chosen and in their actions proceed by imitation, yet they cannot attain to the excellence which they imitate." So Anatole France says, "*Pecus* is imitative, and would appear more so if he did not deform what he imitates. These deformations produce what is called progress." He sees clearly that all institutions carry within them the seeds of their own dissolution. "In all things there is latent some peculiar evil which gives rise to fresh changes. . . . It has been, is, and always will be true that evil succeeds good and good evil, and the one is always the cause of the other. I am convinced that the world has always existed after the same manner, and the quantity of good and evil in it has been constant; but this good and evil keep shifting from country to country, as is seen by the records of ancient empires, but the world itself remained the same." Of forms of government and their changes he speaks like Plato and Aristotle. Monarchy passes into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, democracy into anarchy; and "if the founder of a State establishes any one of these governments, no remedy can prevent it from sliding off into its opposite. This is the circle within which all States are governed." Theoretically, a State might go on revolving in this way for ever; but the actual tendency is downward, because Nature has so fashioned men that they desire everything and cannot get much; so that they are always discontented and consumed either by ambition or by fear; and these passions are the ruin of States. They would fall to pieces sooner but for wars, which bind them together for a time. A strong monarchy, when the monarch respects the laws, gives a nation the best chance. Machiavelli adds this profound observation: "The safety of a republic or kingdom consists not in having a ruler who governs wisely while he lives, but in being subject to one who so organizes "that when he dies it may continue to maintain itself."

The tendency to decay can be prevented in one way only. "The observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the greatness of commonwealths; so also is the neglect of them the cause of ruin. For when the fear of God is wanting, a kingdom must either go to ruin or be supported by the fear of a prince to compensate for the best influences of religion." He adds, in words which might have been borrowed from Plotinus, "The belief that if you remain idle on your knees God will fight for you has ruined many kingdoms. Prayers are indeed necessary; but let no man be so foolish as to believe that if his house falls about his head, God will save him from being crushed." Religion and respect for law are necessary for the health of a community; failing these, a strong and enlightened despot may keep it together for a short time, but not for long. We have here a hard and sober estimate of the conditions of national welfare; its moderate pessimism is amply confirmed by history. To the question, What is right in politics? he gives an answer which would have contented our utilitarians. "I believe good to be that which conduces to the interests of the majority, and with which the majority are contented." I am afraid we must admit that he regarded religion mainly as a support of order and source of contentment. He did not think that the principles of Christianity are workable in practical politics, and in consequence accepted a contradiction between private and political ethics which has been generally accepted in modern Germany by moralists as well as politicians, to the great misfortune of the human race. The Gospel, he says, has made the world weak, and a prey to wicked men, since the majority, in order to get to Paradise, think more how to endure wrongs than how to punish them. Human affairs, on the other hand, are controlled by the law of self-preservation. A ruler finds himself in a world which he did not make and for which he is not responsible; he must do whatever is necessary to ensure the survival and prosperity of his country. Theoretically, he was in favour of a free constitution, of an influential Church, and of an united Italy: but in the desperate state of his country's fortunes he was willing to support a crafty despotism, a repudia-

tion of Christian ethics, and conflict within the confines of Italy. In the spirit of Bernhardt and many other Germans, he says: "Where the bare safety of the country is at stake, no consideration of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of honour or dishonour, can find a place. Every scruple must be set aside, and that plan followed which saves the country's life and preserves her liberty." With a horrible cynicism, he indicates the policy which the Bolsheviks are now following: "To establish a republic in a country where there are gentry, *you cannot succeed unless you kill them all.*" So, perhaps for the first time, was uttered the creed of the God-State which has dominated modern politics ever since, and which has now brought civilization to the brink of ruin. From that time to this, though not without brighter episodes, Christianity has been banished from international politics, and international law has had a precarious existence.

Before leaving Machiavelli, it is only fair to remember that this divorce between the secular and the spiritual power sounded the death-knell of one of the worst evils of the Middle Ages—religious persecution. Whether the idea of a Free Church in a Free State is really tenable and practicable is another question; but at any rate modern secularism has put an end to the Inquisition, even in Roman Catholic countries.

Machiavelli was a pioneer. Let us pass on to the next century, and—after a brief recognition of Grotius, whose *De Iure Belli et Pacis* (1625) was a noble attempt to formulate the principles of international law at a time when they were falling into desuetude—to our own country, where the Renaissance flowered late. Bacon's ideal is a strong military State, in which the people are "ever ready to spring to arms"; and "the opinion of some of the Schoolmen is not to be received, that war cannot be made but upon a precedent injury or provocation; for there is no question but a just fear of danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war." The State is supreme over the religion as well as the politics of its citizens, and Bacon acknowledges no obligation to the comity of civilized nations. He is a pure nationalist.

His international ethics differ in no way from the principles expounded before the war by German professors.

Hobbes, one of the most powerful and original of political thinkers, threw aside the divine right of kings, but proclaimed the divine right of States. The *Lēviathan* is as famous a book as *The Prince* of Machiavelli. The frontispiece shows a gigantic crowned figure, representing the State, with the motto "Non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei." He describes the natural man as torn by various passions and ambitions, without law or justice, and living a life that was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short." The war of all against all was only brought to an end by the establishment of a coercive State. This must be centred in a despotic sovereign, for a limited monarchy is a contradiction in terms. The ruler must be supreme also in spiritual matters, since sovereignty cannot be divided, and there is no room in any well-ordered State for any independent jurisdiction, such as that claimed by the Roman Church. The Papacy is only the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. But the government, though absolute, was not to be inquisitive or tyrannical. There should be no more laws than are absolutely necessary, just as nature does not make river banks higher than are needed to guide the course of the water. It is interesting to find that this ingenious supporter of absolutism was hated by the Royalists. Clarendon said: "I never read a book which contained so much sedition, treason, and impiety." The reason was that, though monarchy seemed to Hobbes the best form of government, what he really inculcated was that power, whether in the hands of a king or a parliament, must not be divided. This was quite different from the Royalist theory; and Hobbes poured scorn on the religious and romantic ideas which were then, as they are always, the great strength of Conservatism. He insisted quite plainly that the State can do no wrong, having no power above itself. Hobbes also believed in an "original compact," which was a favourite plea of the opponents of Divine Right, and perhaps their best argument, though historically baseless. Locke and Milton both uphold it.

It is plain that there is no necessary connection between the idea that a government ought to be all-powerful and that every "nation" has a natural right to independence. The God-State is one thing; the God-Nation is another. There are, in fact, two distinct controversies—that of the State against the individual, or against groups of individuals, which is part of the eternal conflict between Order and Liberty; and the conflict between nationalism and internationalism. The authority of the State was exalted in and after the Renaissance, partly in revolt against such international authority as the Papacy, and partly through growing consciousness of national unity. But nationalism is a much later development, in fact it belongs to the nineteenth century. It was not a very strong sentiment in the eighteenth century, when culture was more European and less national than it is now. Personally, I think it is more superficial than we usually suppose, and a vast amount of deliberate nonsense has been talked about it since 1914. It is impossible to define a nation except as a body of men who believe themselves to be one. Nationalism is different from racialism—the absurd and unscientific theory which the Germans exploited under the guidance of Houston Chamberlain—for the nations are all mixed in blood beyond the possibility of disentanglement. It has nothing to do with language, for the Scots speak two languages, the Belgians and Swiss three each, and the Americans at least a dozen. It has no essential connection with political allegiance; for the most violent nationalism is generally that of some ill-conditioned province which has persuaded itself that it is a fine thing to hate the rest of the political aggregate to which it belongs. But it is an extremely potent sentiment, strong enough to create grievances and antipathies—and sometimes even unities—out of nothing. Mazzini hypnotized the Italians by the word "Italia" and Italy is indubitably a nation, though it is obvious to the most casual observer that the North and South Italians are racially quite different. The Congress of Vienna, which in all respects compares very favourably with the Congress of Versailles, is commonly abused for disregarding this sentiment of nationality, which was by no means universally

felt. Lord Acton says bluntly, "The theory of nationalism is more absurd and more criminal than that of Socialism," a verdict which would have been more telling without the comparison, for Socialism is not necessarily absurd or criminal; it is only a machine which has hitherto refused to work, whereas nationalism works a great deal too well. The good old word "patriotism" is far more rational and intelligible.

The modern period has been marked by the successive attempts of nation-states, intoxicated by their own strength, to destroy their neighbours. We, as it happens, have always been one of the neighbours, though if we look at the world, and not at Europe, the matter appears rather different. The spirit of militant nationalism has never been shown so nakedly as, in the recent war, by Germany; for the earlier attempts to destroy the balance of power in Europe were inspired by more mixed ambitions. Spain wished to re-establish the mediæval theocracy; France, under Louis XIV, was governed partly by the dynastic and personal ambitions of its king; and the Revolutionary Wars began with the desire to disseminate certain ideas—they in part resembled the early wars of Islam. In fact, though patriotic pride played a great part in the support which the French gave to the designs of Napoleon, the spirit of nationalism was ranged against him, and he did more to kindle it than anyone else, not by fostering it, but by threatening it. The victory of the Allies a hundred years ago, like the victory of the Allies in the late war, was a victory for nationalism; though the spirit of nationalism, in its most aggressive form, seemed to be incarnated in the Germans. Napoleon's contribution to the evolution of the God-State lay in his repudiation of all international law and morality, and in the drastic thoroughness with which he brought all the intellectual and spiritual forces in France into subservience to his own policy. There is nothing original in Prussianism; it is carefully copied from Napoleon, its inventor. But Germany had more time to perfect the Napoleonic scheme, and carried it so much farther that Lord Acton was able (too flatteringly, perhaps) to call Prussianism "a new type of autocracy—the Government

the intellectual guide of the nation, the promoter of wealth, the teacher of knowledge, the guardian of morality, the mainspring of the ascending movement of man." He added prophetically that "it is the greatest danger that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race."

These lectures are concerned rather with ideas than with history; and it is with the theory rather than with the practice of the God-State that I wish to deal to-day. The genesis of the doctrine in Germany has been traced back to Fichte, in the famous lectures which he gave at Berlin after Prussia had been humbled to the dust by Napoleon. He said :

"The duty of the State is to care for the maintenance and increase of the population by encouraging marriage and the nurture of children, by health-institutes and the like; to take means for developing man's empire over nature by well-planned and continuous improvements in agriculture, industry, and trade, and by maintaining the necessary balance between these branches; in short, by all those operations which are included in the conception of national economy. In return, it is the right of the State to employ for its purposes the whole surplus of all the powers of its citizens without exception. The free and noble citizen offers his share willingly, as a sacrifice upon the altar of his fatherland; he who needs to be forced to part with it only shows that he was never worthy of the gift entrusted to him."

So far, we seem to have a sketch of a scientific State-socialism. But Fichte goes on: "It is the necessary tendency of every civilized State to expand in every direction." The weaker States struggle against this tendency, and have invented the doctrine of a balance of power. "But no State strives to maintain this balance except as a *pis aller*, and because it cannot compass its own aggrandizement or carry out its implicit plan for a universal monarchy. Every State defends the balance of power when it is attacked by another, and prepares in secret the means whereby it may, in its own time, become itself a disturber of the peace." The well-known advice,

"Threaten war that you may have peace," is equally valid in the converse, "Promise peace in order that you may begin war with an advantage in your favour." "Always, without exception, the most civilized State is the most aggressive." It is a pity that we in England are so convinced that professors do not count; for in Germany they do count, and really they have been very candid. *Civitas civilati lupus*—history is to remain for all time a dismal conjugation of the verb "to eat," in the active and passive.

The direct influence of Fichte has perhaps not been very great after his own generation, at any rate in Germany. But Hegel has certainly founded a school, which still has distinguished men as its prophets. The difference between the two men, as concerns our present subject, is that Fichte deified the German nation—he preached a fanatical patriotism; while Hegel deifies the State *qua* State. The criticism seems to be justified that he draws no distinction between the Ideal and the Actual, holding that the Absolute is realized in concrete experience, so that we cannot condemn things as they are by contrasting them with things as they ought to be. When he says, "the real world is as it ought to be," he is saying what Plato would agree with; but whereas Plato's conclusion is "Let us flee hence to our dear country," Hegel finds his ideal State not invisible and in heaven, but visible and on earth. His religious exaltation in speaking of the State is most extraordinary, and to most of us must appear grotesque. "The State is the divine idea as it exists on earth." "All the worth which the human being possesses, all the spiritual reality which he possesses, he possesses only through the State." "The State is the Spirit which stands in the world and realizes itself therein consciously." "The existence of the State is the movement of God in the world." "The State is the divine will as the present Spirit unfolding itself to the actual shape and organization of a world." "It is the absolute power on earth: it is its own end and object. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual." He even calls the State "this actual God," as the Romans called Augustus *præscens divus*. It is necessary to realize that these wild utterances are not the hyper-

boles of a rhapsodist, but the grave and deliberate opinions of a great philosopher. They throw a flood of light on modern Germany, and incidentally relieve Bismarck from the charge of having invented this type of political theory.

The worshippers of the God-State naturally deny to individual citizens any rights against the State. This view may be easily held without any metaphysical theories about the nature and limits of personality, and there is no reason why a philosophy which minimizes the value and reality of the individual should lead to State-worship. But in Hegel it is said that these two parts of his philosophy are made to help each other; and it is certain that some English disciples of his have made play with the quasi-mystical conception of a General Will, which had its birth, if I am not mistaken, in France, but which may be used to support the notion of the State as a super-person, in whom individuals participate Platonically. Sometimes the General Will is called the Real Will, as if it were that which in our heart of hearts we desire, though we may not always be aware of it. This, however, seems to introduce a contrast between the ideal and the actual which this philosophy on the whole ignores. The Real Will, or the General Will, is the mind of the deified State.

A whole series of difficulties at once occur to the mind. Is not the notion of a General Will a mere metaphor? There is no social sensorium, and we do not really feel for each other in any literal sense. However much I may sympathize with my child who has a toothache, my own teeth do not ache in consequence. When two men desire the same thing—the same woman, for example—their wills remain two, not one. And in politics the idea of a General Will seems to be nonsense, and only invented to prove to the minority that minorities have no right to exist. The nearest approach to a General Will is not presented by the State, even in war-time, when a common danger and enthusiasm sweep away many minor differences of opinion, but by small fanatical, ignorant, selfish groups—such as the political faddists who subordinate all other interests to their one craze, and constitute one of the dangers and difficulties of democratic government. And this suggests

another fatal objection to the theory. Why should the State be the unit? The metaphor of a social organism has been run to death, and certainly, if the State be an organism, it must be compared to the very humblest organisms known to biology. But in fact we all belong to a great many social organisms, each of which has its indefeasible rights over us, and we our rights in it. Some of these are smaller than the State, others are larger. The chief of these are the family; the body for which we work, whether it be a College or University, a commercial company, or a trade guild; the Church; the State; the comity of civilized nations; humanity at large; and (I hope) all living beings on the earth. There is nothing specially sacred about the State, which, so far as it is identified with the Government, may be the least respectable of all the social organisms to which we belong. It is true that some writers, like Dr. Bosanquet, include in "the State" "not merely the political fabric, but the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined, including the family, trade, the Church, the University." But in the first place "the State" in common usage does not mean the entire hierarchy of social life, and does mean the political fabric; and secondly, some of the chief problems of ethics arise from the conflicting claims of the various social organisms which are here merged or confused. The gravamen against the worshippers of the God-State is that they deny all independent authority to the other social organisms, some of which are more important to the welfare and happiness of the individual than the State itself. There is in fact no philosophical reason whatever why the political fabric should be chosen out for apotheosis. The choice is an accident due to the circumstances under which the philosophy arose. It is worth noticing that Karl Marx, starting from Hegelian principles, found his real-ideal commonwealth, not in the political aggregate, but in a general will to power of a social class dispersed throughout the world, and that the Bolsheviks, taking Marx as their prophet, have carried their worship of this new Moloch to a maniacal frenzy which even the German militarists never approached. The essence of the philosophy, and its great moral and

social danger, is not identification of the political aggregate with the Absolute Spirit incarnated in an institution, but the belief that such an incarnation exists somewhere, and that when found, it has a right to an unqualified devotion which overrides all other social obligations and all the principles of morality. The evil is that men should pay divine honours to any human institution, making its claims absolute and unchallengeable. In the period which the Great War perhaps brought to an end, it was natural to deify either the nation or the State. We are perhaps on the threshold of an epoch in which other associations, either wider than the nation, like the Catholic Church, or Labour, or narrower than the nation, like the groups which it is proposed to form into trade guilds, may claim and receive the same immoral and unquestioning devotion which, when given to the State, has brought such hideous calamities upon the world. If so, we shall find that the error is not less destructive in its new forms.

There is one more difficulty, which the worshippers of the State seem seldom to have faced. It would be too absurd to suppose that our own State is the only specimen of these superhuman and supermoral individualities. Even the ancient Hebrews in some sort recognized Chemosh and the other Canaanite gods. But if there are several of these mysterious demigods, who by hypothesis are wiser and more moral than human individuals, how is it that they have never evolved even the rudiments of a system by which they can live on tolerable terms with each other? To the unprejudiced observer, so far from displaying superior wisdom or morality, international relations seem to exhibit the most dismal failure of common sense and common decency to be found anywhere. On the whole, the larger the group, the worse it behaves. Of all aggregates, States are the most shameless in their conduct, when they act as States. To worship the State is to worship a demon who has not even the redeeming quality of being intelligent.

I have said that some serious ethical problems are raised by the conflicting claims of the various social organisms to which we belong. Sometimes the State bids us to do something of which our consciences disapprove. Let us take

an example which has been hotly discussed during the last few years, and in which the possibility of a conflict, such as that in the *Antigone* of Sophocles, between State-law and the older and more august laws of humanity, whether based on religion or not, has become very apparent. When the Great War broke out, the State called upon all able-bodied citizens to help in resisting the enemy. But a minority of citizens thought that the war was a mistake. None but the most perverse could argue that our cause was bad; but some held that the Christian maxims "Resist not the evil man," and "Overcome evil with good," were intended to be put into practice. Non-resistance, they said, is the Christian way of dealing with aggression, and it has yet to be proved that it is not more efficacious than the attempt to crush the aggressor by violence. Others, leaving on one side the religious and humanitarian objections to war, may have thought that bellicose patriotism is an anachronism which is out of relation with the actual facts of civilization in the twentieth century. European civilization, they might argue, is homogeneous and bound together by a hundred ties. Nations are becoming artificial groups; as nations they gain by each other's prosperity and lose by each other's misfortunes. The real cleavage in modern society is horizontal; it runs through all countries, and divides in each country the handworker from the bourgeoisie. This war, then, was a stupid reversion to passions which the world has outgrown, and to rivalries which are really obsolete; the forces of law and order have ruined themselves in a suicidal struggle, oblivious that their real enemies were those of their own household. A third group may have agreed with Mr. Norman Angell that war between great, wealthy, and well-matched Powers is suicidal folly—the worst kind of bad business; since in such a struggle the worst of all calamities is to lose, and the next worst to win. These are all, it seems to me, reasonable attitudes, and I am unable to make a distinction by saying that the first objection is conscientious, the second and third only intellectual. I am not conscious of becoming unconscientious when I begin to think. What then was the duty of a person holding any of these views? Ought he to

have enlisted, or to have refused to serve? And what was the duty of the State if he refused to serve? The position actually taken up by the State in this country—of trying to decide whether an objection was conscientious or not—was, I think, absurd and illogical. The State cannot try men's hearts and examine their motives. The French, as is well known, shot their conscientious objectors, and sent to their next-of-kin a curt notice that So-and-so "died as a coward." This was unjust, for some objectors were not cowards; but who would venture to judge even in his own case whether his objections to the war, reasonable as they may have been in themselves, were not specially recommended to him by his dislike of the prospect of being shot? May there not have been more moral courage in the unwilling recruit who said frankly, "I would rather be a coward than a corpse"? The State had to consider whether it could afford to keep military service on a voluntary basis, since this was the only real alternative to universal conscription and quite clearly it could not afford it. With all my sympathy and admiration for the Quakers, I think that when the safety and existence of the country is at stake, the right of private judgment in opposing the deliberately accepted policy of the State cannot be upheld.

A misleading parallel has sometimes been adduced, from the conduct of the early Christians in refusing to sacrifice. But the cases are quite different. The Roman government of course did not care whether the Christians sacrificed or not; they never compelled the Jews to sacrifice; the sacrificial test was adopted as the simplest which was known to be effective. The object was to stamp out a self-governing society within the State. Now in doing this the State was exceeding its rights. Such societies may be troublesome and even dangerous; but the State must wait till they break the ordinary laws, not laws invented on purpose to catch them. The Roman Catholics are often a nuisance to governments; but the State has no right to ordain that everyone shall publicly eat beef on Good Friday, on pain of death. Societies within the State have a right to exist, so long as they do not break the laws or plot to overthrow the government.

Another case of conscience may be raised. Let us suppose that the constitutional maxim, "No taxation without representation," has been flagrantly violated, and that a class which pays an undue proportion of the taxes has been deprived of all effective representation, and is systematically fleeced by one or both of the dominant parties, which bribe the electorate at their expense. Is it justifiable for the injured class to resist when possible? Remembering St. Thomas Aquinas' maxim, "In the court of conscience there is no obligation to obey an unjust law,"¹ I should hesitate to answer in the negative, but it is clear that an open and concerted refusal to pay may be justifiable, when private concealment of income is not. A different class of problem arises when the State legislates against the rules of a religious body. How far ought Catholics and Anglicans to recognize the marriages of divorced persons, or marriages with a deceased wife's sister? The State is no creator of moral principles, and if we are convinced (for example) that marriage is indissoluble, we cannot absolve from guilt those who have broken this divine decree. The infliction of social penalties, and the expulsion from our religious society of those who have taken advantage of the laxity of the law, are clearly justifiable.

Or suppose that the State has exceeded its rights by prohibiting some harmless act, such as the consumption of alcohol. Is smuggling, in such a case, morally justifiable? I should say Yes: the interference of the State in such matters is a mere impertinence.

These are examples of the moral problems which may arise from our membership of different bodies which overlap each other, and by our possession of certain indefeasible rights as individuals and free men, with which the State has no right to meddle. Among these rights I unhesitatingly include the right of private property.

We have now to remind ourselves that the movement which we have traced from its inception in Machiavelli's *Prince* to its sinister culmination in German philosophy

¹ Locke holds that a government which imposes taxes without consent is no true government.

and German practice, has not been the only movement in European political thought since the Renaissance. I said that in the modern period two new ideas are plainly traceable: one of them is the emergence of nationalities, and the intense loyalties which have clustered round either the idea of the nation or the idea of the State; and the other is the growing independence of the individual.

Both are reactions against the dominant ideas of the Middle Ages, but they are on the whole opposed to each other. Lord Eustace Percy, in his thoughtful book, *The Responsibilities of the League*, maintains that ever since the Renaissance Europe has been living under "a philosophy of emancipation." First the Reformation broke the power of the Church, and freed the Northern Europeans from the yoke of the Latin Empire. Next an attack was made upon the monarchial idea, and kings were deprived of most of their power. Then the aristocracy, who represented the traditions of feudalism, were struck down. Then the middle-class plutocracy were shorn of their political preponderance, and are now trembling for their pockets. Then—let us not shut our eyes to this fact—parliamentary democracy began to be attacked, so that the House of Commons has lost in prestige quite as much as the House of Lords. At the same time the idea of nationality is assailed by the same disintegrating philosophy. We must make our minds quite clear about this. The great issue before the world is not between monarchy and democracy, but between nationalism and internationalism. While we, following humbly in the wake of America, have been airing our fly-blown phylacteries and chattering about making the world safe for democracy, the world has been girding itself for a much grimmer choice. The new revolutionary and semi-revolutionary movements are all, without exception, frankly anti-democratic. That issue is no longer alive. Ballot-box democracy has seen its best days. The question before the world is whether the principle of nationality has been so discredited by the war that it is going to be abandoned, and a universal civil war of classes put in its place. All that we have said about the absurdity of the God-State may prove to be like flogging a dead horse.

known gibe that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel are persons whom one would be glad to see driven to their last refuge. They are frequently persons who also speak disparagingly of other bonds which mankind has held sacred for thousands of years—the family and religion. It is surely plain that to destroy these loyalties—to country, to church and to wife and children—would be to dissolve human society completely. For these are the cement that has made any kind of social fabric possible. And it is surely a truism that though a social fabric may be disintegrated and destroyed, it cannot be put together again like a house. One might as well try to build a tree, or to put life into an anatomical model of a human body. The State is a living organism: not that it is a superhuman person, or a person of any kind; but it is compacted of those organic filaments of which Carlyle speaks, drawing their vitality from the deepest instincts and most firmly rooted racial habits. Private property, the family, religion, patriotism—how can anyone with the slightest pretence to the historical sense suppose that an experiment which repudiates all these can be anything else than a fiasco?

The tragedy is that the modern State has discredited itself, partly by the overweening claims made for it, but mainly by being false to the ideals which a State ought to set before itself; by its explicit or implicit rejection of moral standards, by its insatiable greed of territory and power; by its thinly disguised or quite open injustice in dealing with weaker States; and by the wretched quality of its governments, whether monarchical, oligarchical, or democratic. Instead of trying to realize the ideals of the City of God, whose type is laid up in heaven; instead of "coveting earnestly the best gifts" for the country which it represents, it has cultivated a brutal worship of power, the ideal of the "tyrannical man" of Plato and Aristotle. Our political standards have been purely quantitative: we have gloated over statistics of population, of land areas, and of trade returns, as if these constituted greatness, and their increase progress. We have forgotten that hitherto the nations which have put mankind and posterity

most in their debt have been small States—Israel, Athens, Florence, Elizabethan England. Mankind has honoured its destroyers and persecuted its benefactors, building palaces for living brigands, and tombs for long-dead prophets. It is this perpetual unfaithfulness to the idea of the State which has led to these passionate revolts against it. The cause of our country ought to mean for us Englishmen the defence and triumph of those good qualities which our country may rightly claim as its own—the whole complex of moral attributes which make up the idea of that noble type, the English Gentleman. It should also mean for us the preservation of the great language and literature of our people, and their traditions of liberty, personal independence, and fair play. Are these to be swamped in a bitter struggle for problematical economic rights or privileges, a struggle in which we are to be allied with foreigners against another class of our own countrymen? That is not the way to purify the idea of the State. Rather we should keep the vision of the City of God before our eyes, and try to realize the highest and most spiritual values in the life of our country.

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

THE belief in Progress, not as an ideal but as an indisputable fact, not as a task for humanity but as a law of Nature, has been the working faith of the West for about a hundred and fifty years. Some would have us believe that it is a long-neglected part of the Christian revelation, others that it is a modern discovery. The ancient Pagans, we are told, put their Golden Age in the past; we put ours in the future. The Greeks prided themselves on being the degenerate descendants of gods, we on being the very creditable descendants of monkeys. The Romans endeavoured to preserve the wisdom and virtue of the past, we to anticipate the wisdom and virtue of the future. This, however, is an exaggeration. The theory of progress and the theory of decadence are equally natural, and have in fact been held concurrently wherever men have speculated about their origin, their present condition, and their future prospects. Among the Jews the theory of decadence derived an inspired authority from Genesis, but the story of the Fall had very little influence upon the thought of that tenaciously optimistic race. Among the Greeks, who had the melancholy as well as the buoyancy of youth, it was authorized by Hesiod, whose scheme of retrogression from the age of gold to the age of iron was never forgotten in antiquity. Sophocles, in a well-known chorus imitated by Bacon, holds that the best fate for men "is not to be born, or being born to die." Aratus develops the pessimistic mythology of Hesiod. In the Golden Age Dike or Astræa wandered about the earth freely; in the Silver Age her visits became fewer, and in the Brazen Age she set out for heaven and became the constellation Virgo. Perhaps Horace had read the lament of the goddess: "What a race the golden sires have left—worse than their fathers; and your offspring will be baser still." In the third century

after Christ, when civilization was really crumbling, Pagans and Christians join in a chorus of woe. On the other side, the triumphs of man over nature are celebrated by the great tragedians, and the Introduction to the First Book of Thucydides sketches the past history of Greece in the spirit of the nineteenth century. Lucretius has delighted our anthropologists by his brilliant and by no means idealized description of savage life, and it is to him that we owe the blessed word Progress in its modern sense.

"Usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis
 paulatim docuit pedetentim progredientes.
 sic unum quicquid paulatim protrahit aetas
 in medium, ratioque in luminis erigit oras."

Pliny believes that each age is better than the last. Seneca, in a treatise, parts of which were read in the Middle Ages, reminds us that "not a thousand years have passed since Greece counted and named the stars, and it is only recently that we have learned why the moon is eclipsed. Posterity will be amazed that we did not know some things that will seem obvious to them." "The world," he adds, "is a poor affair if it does not contain matter for investigation for men in every age. We imagine that we are initiated into the mysteries of Nature; but we are still hanging about her outer courts." These last are memorable utterances, even if Seneca confines his optimism to the pleasure of exploring Nature's secrets. The difference between Rousseau, who admired the simple life, and Condorcet, who believed in modern civilization, was no new one: it was a common theme of discussion in antiquity, and the ancients were well aware that the same process may be called either progress or decline. As Freeman says, "In history every step in advance has ~~also been a step backwards~~." (The picture is a little difficult to visualize, but the meaning is plain.) The fruit of the tree of knowledge always drives man from some paradise or other; and even the paradise of fools is not an unpleasant abode while it is habitable. Few emblematic pictures are more striking than the *Melencolia* (as he spells it) of Dürer, representing the Spirit of the race sitting mournfully among all her inventions;

and this was at the *beginning* of the age of discovery ! But the deepest thought of antiquity was neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It was that progress and retrogression are only the incoming and outgoing tide in an unchanging sea. The pulse of the universe beats in an alternate expansion and contraction. The result is a series of cycles, in which history repeats itself. Plato contemplates a world-cycle of 360,000 solar years, during which the Creator guides the course of events ; after which he relaxes his hold of the machine, and a period of the same length follows during which the world gradually degenerates. When this process is complete the Creator restores again the original conditions, and a new cycle begins. Aristotle thinks that all the arts and sciences have been discovered and lost "an infinite number of times." Virgil in the *Fourth Eclogue* tries to please Augustus by predicting the near approach of a new Golden Age, which, he says, is now due. This doctrine of recurrence is not popular to-day ; but whether we like it or not, no other view of the macrocosm is even tenable. Even if those physicists are right who hold that the universe is running down like a clock, that belief postulates a moment in past time when the clock was wound up ; and whatever power wound it up once may presumably wind it up again. The doctrine of cycles was held by Goethe, who, in reply to Eckermann's remark that "the progress of humanity seems to be a matter of thousands of years," answered :

"Perhaps of millions. Men will become more clever and discerning, but not better or happier, except for limited periods. I see the time coming when God will take no more pleasure in our race, and must again proceed to a rejuvenated creation. I am sure that the time and hour in the distant future are already fixed for the beginning of this epoch. But we can still for thousands of years enjoy ourselves on this dear old playground of ours."

Nietzsche also maintained the law of recurrence, and so did the Danish philosophic theologian Kierkegaard. Shelley's fine poem, "The world's great age begins anew,"

is based upon it. Still, I must admit that on the whole the ancients did tend to regard time as the enemy: *damnosa quid non immittit dies?* They would have thought the modern notion of human perfectibility at once absurd and impious.

The Dark Ages knew that they were dark, and we hear little talk about progress during those seven centuries which, as far as we can see, might have been cut out of history without any great loss to posterity. The Middle Ages (which we ought never to confuse with the Dark Ages) though they developed an interesting type of civilization, set their hopes mainly on another world. The Church has never encouraged the belief that this world is steadily improving; the Middle Ages, like the early Christians, would have been quite content to see the earthly career of the race closed in their own time. Even Roger Bacon, who is claimed as the precursor of modern science, says that all wise men believe that we are not far from the time of Antichrist, which was to be the herald of the end. The Renaissance was a conscious recovery from the longest and dreariest set-back that humanity has ever experienced within the historical period—a veritable glacial age of the spirit. At this time men were too full of admiration and reverence for the newly recovered treasures of antiquity to look forward to the future. In the seventeenth century a doctrine of progress was already in the air, and a long literary battle was waged between the Ancients and the Moderns. But it was only in the eighteenth century that Western Europe began to dream of an approaching millennium without miracle, to be gradually ushered in under the auspices of a faculty which was called Reason. Unlike some of their successors, these optimists believed that perfection was to be attained by the self-determination of the human will; they were not fatalists. In France, the chief home of this heady doctrine, the psychical temperature soon began to rise under its influence, till it culminated in the delirium of the Terror. The Goddess of Reason hardly survived Robespierre and his guillotine; but the belief in progress, which might otherwise have subsided when the French resumed their traditional pursuits—

rem militarem et argute loqui—was reinforced by the industrial revolution, which was to run a very different course from that indicated by the theatrical disturbances at Paris between 1789 and 1794, the importance of which has perhaps been exaggerated. In England above all, the home of the new industry, progress was regarded (in the words which Mr. Malloek puts into the mouth of a nineteenth-century scientist) as that kind of improvement which can be measured by statistics. This was quite seriously the view of the last century generally, and there has never been, nor will there ever be again, such an opportunity for gloating over this kind of improvement. The mechanical inventions of Watt, Arkwright, Crompton, Stephenson, and others led to an unparalleled increase of population. Exports and imports also progressed, in a favourite phrase of the time, by leaps and bounds. Those who, like Malthus, sounded a note of warning, showing that population increases, unlike the supply of food, by geometrical progression, were answered that compound interest follows the same admirable law. It was obvious to many of our grandparents that a nation which travels sixty miles an hour must be five times as civilized as one which travels only twelve, and that, as Glanvill had already declared in the reign of Charles II, we owe more gratitude to the inventor of the mariner's compass "than to a thousand Alexanders and Cæsars, or to ten times the number of Aristotles." The historians of the time could not contain their glee in recording these triumphs. Only the language of religion seemed appropriate in contemplating so magnificent a spectacle. If they had read Herder, they would have quoted with approval his prediction that "the flower of humanity, captive still in its germ, will blossom out one day into the true form of man like unto God, in a state of which no man on earth can imagine the greatness and the majesty." Determinism was much in vogue by this time; but why should determinism be a depressing creed? The law which we cannot escape is the blessed law of progress—"that kind of improvement that can be measured by statistics." We had only to thank our stars for placing us in such an environment, and to carry out energetically

the course of development which Nature has prescribed for us, and to resist which would be at once impious and futile.

Thus the superstition of progress was firmly established. To become a popular religion, it is only necessary for a superstition to enslave a philosophy. The superstition of progress had the singular good fortune to enslave at least three philosophies—those of Hegel, of Comte, and of Darwin. The strange thing is that none of these philosophies is really favourable to the belief which it was supposed to support. Leaving for the present the German and the French thinkers, we observe with astonishment that many leading men in Queen Victoria's reign found it possible to use the great biological discovery of Darwin to tyrannize over the minds of their contemporaries, to give their blessing to the economic and social movements of their time, and to unite determinism with teleology in the highly edifying manner to which I have already referred. Scientific optimism was no doubt rampant before Darwin. For example, Herschel says: "Man's progress towards a higher state need never fear a check, but must continue till the very last existence of history." But Herbert Spencer asserts the perfectibility of man with an assurance which makes us gasp. "Progress is not an accident but a necessity. What we call evil and immorality must disappear. It is certain that man must become perfect." "The ultimate development of the ideal man is certain—as certain as any conclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that all men will die." "Always towards perfection is the mighty movement—towards a complete development and a more unmingled good." It has been pointed out by Mr. Bradley that these apocalyptic prophecies have nothing whatever to do with Darwinism. If we take the so-called doctrine of evolution in Nature as a metaphysics of existence, which Darwin never intended it to be, "there is in the world nothing like value, or good, or evil. Anything implying evolution, in the ordinary sense of development or progress, is wholly rejected." The survival of the fittest does not mean that the most virtuous, or the most useful, or the most beautiful,

or even the most complex survive; there is no moral or æsthetic judgment pronounced on the process or any part of it.

"Darwinism [Mr. Bradloy goes on to say] often recommends itself because it is confused with a doctrine of evolution which is radically different. Humanity is taken in that doctrine as a real being, or even as the one real being; and humanity (it is said) advances continuously. Its history is development and progress towards a goal, because the type and character in which its reality consists is gradually brought more and more into fact. That which is strongest on the whole must therefore be good, and the ideas which come to prevail must therefore be true. This doctrine, though I certainly cannot accept it, for good or evil more or less dominates or sways our minds to an extent of which most of us perhaps are dangerously unaware. Any such view of course conflicts radically with Darwinism, which only teaches that the true idea is the idea which prevails, and this leaves us in the end with no criterion at all."

It may further be suggested that Spencer's optimism depends on the transmissibility of acquired characters; but this is too dangerous a subject for a layman in science to discuss.

Although the main facts of cosmic evolution, and the main course of human history from *Pithecanthropus* downwards, are well known to all my hearers, and to some of them much better than to myself, it may be worth while to recall to you, in bald and colourless language, what science really tells us about the nature and destiny of our species. It is so different from the gay colours of the rhapsodists whom I have just quoted, that we must be amazed that such doctrines should ever have passed for scientific. Astronomy gives us a picture of a wilderness of space, probably boundless, sparsely sown with aggregations of elemental particles in all stages of heat and cold. These heavenly bodies are in some cases growing hotter, in other cases growing colder; but the fate of every globe must be, sooner or later, to become cold and dead, like the moon.

Our sun, from which we derive the warmth which makes our life possible, is, I believe, an elderly star, which has long outlived the turbulent heats of youth, and is on its way to join the most senile class of luminiferous bodies, in which the star 19 Piscium is placed. When a star has once become cold, it must apparently remain dead until some chance collision sets the whole cycle going again. From time to time a great conflagration in the heavens, which occurred perhaps in the seventeenth century, becomes visible from this earth; and we may imagine, if we will, that two great solar systems have been reduced in a moment to incandescent gas. But space is probably so empty that the most pugnacious of astral knights-errant might wander for billions of years without meeting an opponent worthy of its bulk. If time as well as space is infinite, worlds must be born and die innumerable times, however few and far between their periods of activity may be. Of progress, in such a system taken as a whole, there cannot be a trace. Nor can there be any doubt about the fate of our own planet. Man and all his achievements will one day be obliterated like a child's sand-castle when the next tide comes in. Lucretius, who gave us the word progress, has told us our ultimate fate in sonorous lines:

"Quorundam naturam triplicem, tria corpora. Memini,
tres species tam dissimiles, tria talia texta,
una dies dabit exitio, multosque per annos
sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi."

The racial life of the species to which we happen to belong is a brief episode even in the brief life of the planet. And what we call civilization or culture, though much older than we used to suppose, is a brief episode in the life of our race. For tens of thousands of years the changes in our habits must have been very slight, and chiefly those which were forced upon our rude ancestors by changes of climate. Then in certain districts man began, as Samuel Butler says, to wish to live beyond his income. This was the beginning of the vast series of inventions which have made our life so complex. And, we used to be told, the "law of all progress is the same, the evolution of the simple into

the complex by successive differentiations." This is the gospel according to Herbert Spencer. As a universal law of nature, it is ludicrously untrue. Some species have survived by becoming more complex, others, like the whole tribe of parasites, by becoming more simple. On the whole, perhaps the parasites have had the best of it. The progressive species have in many cases flourished for a while and then paid the supremo penalty. The living dreadnoughts of the Saurian age have left us their bones, but no progeny. But the microbes, one of which had the honour of killing Alexander the Great at the age of thirty-two, and so changing the whole course of history, survive and flourish. The microbe illustrates the wisdom of the maxim, *λάθε βιώσας*. It took thousands of years to find him out. Our own species, being rather poorly provided by nature for offence and defence, had to live by its wits, and so came to the top. It developed many new needs, and set itself many insoluble problems. Physiologists like Metchnikoff have shown how very ill-adapted our bodies are to the tasks which we impose upon them; and in spite of the Spencerian identification of complexity with progress, our surgeons try to simplify our structure by forcibly removing various organs which they assure us that we do not need. If we turn to history for a confirmation of the Spencerian doctrine, we find, on the contrary, that civilization is a disease which is almost invariably fatal, unless its course is checked in time. The Hindus and Chinese, after advancing to a certain point, were content to mark time; and they survive. But the Greeks and Romans are gone; and aristocracies everywhere die out. Do we not see to-day the complex organization of the ecclesiastical and college don succumbing before the simple squeezing and sucking apparatus of the profiteer and trade-unionist? If so-called civilized nations show any protracted vitality, it is because they are only civilized at the top. Ancient civilizations were destroyed by imported barbarians; we breed our own.

It is also an unproved assumption that the domination of the planet by our own species is a desirable thing, which must give satisfaction to its Creator. We have devastated the loveliness of the world; we have exterminated several

species more beautiful and less vicious than ourselves; we have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form. If it is progress to turn the fields and woods of Essex into East and West Ham, we may be thankful that progress is a sporadic and transient phenomenon in history. It is a pity that our biologists, instead of singing pæans to Progress and thereby stultifying their own researches, have not preached us sermons on the sin of racial self-idolatry, a topic which really does arise out of their studies. *L'anthropolatric, voila l'ennemi*, is the real ethical motto of biological science, and a valuable contribution to morals.

It was impossible that such shallow optimism as that of Herbert Spencer should not arouse protests from other scientific thinkers. Hartmann had already shown how a system of pessimism, resembling that of Schopenhauer, may be built upon the foundation of evolutionary science. And in this place we are not likely to forget the second Romanes Lecture, when Professor Huxley astonished his friends and opponents alike by throwing down the gauntlet in the face of Nature, and bidding mankind to find salvation by accepting for itself the position which the early Christian writer Hippolytus gives as a definition of the Devil—"he who resists the cosmic process" (*ὁ ἀντιτάττων τοῖς κοσμικοῖς*). The revolt was not in reality so sudden as some of Huxley's hearers supposed. He had already realized that "so far from gradual progress forming any necessary part of the Darwinian creed, it appears to us that it is perfectly consistent with indefinite persistence in one state, or with a gradual retrogression. Suppose, *e.g.*, a return of the glacial period or a spread of polar climatical conditions over the whole globe." The alliance between determinism and optimism was thus dissolved; and as time went on, Huxley began to see in the cosmic process something like a power of evil. The natural process, he told us in this place, has no tendency to bring about the good of mankind. Cosmic nature is no school of virtue, but the head-quarters of the enemy of ethical nature. Nature is

the realm of tiger-rights; it has no morals and no ought-to-be; its only rights are brutal powers. Morality exists only in the "artificial" moral world: man is a glorious rebel, a Prometheus defying Zeus. This strange rebound into Manichæism sounded like a blasphemy against all the gods whom the lecturer was believed to worship, and half-scandalized even the clerics in his audience. It was bound to raise the question whether this titanic revolt against the cosmic process has any chance of success. One recent thinker, who accepts Huxley's view that the nature of things is cruel and immoral, is willing to face the probability that we cannot resist it with any prospect of victory. Mr. Bertrand Russell, in his arresting essay, "A Free Man's Worship," shows us Prometheus again, but Prometheus chained to the rock and still hurling defiance against God. He proclaims the moral bankruptcy of naturalism, which he yet holds to be forced upon us.

"That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built."

Man belongs to "an alien and inhuman world," alone amid "hostile forces." What is man to do? The God who exists is evil; the God whom we can worship is the creation of our own conscience, and has no existence outside it. The "free man" will worship the latter; and, like John Stuart Mill, "to hell he will go."

If I wished to criticize this defiant pronouncement, which is not without a touch of bravado, I should say that, so complete a separation of the real from the ideal is impossible, and that the choice which the writer offers us, of worshipping a Devil who exists or a God who does not, is no real choice, since we cannot worship either. But my object in quoting from this essay is to show how completely naturalism has severed its alliance with optimism and belief in progress. Professor Huxley and Mr. Russell have sung their palinode and smashed the old gods of their creed. No more proof is needed, I think, that the alleged law of progress has no scientific basis whatever.

But the superstition has also invaded and vitiated our history, our political science, our philosophy, and our religion.

The historian is a natural snob; he sides with the gods against Cato, and approves the winning side. He lectures the vanquished for their wilfulness and want of foresight, sometimes rather prematurely, as when Seeley, looking about for an example of perverse refusal to recognize facts, exclaims "Sedet, aeternumque sedebit unhappy Poland!" The nineteenth-century historian was so loath to admit retrogression that he liked to fancy the river of progress flowing underground all through the Dark Ages, and endowed the German barbarians who overthrew Mediterranean civilization with all the manly virtues. If a nation, or a religion, or a school of art dies, the historian explains why it was not worthy to live.

In political science the corruption of the scientific spirit by the superstition of progress has been flagrant. It enables the disputant to overbear questions of right and wrong by confident prediction, a method which has the double advantage of being peculiarly irritating and incapable of refutation. On the theory of progress, what is "coming" must be right. Forms of government and modes of thought which for the time being are not in favour are assumed to have been permanently left behind. A student of history who believed in cyclical changes and long swings of the pendulum would take a very different and probably much sounder view of contemporary affairs. The votaries of progress mistake the flowing tide for the

river of eternity, and when the tide turns they are likely to be left stranded like the corks and seraps of seaweed which mark the high-water line. This has already happened, though few realize it. The praises of Liberty are mainly left to Conservatives, who couple it with Property as something to be defended, and to conscientious objectors, who dissociate it from their country, which is not to be defended. Democracy—the magic ballot-box—has few worshippers any longer except in America, where men will still shout for about two hours—and indeed much longer—that she is “great.” But our pundits will be slow to surrender the useful words “progressive” and “reactionary.” The classification is, however, a little awkward. If a reactionary is anyone who will not float with the stream, and a progressive anyone who has the flowing tide with them, we must classify the Christian Fathers and the French Encyclopædists as belonging to the same type, the progressive; while the Roman Stoics under the Empire and the Russian bureaucrats under Nicholas II will be placed together under the opposite title, as reactionaries. Or is the progressive not the supporter of the winning cause for the time being, but the man who thinks, with a distinguished Head of a College who, as I remember, affirmed his principles in Convocation, that “any leap in the dark is better than standing still”; and is the reactionary the man whose constitutional timidity would deter him from performing this act of faith when caught by a mist on the Matterhorn? Machiavelli recognizes fixed types of human character, such as the cautious Fabius and the impetuous Julius II, and observes that these qualities lead sometimes to success and sometimes to failure. If a reactionary only means an adherent of political opinions which we happen to dislike, there is no reason why a bureaucrat should not call a republican a reactionary, as Mæcenas may have applied the name to Brutus and Cassius. Such examples of evolution as that which turned the Roman Republic into a principate and then into an empire of the Asiatic type, are inconvenient for those who say “It is coming,” and think that they have vindicated the superiority of their own theories of government.

We have next to consider the influence of the superstition of progress on the philosophy of the last century. To attempt such a task in this place is a little rash, and to prove the charge in a few minutes would be impossible even for one much better equipped than I am. But something must be said. Hegel and Comte are often held to have been the chief advocates of the doctrine of progress among philosophers. Both of them give definitions of the word—a very necessary thing to do, and I have not yet attempted to do it. Hegel defines progress as spiritual freedom; Comte as true or positive social philosophy. The definitions are peculiar; and neither theory can be made to fit past history, though that of Comte, at any rate, falls to the ground if it does not fit past history. Hegel is perhaps more independent of facts; his predecessor Fichte professes to be entirely indifferent to them. "The philosopher," he says, "follows the *a priori* thread of the world-plan which is clear to him without any history; and if he makes use of history, it is not to prove anything, since his theses are already proved independently of all history." Certainly, Hegel's dialectical process cannot easily be recognized in the course of European events; and, what is more fatal to the believers in a law of progress who appeal to him, he does not seem to have contemplated any further marked improvements upon the political system of Prussia in his own time, which he admired so much that his critics have accused him of teaching that the Absolute first attained full self-consciousness at Berlin in the nineteenth century. He undoubtedly believed that there has been progress in the past; but he does not, it appears, look forward to further changes; as a politician, at any rate, he gives us something like a closed system. Comte can only bring his famous "three stages" into history by arguing that the Catholic monotheism of the Middle Ages was an advance upon Pagan antiquity. A Catholic might defend such a thesis with success; but for Comte the chief advantage seems to be that the change left the Olympians with only one neck for Positive Philosophy to cut off. But Comte himself is what his system requires us to call a reactionary; he is back in the "theological stage"; he would like a theocracy, if he could have one without a God.

The State is to be subordinate to the Positive Church, and he will allow "no unlimited freedom of thought." The connection of this philosophy with the doctrine of progress seems very slender. It is not so easy to answer the question in the case of Hegel, because his contentment with the Prussian government may be set down to idiosyncrasy or to prudence; but it is significant that some of his ablest disciples have disavowed the belief. To say that "the world is as it ought to be" does not imply that it goes on getting better, though some would think it was not good if it was not getting better. It is hard to believe that a great thinker really supposed that the universe as a whole is progressing, a notion which Mr. Bradley has stigmatized as "nonsense, unmeaning or blasphemous." Mr. Bradley may perhaps be interpreting Hegel rightly when he says that for a philosopher "progress can never have any temporal sense," and explains that a perfect philosopher would see the whole world of appearance as a "progress," by which he seems to mean only a rearrangement in terms of ascending and descending value and reality. But it might be objected that to use "progress" in this sense is to lay a trap for the unwary. Mathematicians undoubtedly talk of progress, or rather of progression, without any implication of temporal sequence; but outside this science to speak of "progress without any temporal sense" is to use a phrase which some would call self-contradictory. Be that as it may, popularized Hegelianism has laid hold of the idea of a self-improving universe, of perpetual and universal progress, in a strictly temporal sense. The notion of an evolving and progressing cosmos, with a Creator who is either improving himself (though we do not put it quite so crudely) or who is gradually coming into his own, has taken strong hold of the popular imagination. The latter notion leads straight to ethical dualism of the Manichean type. The theory of a single purpose in the universe seems to me untenable. Such a purpose, being infinite, could never have been conceived, and if conceived, could never be accomplished. The theory condemns both God and man to the doom of Tantalus. Mr. Bradley is quite right in finding this belief incompatible with Christianity.

It would not be possible, without transgressing the limits

set for lecturers on this foundation, to show how the belief in a law of progress has prejudicially affected the religious beliefs of our time. I need only recall to you the discussions whether the perfect man could have lived in the first, and not in the nineteenth or twentieth century—although one would have thought that the ancient Greeks, to take one nation only, have produced many examples of hitherto unsurpassed genius, the secularization of religion by throwing its ideals into the near future—a new apocalypticism which is doing mischief enough in politics without the help of the clergy; and the unauthorized belief in future probation, which rests on the queer assumption that, if a man is given time enough, he must necessarily become perfect. In fact, the superstition which is the subject of this lecture has distorted Christianity almost beyond recognition. Only one great Church, old in worldly wisdom, knows that human nature does not change, and acts on the knowledge. Accordingly, the papal syllabus of 1864 declares: "*Si quis dixerit: Romanus pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo, et cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere, anathema sit.*"

Our optimists have not made it clear to themselves or others what they mean by progress, and we may suspect that the vagueness of the idea is one of its attractions. There has been no physical progress in our species for many thousands of years. The Cro-Magnon race, which lived perhaps twenty thousand years ago, was at least equal to any modern people in size and strength; the ancient Greeks were, I suppose, handsomer and better formed than we are; and some unprogressive races, such as the Zulus, Samoans, and Tahitians, are envied by Europeans for either strength or beauty. Although it seems not to be true that the sight and hearing of civilized peoples are inferior to those of savages, we have certainly lost our natural weapons, which from one point of view is a mark of degeneracy. Mentally, we are now told that the men of the Old Stone Age, ugly as most of them must have been, had as large brains as ours; and he would be a bold man who should claim that we are intellectually equal to the Athenians or superior to the Romans. The question of moral improve-

ment is much more difficult. Until the Great War few would have disputed that civilized man had become much more humane, much more sensitive to the sufferings of others, and so more just, more self-controlled, and less brutal in his pleasures and in his resentments. The habitual honesty of the Western European might also have been contrasted with the rascality of inferior races in the past and present. It was often forgotten that, if progress means the improvement of human nature itself, the question to be asked is whether the modern civilized man behaves better in the same circumstances than his ancestor would have done. Absence of temptation may produce an appearance of improvement; but this is hardly what we mean by progress, and there is an old saying that the Devil has a clever trick of pretending to be dead. It seems to me very doubtful whether when we are exposed to the same temptations we are more humane or more sympathetic or juster or less brutal than the ancients.

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During the Great War, even if some atrocities were magnified with the amiable object of rousing a good-natured people to violent hatred, it was the well-considered opinion of Lord Bryce's commission that no such cruelties had been committed for three hundred years as those which the Germans practised in Belgium and France. It was startling to observe how easily the blood-lust was excited in young men straight from the fields, the factory, and the counter, many of whom had never before killed anything larger than a wasp, and that in self-defence. As for the Turks, we must go back to Genghis Khan to find any parallel to their massacres in Armenia; and the Russian terrorists have reintroduced torture into Europe, with the help of Chinese experts in the art. With these examples before our eyes, it is difficult to feel any confidence that either the lapse of time or civilization has made the *bête humaine* less ferocious. On biological grounds there is no reason to expect it. No selection in favour of superior types is now going on; on the contrary, civilization tends now, as always, to an *Ausrottung der Besten*—a weeding-out of the best; and the new practice of subsidising the unsuccessful

by taxes extorted from the industrious is cacogenics erected into a principle. The best hope of stopping this progressive degeneration is in the science of eugenics. But this science is still too tentative to be made the basis of legislation, and we are not yet agreed what we should breed for. The two ideals, that of the perfect man and that of the perfectly organized State, would lead to very different principles of selection. Do we want a nation of beautiful and moderately efficient Greek gods, or do we want human mastiffs for policemen, human greyhounds for postmen. and so on? However, the opposition which eugenics has now to face is based on less respectable grounds, such as pure hedonism ("would the superman be any happier?"): indifference to the future welfare of the race ("posterity has done nothing for me; why should I do anything for posterity?"); and, in politics, the reflection that the unborn have no votes.

We have, then, been driven to the conclusion that neither science nor history gives us any warrant for believing that humanity has advanced, except by accumulating knowledge and experience and the instruments of living. The value of these accumulations is not beyond dispute. Attacks upon civilization have been frequent, from Crates, Pherecrates, Antisthenes, and Lucretius in antiquity to Rousseau, Walt Whitman, Thoreau, Ruskin, Morris, and Edward Carpenter in modern times. I cannot myself agree with these extremists. I believe that the accumulated experience of mankind, and his wonderful discoveries, are of great value. I only point out that they do not constitute real progress in human nature itself, and that in the absence of any real progress these gains are external, precarious, and liable to be turned to our own destruction, as new discoveries in chemistry may easily be.

But it is possible to approach the whole question of progress from another side, and from this side the results will not be quite the same, and may be more encouraging. We have said that there can be no progress in the macrocosm, and no single purpose in a universe which has neither beginning nor end in time. But there may be an infinite number of finite purposes, some much greater and others

much smaller than the span of an individual life; and within each of these some Divine thought may be working itself out, bringing some life or series of lives, some nation or race or species, to that perfection which is natural to it—what the Greeks called its “nature.” The Greeks saw no contradiction between this belief and the theory of cosmic cycles, and I do not think that there is any contradiction. It may be that there is an immanent telology which is shaping the life of the human race towards some completed development which has not yet been reached. To advocate such a theory seems like going back from Darwin to Lamarck; but “vitalism,” if it be a heresy, is a very vigorous and obstinate one; we can hardly dismiss it as unscientific. The possibility that such a development is going on is not disproved by the slowness of the change within the historical period. Progress in the recent millennia seems to us to have been external, precarious, and disappointing. But let this last adjective give us pause. By what standard do we pronounce it disappointing, and who gave us this standard? This disappointment has been a constant phenomenon, with a very few exceptions. What does it mean? Have those who reject the law of progress taken it into account? The philosophy of naturalism always makes the mistake of leaving human nature out. The climbing instinct of humanity, and our discontent with things as they are, are facts which have to be accounted for, no less than the stable instincts of nearly all other species. We all desire to make progress, and our ambitions are not limited to our own lives or our lifetime. It is part of our nature to aspire and hope; even on biological grounds this instinct must be assumed to serve some function. The first Christian poet, Prudentius, quite in the spirit of Robert Browning, names Hope as the distinguishing characteristic of mankind.

“Nonne hominum et pecudum distantia separat una?
quod bona quadrupedum ante oculus sita sunt, ego contra
spero.”

We must consider seriously what this instinct of hope means and implies in the scheme of things.

forms; and if I am not mistaken, it is nearly worn out. Disraeli in his detached way said, "The European talks of progress because by the aid of a few scientific discoveries he has established a society which has mistaken comfort for civilization." It would not be easy to sum up better the achievements of the nineteenth century, which will be always remembered as the century of accumulation and expansion. It was one of the great ages of the world; and its greatness was bound up with that very idea of progress which, in the crude forms which it usually assumed, we have seen to be an illusion. It was a strenuous, not a self-indulgent age. The profits of industry were not squandered, but turned into new capital, providing new markets and employment for more labour. The nation, as an aggregate, increased in wealth, numbers, and power every day; and public opinion approved this increase, and the sacrifices which it involved. It was a great century; there were giants in the earth in those days; I have no patience with the pygmies who gird at them. But, as its greatest and most representative poet said: "God fulfils himself in many ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the world." The mould in which the Victorian age cast its hopes is broken. There is no law of progress; and the gains of that age now seem to some of us to have been purchased too dearly, or even to be themselves of doubtful value. In Clough's fine poem, beginning "Hope evermore and believe, O man," a poem in which the ethics of Puritanism find their perfect expression, the poet exhorts us:

"Go! say not in thine heart, And what then, were it
accomplished,
Were the wild impulse allayed, what were the use and
the good?"

But this question, which the blind Puritan asceticism resolutely thrust on one side, has begun to press for an answer. It had begun to press for an answer before the great cataclysm, which shattered the material symbols of the cult which for a century and a half had absorbed the chief energies of mankind. Whether our widespread discontent is mainly caused, as I sometimes think, by the

unnatural conditions of life in large towns, or by the decay of the ideal itself, it is not easy to say. In any case, the gods of Queen Victoria's reign are no longer worshipped. And I believe that the dissatisfaction with things as they are is caused not only by the failure of nineteenth-century civilization, but partly also by its success. We no longer wish to progress on those lines if we could. Our apocalyptic dream is vanishing into thin air. It may be that the industrial revolution which began in the reign of George III has produced most of its fruits, and has had its day. We may have to look forward to such a change as is imagined by Anatole France at the end of his *Isle of the Penguins* when, after an orgy of revolution and destruction, we shall slide back into the quiet rural life of the early modern period. If so, the authors of the revolution will have cut their own throats, for there can be no great manufacturing towns in such a society. The race will have tried a great experiment, and will have rejected it as unsatisfying. We shall have added something to our experience. Fontenelle exclaimed, "How many foolish things we should say now, if the ancients had not said them all before us!" Fools are not so much afraid of plagiarism as this Frenchman supposed; but it is true that "Eventu rerum stolidi didicere magistro."

There is much to support the belief that there is a struggle for existence among ideas, and that those tend to prevail which correspond with the changing needs of humanity. It does not necessarily follow that the ideas which prevail are better morally, or even truer to the law of Nature, than those which fail. Life is so chaotic, and development so sporadic and one-sided, that a brief and brilliant success may carry with it the seeds of its own early ruin. The great triumphs of humanity have not come all at once. Architecture reached its climax in an age otherwise barbarous; Roman law was perfected in a dismal age of decline; and the nineteenth century, with its marvels of applied science, has produced the ugliest of all civilizations. There have been not a few flowering times of the Spirit of Man—Ages of Pericles, Augustan Ages, Renaissances. The laws which determine these efflorescences are unknown.

They may depend on undistinguished periods when force is being stored up. So in individual greatness, the wind bloweth where it listeth. Some of our greatest may have died unknown, "*carent quia vate sacro*." Emerson indeed tells us that "One accent of the Holy Ghost The careless world has never lost." But I should like to know how Emerson obtained this information. The World has not always been "careless" about its inspired prophets; it has often, as Faust remarks, burnt or crucified them, before they have delivered all their message. The activities of the Race-Spirit have been quite unaccountable. It has stumbled along blindly, falling into every possible pitfall.

The laws of Nature neither promise progress nor forbid it. We could do much to determine our own future; but there has been no consistency about our aspirations, and we have frequently followed false lights, and been disillusioned as much by success as by failure. The well-known law that all institutions carry with them the seeds of their own dissolution is not so much an illustration of the law of cyclical revolution, as a proof that we have been carried to and fro by every wind of doctrine. What we need is a fixed and absolute standard of values, that we may know what we want to get and whither we want to go. It is no answer to say that all values are relative and ought to change. Some values are not relative but absolute. Spiritual progress must be within the sphere of a reality which is not itself progressing, or for which, in Milton's grand words, "*progresses the dateless and irrevoluble circle of its own perfection, joining inseparable hands with joy and bliss in over-measure for ever*." Assuredly there must be advance in our apprehension of the ideal, which can never be fully realized because it belongs to the eternal world. We count not ourselves to have apprehended in aspiration any more than in practice. As Nicholas of Cusa says: "*To be able to know ever more and more without end, this is our likeness to the eternal Wisdom. Man always desires to know better what he knows, and to love more what he loves; and the whole world is not sufficient for him, because it does not satisfy his craving for knowledge*." But since our object is to enter within the realm

of unchanging perfection, finite and relative progress cannot be our ultimate aim, and such progress, like everything else most worth having, must not be aimed at too directly. Our ultimate aim is to live in the knowledge and enjoyment of the absolute values, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. If the Platonists are right, we shall shape our surroundings more effectively by this kind of idealism than by adopting the creed and the methods of secularism. I have suggested that our disappointments have been very largely due to the unworthiness of our ideals, and to the confused manner in which we have set them before our minds. The best men and women do not seem to be subject to this confusion. So far as they can make their environment, it is a society immensely in advance of anything which has been realized among mankind generally.

If any social amelioration is to be hoped for, its main characteristic will probably be simplification rather than further complexity. This, however, is not a question which can be handled at the end of a lecture.

Plato says of his ideal State that it does not much matter whether it is ever realized on earth or not. The type is laid up in heaven, and approximations to it will be made from time to time, since all living creatures are drawn upwards towards the source of their being. It does not matter very much, if he was right in believing—as we too believe—in human immortality. And yet it does matter; for unless our communing with the eternal Ideas endows us with some creative virtue, some power which makes itself felt upon our immediate environment, it cannot be that we have made those Ideas in any sense our own. There is no alchemy by which we may get golden conduct out of leaden instincts—so Herbert Spencer told us very truly; but if our ideals are of gold, there is an alchemy which will transmute our external activities, so that our contributions to the spiritual temple may be no longer “wood, hay, and stubble,” to be destroyed in the next conflagration, but precious and durable material.

For individuals, then, the path of progress is always open; but, as Hesiod told us long before the Sermon on the Mount, it is a narrow path, steep and difficult, especially

at first. There will never be a crowd gathered round this gate; "few there be that find it." For this reason, we must cut down our hopes for our nation, for Europe, and for humanity at large, to a very modest and humble aspiration. We have no millennium to look forward to; but neither need we fear any protracted or widespread retrogression. There will be new types of achievement which will enrich the experience of the race; and from time to time, in the long vista which science seems to promise us, there will be new flowering-times of genius and virtue, not less glorious than the age of Sophocles or the age of Shakespeare. They will not merely repeat the triumphs of the past, but will add new varieties to the achievements of the human mind.

Whether the human type itself is capable of further physical, intellectual, or moral improvement, we do not know. It is safe to predict that we shall go on hoping, though our recent hopes have ended in disappointment. Our lower ambitions partly succeed and partly fail, and never wholly satisfy us; of our more worthy visions for our race we may perhaps cherish the faith that no pure hope can ever wither, except that a purer may grow out of its roots.

THE VICTORIAN AGE

EACH generation takes a special pleasure in removing the household gods of its parents from their pedestals, and consigning them to the cupboard. The prophet or pioneer, after being at first declared to be unintelligible or absurd, has a brief spell of popularity, after which he is said to be conventional, and then antiquated. We may find more than one reason for this. A movement has more to fear from its disciples than from its critics. The great man is linked to his age by his weakest side; and his epigoni, who are not great men, caricature his message and make it ridiculous. Besides, every movement is a reaction, and generates counter-reactions. The pendulum swings backwards and forwards. Every institution not only carries within it the seeds of its own dissolution, but prepares the way for its most hated rival.

The German Von Eicken found, in this tendency of all human movements to provoke violent reactions, the master key of history. Every idea or institution passes into its opposite. For instance, Roman imperialism, which was created by an intense national consciousness, ended by destroying the nationality of rulers and subjects alike. The fanatical nationalism of the Jews left them a people without a country. The Catholic Church began by renouncing the world, and became the heir of the defunct Roman empire. In political philosophy, the law of the swinging pendulum may act as a salutary cold douche. Universal suffrage, says Sybel, has always heralded the end of parliamentary government. Tocqueville caps this by saying that the more successful a democracy is in levelling a population, the less will be the resistance which the next despotism will encounter.

But the pendulum sometimes swings very slowly, and oscillates within narrow limits; while at other times the

changes are violent and rapid. The last century and a half, beginning with what Arnold Toynbee was the first to call the Industrial Revolution, has been a period of more rapid changes than any other which history records. The French Revolution, which coincided with its first stages, helped to break the continuity between the old order and the new, and both by its direct influence and by the vigorous reactions which it generated cleft society into conflicting elements. Then followed a Great War, which shook the social structure to its base, and awakened into intense vitality the slumbering enthusiasm of nationality. At the same time, a variety of mechanical inventions gave man an entirely new control over the forces of nature and a new knowledge of the laws of nature, and this new knowledge, not content with practical applications, soon revolutionized all the natural sciences, and profoundly affected both religion and philosophy. The reign of Queen Victoria, which I have chosen to mark the limits of my survey to-day, covered the latter half of this *sacculum mirabile*, the most wonderful century in human history.

There are of course no beginnings or ends in history. We may walk for a few miles by the side of a river, noting its shallows and its rapids, the gorges which confine it and the plains through which it meanders; but we know that we have seen neither the beginning nor the end of its course, that the whole river has an unbroken continuity, and that sections, whether of space or time, are purely arbitrary. We are always sowing our future; we are always reaping our past. The Industrial Revolution began in reality before the accession of George III, and the French monarchy was stricken with mortal disease before Louis XV bequeathed his kingdom to his luckless successor.

But there can be no question that the river of civilization reached a stretch of rapids towards the end of the eighteenth century. For instance, in locomotion the riding-horse and pack-horse had hardly given place to the coach and wagon before the railway superseded road traffic; the fast-sailing clippers had a short lease of life before steam was used for crossing the seas. Industrial changes

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came too quickly for the government to make the necessary readjustments, at a time when the nation was fighting for its life and then recovering from its exhaustion. The greatest sufferings caused by the revolution in the life of the people were in the first half of the century; the latter half was a time of readjustment and reform. One great interest of the Victorian Age is that it was the time when a new social order was being built up, and entirely new problems were being solved. The nineteenth century has been called the age of hope; and perhaps only a superstitious belief in the automatic progress of humanity could have carried our fathers and grandfathers through the tremendous difficulties which the rush through the rapids imposed upon them.

Let us spend five minutes in picturing to ourselves the English nation in a condition of stable equilibrium, as it was in the eighteenth century. Before the Industrial Revolution, the country was on the whole prosperous and contented. The masses had no voice in the government, but most of them had a stake in the country. There were no large towns, except London, and the typical unit was the self-contained village, which included craftsmen as well as agriculturists, and especially workers in wool, the staple national industry. The aim of village agriculture was to provide subsistence for the parishioners, not to feed the towns. The typical village was a street of cottages, each with a small garden, and an open field round it, divided up like a modern allotments area. The roads between villages were mere tracks across the common, often so bad that carts were driven by preference through the fields, as they still are in Greece. So each parish provided for its own needs. The population was sparse, and increased very slowly, in spite of the enormous birthrate, because the majority of the children died. Families like that of Dean Collet, who was one of twenty-two children, among whom he was the only one to grow up, remained common till the middle of the eighteenth century. Then, for reasons which I do not, I think, have been fully explained, the deathrate rapidly declined, at the very time when economic conditions demanded a larger population. This

is the more remarkable, when we remember the manner in which young children were treated before the Factory Acts

Political power was in the hands of a genuine aristocracy, who did more to deserve their privileges than any other aristocracy of modern times. They were, as a class, highly cultivated men, who had travelled much on the Continent, and mixed in society there. In 1785 Gibbon was told that 40,000 English were either travelling or living abroad at one time. They were enlightened patrons of literature and art, and made the collections of masterpieces which were the pride of England, and which are now being dispersed to the winds. Their libraries were well stocked, and many of them were accomplished classical scholars. They were not content, like their successors to-day, to load their tables with magazines and newspapers. Lastly, they fought Napoleon to a finish, and never showed the white feather. Those who have studied the family portraits in a great house, or the wonderful portrait gallery in the Provost's Lodge at Eton, will see on the faces not only the pride and self-satisfaction of a privileged class, but the power to lead the nation whether in the arts of war or of peace.

No doubt, political corruption was rampant; but it was not till George III tried to govern personally by means of corruption, that its consequences were disastrous. The loss of America was the first serious blow to the aristocratic régime.

The necessary changes would have come about earlier but for the French Revolution and the war. The former caused a panic which now seems to us exaggerated. But we are accustomed to revolutions, and know that they never last more than a few years; the French Revolution was the first of its kind. Moreover, France had long been the acknowledged leader of civilization, and a general overturn in that country terrified men like Gibbon into prophesying that a similar outbreak was likely to overwhelm law, order and property in England. They did not realize how different the conditions were in the two countries. The most modest democratic reforms were therefore

impossible till Napoleon was out of the way, and till the anti-revolutionary panic had subsided.

One result of the war has not always been realized. The eighteenth century had been international; there was not much Chauvinism or Jingoism anywhere till the French, fighting ostensibly under the banner of humanity, had kindled the fire of patriotism in Spain, in Germany, and even in Russia. England had always had a strong national self-consciousness; and after the war the bonds of sympathy with France were not at once renewed, so that our country during the early part of Victoria's reign, was more isolated from the main currents of European thought than ever before or since. Men of letters who lamented this isolation now turned for inspiration rather to Germany than to France. On the other hand, the war did not interrupt the intellectual life of the country to anything like the same extent as the recent Great War. At no period since the Elizabethans was there such an output of great poetry; and it does not seem to have occurred to any young lady of that time to ask Scott or Wordsworth what they were doing during the war.

Modern sociologists have drawn lurid pictures of the condition of the working class during the earlier part of the last century. It seems in truth to have been very bad. Byron in 1812 told the Lords: "I have been in some of the most oppressed provinces of Turkey, but never under the most despotic of infidel governments did I behold such squalid wretchedness as I have seen since my return in the very heart of a Christian country." In 1831 a member of parliament said: "An agricultural labourer and a pauper—the words are synonymous." Those who want details can find them in the well-known controversial books by the Hammonds, which state the case against the governing class in an exhaustive manner. There was in fact too much ground for Disraeli's statement that England at that time consisted of two nations, the rich and the poor. The poor were still largely illiterate, and so inarticulate; and the comparative absence of the large half-educated class which now dominates all public discussion made the cultivated gentry a class apart. Their

own standard of culture was higher than that of the leisured class to-day; but they took little interest in the lives of the poor, until they were forced to do so. We however who have witnessed the succession of economic crises which attend and follow a great war ought not to forget the appalling difficulties with which the government was confronted. In 1795 there was actual famine, which was met by the famous system of doles out of the rates, in augmentation of wages, a most mischievous bit of legislation, like the similar expedients of the last three years. It had the double effect of pauperizing the rural labourer and of putting an artificial premium on large families—the children who were carted off in waggon-loads to feed the factories. It was repealed only when the ruined farmers were abandoning their land, and the glebe-owning clergy their livings. Fluctuations in prices had much to do with the miseries of the hungry 'thirties and 'forties; but over-population, as the economists of the time pointed out with perfect justice, was one of the main causes. It was not till much later that there was food enough for all; and this was the result of the new wheat-fields of America and the sheep-walks of Australia, which brought in food and took away mouths. In Ireland the barbarous and illiterate peasantry multiplied till the population exceeded eight millions, when the inevitable famine illustrated nature's method of dealing with recklessness. The only error with which the economists of this time may be charged was that they did not realize that over-population is the result of a very low standard of civilization. Families are restricted whenever the parents have social ambitions and a standard of comfort. Where they have none, the vital statistics are those of Russia, Ireland, India and China.

The astonishing progress in all measurable values which marked the first half of the reign produced a whole literature of complacency. I quoted some examples of the language which was then common, in my Romanes Lecture on "The Idea of Progress." Macaulay supplies some of the best examples. We must remember that the progress was real, and that its speed was unexampled in history.

The country was, in vulgar language, a going concern, as it never was before and has not been since. The dominions beyond the seas were being peopled up and consolidated. At home education was spreading, liberty was increasing, and the light taxes were raised with an ease which fortunately for ourselves we no longer even remember. Principles seemed to have been discovered which guaranteed a further advance in almost every direction, intellectual as well as material. For that was the great age of British science; and most branches of literature were flourishing. Hope told a flattering tale, and optimism became a sort of religion.

Nevertheless, such complacency was bound to produce a violent protest. Disraeli, whose well-remembered warning about "the two nations" has already been quoted, described the age as one which by the help of mechanical inventions had mistaken comfort for progress. And comfort, as another critic of social science has said, is more insidious than luxury in hampering the higher development of a people. The literature of social indignation was contemporaneous with the literature of complacency. Carlyle and Ruskin were its chief prophets; but we must not forget the novels of Dickens, Charles Reade and Kingsley.

Carlyle and Ruskin both denounced the age with the vehemence of major prophets—vehemence was in fashion at that time in English literature—but they did not approach the "condition of England question" from quite the same angle. Carlyle was a Stoic, or in other words a Calvinist without dogmas; he had also learned to be a mystic from his studies of German idealism. He represents one phase of the anti-French reaction; he hated most of the ideas of 1789, as displayed in their results. He hated the scepticism of the Revolution, its negations, its love of elaptrap rhetoric and fine phrases, and above all its anarchism. He wished to see society well ordered, under its wisest men; he wished to overcome materialism by idealism, and loose morality by industry and the fear of God. Justice, he declared, is done in this world; right is might, if we take long views. Institutions collapse when they become shams, and no longer fulfil their function.

The sporting squires ought to be founding colonies instead of preserving game. As for the new industrialism, he disliked it with the fervour of a Scottish peasant.

Ruskin was a Platonist, steeped in the study of Plato, and bound to him by complete sympathy. We cannot separate Ruskin the art-critic from Ruskin the social reformer. His great discovery was the close connection of the decay of art with faulty social arrangements. Ugliness in the works of man is a symptom of social disease. He could not avert his eyes from the modern town, as Wordsworth did, because the modern town meant a great deal to him, and all of it was intolerable. He observed that the disappearance of beauty in human productions synchronized with the invention of machinery and the development of great industries, and he could not doubt that the two changes were interconnected. We sometimes forget that until the reign of George III a town was regarded as improving a landscape. A city was a glorious and beautiful thing, an object to be proud of. The hill of Zion is a fair place, the joy of the whole earth, because it had the holy city built upon it. Never since civilization began has such ugliness been created as the modern English or American town. Ruskin saw in these structures a true index of the mind of their builders and inhabitants, and the sight filled him with horror. He read with entire approval what Plato wrote of industrialized Athens. "The city of which we are speaking," he says in the *Laws*, "is some eighty furlongs from the sea. Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous. Had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were to have even a chance of preserving your State from degeneracy. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but it has a bitter and brackish quality, filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and dishonest ways, making the State unfaithful and unfriendly to her own children and to other nations." Like Plato, Ruskin would fain have returned to a much simpler

social structure, when each country, and even to a great extent each village, was sufficient to itself. He did not show how such a return is possible without blowing up the great towns and their inhabitants; but he quite seriously regarded the Industrial Revolution as a gigantic blunder, and believed that England would never be healthy or happy until what his contemporaries called progress had been somehow swept away with all its works. How this was to be done he hardly considered. Like a true Platonist, he set before his countrymen, in glowing language, the beauty of the eternal Ideas or absolute Values, pleaded that there was no necessary connection between equality of production and equality of remuneration, and instituted various experiments, not all unsuccessful, in restoring the old handicrafts and the temper which inspired them.

The problem of mending or ending industrialism, foolishly called capitalism, remains unsolved. Ruskin's own artistic life would have been impossible without the paternal sherry and the rich men who drank it; and Morris' exquisite manufactures depended absolutely on the patronage of the capitalists whom he denounced. But the indignation which these Victorian social reformers exhibited had much justification, even after the worst abuses had been partially remedied.

A mixture of rapid progress and extreme departmental inefficiency is one of the characteristics of the earlier part of the reign. Lord Justice Bowen has written an instructive sketch of the administration of the Law between 1837 and 1887. There were two systems of judicature, Law and Equity, with a different origin, different procedure, and different rules of right and wrong. One side of Westminster Hall gave judgments which the other side restrained the successful party from enforcing. The bewildered litigant was driven backwards and forwards. Merchants were hindered for months and years from recovering their dues. The fictitious adventures of John Doe and Richard Roe, the legal Gog and Magog, played an important part in trials to recover possession of land. Arrears accumulated year by year. The Court of Chancery was closed to the poor, and was a name of terror to the rich. It was said by a legal

writer that "no man can enter into a Chancery suit with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a determined adversary." Bowen says that Dickens' pictures of the English law "contain genuine history." The horrors of the debtors' prison are well known, and nearly 4000 persons were sometimes arrested for debt in one year. In 1837, 494 persons were condemned to death, though only 34 were hanged. Public executions continued to 1867. If a farmer's gig knocked down a foot passenger in a lonely lane, two persons were not allowed to speak in court—the farmer and the pedestrian. Most of these abuses were rectified long before the end of the reign.

The Universities were slowly emerging from the depths to which they had sunk in the eighteenth century, when they neither taught nor examined nor maintained discipline. We all remember Gibbon's description of the Fellows of his College, "whose dull but deep potations excused the brisker intemperance of youth." These gentlemen were most of them waiting for College livings, to which they were allowed to carry off, as a solatium, some dozens of College port. Cambridge, it is only fair to say, never fell quite so low as Oxford, and began to reform itself earlier. The Mathematical and Classical Triposes were both founded before Queen Victoria's accession. But public opinion thought that the University authorities needed some stimulation from outside, and in 1850 a Royal Commission was appointed for Oxford, and two years later another for Cambridge. The Reports of these two Commissions are very amusing, especially that of the Oxford Board, which lets itself go in a refreshing style. Its members had received provocation. The Governing Bodies generally refused to answer the questions. Some of the Colleges had exacted an oath from new Fellows to reveal nothing about the affairs of the College. The Dean of Christ Church declined to answer letters from the Royal Commission; the President of Magdalen replied that he was not aware that he had misused his revenues, and begged to close the correspondence. These dignified potentates are not spared in the Report. The Cambridge Report, which is much more polite, did good service by recommending the foundation of a medical school. Other

changes, such as the abolition of all Anglican privileges, and the permission of Fellows to marry, came later. In the case of the Universities, as in that of the Law, the improvements between 1837 and the first Jubilee were enormous.

The Civil Service, it is almost needless to say, was a sanctuary of aristocratic jobbery. Many of the clerks were rather supercilious gentlemen, who arrived late and departed early from their offices.

The Army in 1837 consisted, in actual strength, of about 100,000 men, of whom 19,000 were in India and 20,000 in Ireland. There had been a strong movement after the peace to abolish the Army altogether, on the ground that another war was almost unthinkable. The Duke of Wellington was only able to keep up this small force by hiding it away in distant parts of the empire; the total number of troops in Great Britain was only 26,000. Officers were ordered to efface themselves by never wearing uniform except on parade. A Royal Duke could not be given a military funeral, because "there were not troops enough to bury a Field Marshal." As to the quality of the troops, the Duke frequently called them "the scum of the earth," and the brutal discipline of the time did everything to justify this description, for the soldier was supposed to have surrendered all his rights as a man and a citizen. The privates enlisted for life or for twenty-one years, and it was so difficult to get recruits that they were frequently caught while drunk, or frankly kidnapped. They were dressed, for campaigning in the tropics, in high leather stocks and buttoned-up jackets, so that hundreds died of heat apoplexy. Lord Wolseley thought that in 1837 50,000 Frenchmen could have easily taken London. Nor was the danger of a French invasion at all remote. The Volunteer movement, the social effects of which were excellent, was mainly due to the Prince Consort, a far wiser man than was recognized during his lifetime.

The Crimean War revealed in glaring colours the incompetence of the military authorities and of the Cabinet at home. If we had been fighting against any European power except Russia, with whom utter mismanagement is a tradition, there can be no doubt that our Army would

have been destroyed, as it ought to have been at Inkerman. The military credit of the nation was only partially restored by the prompt suppression of the Indian Mutiny. Yet here again the age of hope and progress made good its professions. The mistakes in the Boer War seem not to have been nearly so bad as those in the Crimea.

It would be easy to go through the other departments of national life—the Navy, Finance, Colonial and Indian Policy, the growth and distribution of Wealth, Locomotion and Transport, Education, Science, Medicine and Surgery, and to prove that the progress during the reign of Queen Victoria was quite unprecedented. The creed of optimism was natural and inevitable at such a time, though cool heads might remember the line of Publilius Syrus,

“Ubi nil timetur, quod timeatur nascitur.”

Lecky, a historian with some practical experience of politics, deliberately stated his opinion that no country was ever better governed than England between 1832 and 1867, the dates of the first Reform Bill and of Disraeli's scheme to dish the Whigs. As far as internal affairs go, it would not be easy to prove him wrong. The one prime necessity for good government was present: those who paid the taxes were also those who imposed them. If there was some false economy, as there was in the Crimean War, sound finance benefited the whole population by keeping credit high, interest low, and taxation light. Political life was purer than it had been, and purer probably than it is now. The House of Commons enjoyed that immense prestige which has been completely lost since the old Queen's death. The debates were read with semi-religious fervour by every good citizen over his breakfast, and a prominent politician was treated with even more exaggerated reverence than our worthy grandfathers paid to bishops. The debates were good because they were real debates and conducted by men who all spoke the same language. The rhetorical methods of the working man are quite different from those of the gentry, and mutual annoyance is generated by the mixture of styles in debate. Above all, the House of Commons was still a

rather independent body. The history of England shows that as soon as the Commons freed themselves from the control of the king, they began to try to free themselves from the control of the constituencies. They debated in secret; they made their persons legally sacrosanct; and on several occasions they turned out a member who had been duly elected by his constituents, and admitted a member who had been duly rejected. These encroachments could not last long. The Bradlaugh case was the last attempt to repeat the tactics by which Wilkes was kept out of Parliament; but until the poisonous delegate theory obtained currency, the member of Parliament was a real legislator, with a right to think, speak and vote for himself. During the middle part of the reign, the dramatic duel between Gladstone and Disraeli gave a heroic aspect to party politics, and kept up the public interest.

In foreign politics it is not so easy to share Lecky's opinion. The opium war against China and the Crimean War were blunders which hardly anyone now defends; and Palmerston's habit of bullying weak foreign powers did not really raise our prestige. For a long time we could not make up our minds whether France or Russia was the potential enemy: a vacillation which proved that the balance of power, which we thought so necessary for our safety, already existed. Our statesmen, in spite of the warnings of Lord Acton and Matthew Arnold, were blind to the menace from Germany, down to the end of the reign and later. The Crimean War only increased the friction between France and England. The French fortified Cherbourg, and talked openly of invasion. In 1860 Flahault, the French ambassador in London, said bluntly that "his great object was to prevent war between the two countries."

This prolonged jealousy and suspicion between the two Western Powers made it impossible for England to exercise much influence on the Continent. The settlement after 1815 handed over central and eastern Europe to governments of the type which it is the fashion to call reactionary. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, acting together, were not to be resisted. And so the disturbances of 1848, once

more kindled by Paris, just failed; and democracy had a serious rebuff. Nearly all the despotic governments of Europe were overthrown in 1848, and nearly all were restored a year later. The French indeed got rid of their king, mainly because he was a pacifist; but Germany refused to be unified under the red flag, and began to prepare for a very different destiny. The Pope wobbled and then came down heavily on the side of the old order. Meanwhile, England looked on. Chartism was a very feeble affair compared with the continental revolutions, and it flickered out in this year. The people had got rid of the corn-laws, and were fairly content; there was nothing at all like a class war in this generation. So, while Macaulay was showing how very differently we manage things in England—compare, for example, 1688 with 1848—we decided to invite the world and his wife to London, to envy and admire us in Sir Joseph Paxton's great glass house. We must not laugh at that architectural monstrosity. It was the mausoleum of certain generous hopes. On the Continent men had been shot and hanged for the brotherhood of the human race; we hoped to show them a more excellent way. We had given a lead in free trade; we still hoped that our example would soon be followed in all civilized nations. We had reduced our Army to almost nothing; we hoped that militarism was a thing of the past. All these hopes were frustrated. A fanatical nationalism began to foster racial animosity; the *enragés* of Europe began to preach class-hatred and to find many listeners; protective tariffs were set up on every frontier; international law became a mere cloak for the schemes of violence; and, as has been said, all Europe "breathed a harsher air." Worst of all, the mad race of competitive armaments, which was destined to wreck a great part of the wealth which two generations of peaceful industry had gathered, was begun.

We have to remember that the prosperity and security of the happy time which we are now considering were due to temporary causes, which can never recur. In the nineteenth century England was the most fortunately situated country, geographically, in the world. When the

opening and development of the Atlantic trade deprived the Mediterranean ports of their pride of place, an Atlantic stage of world-commerce began, in which England, an island with good harbours on its western coasts, was in the most favourable position. The Pacific stage which is now beginning must inevitably give the primacy to America. We had also a long start, industrially, over all our rivals, and our possession of great coal-fields and iron-fields close together gave us a still further advantage. All these advantages are past or passing. Henceforth we shall have to compete with other nations on unprivileged conditions. It is useless to lament the inevitable, but it is foolish to shut our eyes to it. The Victorian Age was the culminating point of our prosperity. Our great wealth, indeed, continued to advance till the catastrophe of 1914. But there was a shadow of apprehension over everything -- "never glad confident morning again."

Let us now turn to the intellectual and spiritual movements of the reign. The Romanticist revolution was complete, in a sense, before 1825. It was a European, not only an English movement, and perhaps it was not less potent in France than in Germany and England, though in accordance with the genius and traditions of that nation it took very different forms. In England it inspired verse more than prose, though we must not forget Scott's novels. It produced a galaxy of noble poetry during the Great War, and added another immortal glory to that age of heroic struggle. By a strange chance, nearly all the great poets of the war-period died young. Wordsworth alone was left, and he was spared to reap in a barren old age the honours which he had earned and not received between 1798 and 1820. For about fifteen years there was an interregnum in English literature, which makes a convenient division between the great men of the Napoleonic era and the great Victorians.

From about 1840, when great literature again began to appear, the conditions were more like those with which we are familiar. There was an unparalleled output of books of all kinds, a very large reading public, and a steadily increasing number of professional authors dependent on

the success of their popular appeal. As in our own day, a great quantity of good second-rate talent trod on the heels of genius, and made it more difficult for really first-rate work to find recognition. The impetus of the Romantic movement was by no means exhausted, but it began to spread into new fields. The study of "Gothic" art and literature had been at first, as was inevitable, ill-informed. Its reconstruction of the Middle Ages was a matter of sentimental antiquarianism, no more successful than much of its church restoration. The Victorians now extended the imaginative sensibility, which had been expended on nature and history, to the life of the individual. This meant that the novel instead of the poem was to be the characteristic means of literary expression; and even the chief Victorian poets, Tennyson and Browning, are sometimes novelists in verse.

The grandest and most fully representative figure in all Victorian literature is of course Alfred Tennyson. And here let me digress for one minute. It was a good rule of Thomas Carlyle to set a portrait of the man whom he was describing in front of him on his writing-table. It is a practice which would greatly diminish the output of literary impertinence. Let those who are disposed to follow the present evil fashion of disparaging the great Victorians make a collection of their heads in photographs or engravings, and compare them with those of their own favourites. Let them set up in a row good portraits of Tennyson, Charles Darwin, Gladstone, Manning, Newman, Martineau, Lord Lawrence, Burne Jones, and, if they like, a dozen lesser luminaries, and ask themselves candidly whether men of this stature are any longer among us. I will not speculate on the causes which from time to time throw up a large number of great men in a single generation. I will only ask you to agree with me that since the golden age of Greece (assuming that we can trust the portrait busts of the famous Greeks) no age can boast so many magnificent types of the human countenance as the reign of Queen Victoria. We, perhaps, being epigoni ourselves, are more at home among our fellow-pygmyies. Let us agree with Ovid, if we will :

Prisca iuvent alios; ego me nunc denique natum
Gratulor; hæc ætas moribus apta meis.

But let us have the decency to uncover before the great men of the last century; and if we cannot appreciate them, let us reflect that the fault may possibly be in ourselves.

Tennyson's leonine head realizes the ideal of a great poet. And he reigned nearly as long as his royal mistress. The longevity and unimpaired freshness of the great Victorians has no parallel in history, except in ancient Greece. The great Attic tragedians lived as long as Tennyson and Browning; the Greek philosophers reached as great ages as Victorian theologians; but if you look at the dates in other flowering times of literature you will find that the life of a man of genius is usually short, and his period of production very short indeed.

Tennyson is now depreciated for several reasons. His technique as a writer of verse was quite perfect; our newest poets prefer to write verses which will not even scan. He wrote beautifully about beautiful things, and among beautiful things he included beautiful conduct. He thought it an ugly and disgraceful thing for a wife to be unfaithful to her husband, and condemned Guinevere and Lancelot as any sound moralist would condemn them. A generation which will not buy a novel unless it contains some scabrous story of adultery, and revels in the "realism" of the man with a muck-rake, naturally "has no use for" the *Idylls of the King*, and calls Arthur the blameless prig. The reaction against Tennyson has culminated in abuses of the *Idylls*, in which the present generation finds all that it most dislikes in the Victorian mind. Modern research has unburied the unsavoury story that Modred was the illegitimate son of Arthur by his own half-sister, and blames Tennyson for not treating the whole story as an Oedipus-legend. In reality, Malory does not so treat it. He admits the story, but depicts Arthur as the flower of kinghood, "*Rex quondam rexque futurus.*" Tennyson, however, was not bound to follow Malory. He has followed other and still greater models, Spenser and

Milton. He has given us an allegorical epic, as he explains in his Epilogue to the Queen :

"Accept this old imperfect tale,
New-old, and shadowing Sense at war with Soul,
Ideal manhood closed in real man
Rather than that gray king, whose name, a ghost,
Streams like a cloud, man-shaped, from mountain peak,
And cleaves to cairn and cromlech still; or him
Of Geoffrey's book, or him of Malleer's."

The whole poem is an allegory. Camelot is

"Never built at all,
"And therefore built for ever."

The charming novelettes in which the allegory is forgotten need no more justification than the adventures in *The Faerie Queene*, or the parliamentary debates in *Paradise Lost*. The *Idylls* fall into line with two of the greatest poems in the English language; and when Tennyson writes of Arthur, "From the great deep to the great deep he goes," he is telling his own deepest conviction of what our brief life on earth means—the conviction which inspires his last words of poetry, *Crossing the Bar*.

Tennyson knew materialism and revolution, and whither they tend.

"The children born of thee are sword and fire,
Red ruin, and the breaking up of laws."

And

"The fear lest this my realm, upreared
By noble deeds at one with noble vows,
From flat confusion and brute violence
Reel back into the beast and be no more."

We are told that he is shallow, an echo of the thoughts of educated men at the time, and that, like the Victorians in general, he never probes anything to the bottom. It is true that he reflects his age; so do almost all other great men; and that his age was an age of transition; so, I believe, are all other ages. He represents his age both in his deep-rooted conservatism or moderate liberalism,

and in his reverence for the new knowledge, which was undermining the conservative stronghold, especially in religion. He is unjustly reproached with speaking contemptuously of the French Revolution, "the red fool-fury of the Seine," as "no graver than a schoolboys' barring out." He despised barricades and red flags and September massacres, because he believed that the victories of broadening Freedom are to be won by constitutional means. He is a little self-righteous about it, no doubt; that helps to date him. He came, we must remember, half-way between the Pantisocracy of Coleridge and his friends and the still cruder vagaries of our young intellectuals. Years brought the philosophic mind to Carlyle, Southey, Wordsworth and Coleridge. Years will bring a relative sanity to our young Bolsheviks; they will then, I hope (for I wish them well), begin to read Tennyson. The second *Locksley Hall* is peculiarly interesting for our purpose, because, though the author protested that it was written in character, dramatically, it is plain that it does express his political and social disillusionments and anxiety about the future; and Gladstone answered it as an attack upon the England of the day, calling attention to the great progress which had been made in the "sixty years" since the first *Locksley Hall*. Tennyson saw that the Victorian social order was breaking up; and with great prescience he foretold many of the evils which have since come upon us. The deluge of political "babble"; the indifference of the new voters to the grandeur of the British Empire; the contempt for experience and wisdom, setting the feet above the brain and bringing back the dark ages without their faith or hope; the vague aspirations for international friendship, blighted by the pressure of over-population and ending in universal war; all these shadows of coming events, too clearly seen, have convinced him that there is no straight line of progress, but many a backward-streaming curve, which often seems more like retrogression than progress. This is not the language of 1851. In truth the clouds began to gather before the old Queen and the old poet died. Even in fiction, the note of disillusionment is heard with increasing clearness, in the latest novels of George Eliot, in

writers like Gissing, and in the later books of Thomas Hardy compared with the earlier.

In religion Tennyson certainly represents the mood of the mid-century. Romanticism had given religion a new attractiveness in the revolutionary era. In France it stimulated the Neo-Catholicism of De Maistre and Chateaubriand; in Germany it gave a mystical turn to philosophical idealism; and in England it produced an Anglo-Catholic revival. But for reasons mentioned above, this revival remained intensely insular. England, and perhaps especially Oxford, were at this time so cut off from the Continent that the isolation of the English Tractarians was not at first felt; and the constructive work of philosophers and critics on the Continent was spurned as "German theology." So when Newman at length took the perhaps logical step of joining the Roman communion, the Movement broke up, and its ablest members turned against it with the anger of men who feel that they have been duped. Neither science nor criticism could be disregarded any longer. English scholars began to read German, as Carlyle had exhorted them to do; and everybody began to read Darwin. There arose among the educated class an attitude towards religion which we may call very distinctively Victorian. Carlyle remained a Puritan, without any dogmatic beliefs except a kind of moralistic pantheism. Ruskin was a Protestant medievalist who admired everything in a medieval cathedral except the altar. Tennyson and Browning were ready to let most dogmas go, but clung passionately to the belief in personal human survival. Tennyson's famous lines "There lives more faith in honest doubt, Believe me, than in half the creeds" have been wittily parodied by Samuel Butler: "There lives more doubt in honest faith," etc. The sentiment in Tennyson's lines may be easily defended; but it must be confessed that "honest doubt" was something of a pose at the time. In reading such men as Clough or Henri Amiel, the average man becomes impatient, and is inclined to say, "Why can't the fellow make up his mind one way or the other, and get started?" They carry suspension of judgment to the verge of futility.

and though they obviously suffer, one does not feel very sorry for them. It is the opposite failing from that of Macaulay, who as a historian suffers from a constitutional inability *not* to make up his mind on everything and everybody. Matthew Arnold is also a religious sceptic, but he has formulated a liberal Protestant creed for himself, not very unlike that of Sir John Seeley's *Ecce Homo*. It was not a happy time for religious thinkers, unless they made themselves quite independent of organized Christianity. Intolerance was very bitter; and only the secular arm stopped a whole series of ecclesiastical prosecutions, which would have made the ministry of the Church of England impossible except for fools, liars, and bigots. Real hatred was shown against the scientific leaders, which Darwin calmly ignored, and Huxley returned with interest.

But though the contradictions and perplexities of rapid transition were more felt in religion than in any other subject, it may be doubted whether organized Christianity has ever been more influential in England than during the Victorian age, before the growth of the towns threw all the Church's machinery out of gear. Many of you will remember Lecky's charming description of the typical country parsonage, and the gracious and civilizing influences which radiated from what was often the very ideal of a Christian home. The description is in no way exaggerated; and now that high prices and predatory taxation have destroyed this pleasant and unique feature of English life, it is worth while to recall to the younger generation what it was in the time of their fathers and grandfathers.

I have taken Tennyson as my example of Victorian literature, because his is the greatest and most representative name. It is no reproach to say that he is thoroughly English. Browning is more cosmopolitan, but his method of facing the problems of life like a bull at a fence is characteristically English.

There is no time to speak at length of the Victorian novel, another bright star in the firmament of the reign. Our nation has a great tradition in fiction, and we shall be

wise to stick to it, instead of preferring a corrupt following of the French, whose novelists, in spite of their clever technique, seem to me frequently dull and usually repulsive. Dickens and Thackeray have been rivals, almost like Gladstone and Disraeli, and perhaps few are whole-hearted admirers of both. That any educated reader should fail to love one or the other is to me inexplicable. The palmiest day of English novel-writing was in the 'fifties, when Dickens, Thackeray, Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, Kingsley, Disraeli, Bulwer Lytton and Meredith were all writing. Later in the reign there was a short set-back, and the fortunes of English fiction seemed for a few years to be less promising than they became in the next generation, when several new writers of great ability and charm appeared. Now we seem to be once more in the trough of the wave; and I cannot doubt that the main cause of the decay is the pernicious habit of writing hastily for money. If we take the trouble to consult Mr. Mudie's catalogue of fiction, we shall learn to our amazement that there are several writers, whose names we have never heard, who have to their discredit over a hundred works of fiction apiece. They obviously turn out several books a year, just as a shoemaker manufactures so many pairs of boots. The great novelists have generally written rapidly, rather too rapidly; but such a cataract of ink as these heroes of the circulating library spill is absolutely inconsistent with even second-rate work. Literature flourishes best when it is half a trade and half an art; and here again the Victorian Age occupies the most favourable part of the curve.

Of the other glories of Victorian literature I can say nothing now. But before leaving this part of the subject, consider the wonderful variety of strong or beautiful English prose writing which that age produced. Froude, Macaulay, Newman, Ruskin, Pater and Stevenson are each supreme in very different styles; and all of them achieved excellence by an amount of labour which very few writers are now willing to bestow.

I have no wish to offer an unmeasured panegyric on an age which after all cannot be divested of the responsibility

for making our own inevitable. It was to a considerable extent vulgarized by the amazing success of the Industrial Revolution. Napoleon's nation of shopkeepers did judge almost everything by quantitative standards, and by quantitative standards the higher values cannot be measured. There was no lack of prophets to point out a better way, but the nation as a whole was not unfairly caricatured as John Bull, that stout, comfortable, rather bullying figure which excited Ruskin's indignation, and which others have said that we ought to burn instead of Guy Fawkes. We were unpopular on the Continent just when we thought that all other nations were envying us. They did envy us, but with the underlying conviction that there must be something wrong in a world where the Palmerstonian John Bull comes out on top.

The greatness of the age, as I have said, depended on a combination of circumstances in their nature transient. It resembled the short-lived greatness of Venice, Genoa, and Holland. Before the end of the reign society had begun to disintegrate, so that we find antagonistic movements flourishing together. Theoretical socialism reached its zenith; but there was also an outburst of romantic imperialism, of which Sir John Seeley, Regius Professor of History at Cambridge, was one of the founders, Froude and Dilke powerful propagandists, Rudyard Kipling the poet, and Joseph Chamberlain the practical manager. It was a mild attack of the epidemic which afterwards enticed Germany into the Great War, and the worst that can be said of it is that it encouraged a temper of sentimental brutality in the English people, and brought us for the first time into danger from a coalition of foreign powers. The second Jubilee was its day of triumph; the Boer War the beginning of its downfall.

The fusion of social classes proceeded more and more rapidly as the century went on. At the beginning of the reign the territorial oligarchs purchased another lease of power by an alliance with the successful commercial class which, with the Indian Nabobs, had been violently radical until the aristocracy recognized them. The two parties quarrelled about the Corn Laws and Factory Acts, but

when these questions were settled, they gradually drew together, while lavish new creations of peers turned the House of Lords into the predominantly middle-class body which it is now. Towards the end of the reign the higher gentry began again to go into trade, as they had done until the Georges brought in German ideas, and the way was prepared for the complete destruction of social barriers which the Great War effected. Meanwhile, there were ominous signs that our civilization, like others in the past, might be poisoned by the noxious by-products of its own activities. Parasitism at both ends of the scale became an ever-increasing burden on industry, and symptoms of race-deterioration became apparent to the very few who have eyes for such things. Legislation removed most of the obvious evils in the workmen's lot, but one evil it could not remove, and this became more grievous and more resented every year. The great industry was turning human beings into mere cogs in machines, and a type of workman was evolved who needed no craftsmanship such as an intelligent man could be proud to acquire and happy to exercise. This problem, which threatens the life of our civilization, was already beginning to loom darkly before the eyes of the late Victorians.

I have no doubt that the Elizabethan and the Victorian Ages will appear to the historian of the near future as the twin peaks in which English civilization culminated. There may be a third, equally splendid, period yet to come, but I do not think that any of us will live to see it. The remainder of the twentieth century will be handicapped by the necessity of clearing up the mess made in the last eight years. However, the Napoleonic War was followed, as I have argued, by a very great age, and I will not be so rash as to prophesy what England will be like thirty years hence. It is for you, my younger hearers, to answer that question, for the answer depends on yourselves. We old Victorians will before then have made room for you by quitting a world to which, as I am sure you think, we no longer belong.

THE DILEMMA OF CIVILIZATION

THE social outlook of the man of science is very different from that of the politician, and hardly less from that of the average social reformer. The biologist thinks in centuries and millennia; he looks before and after in a way which would ruin a politician, who is acute enough in predicting which way the popular breeze will blow to-morrow, but knows and cares little what will happen in the next generation. The man of science also believes that we can only conquer nature by obeying her; he does not think that human nature is likely to change appreciably even in a thousand years, except by the operation of natural selection or counter-selection, or if he is an optimist, by rational selection; he certainly does not believe that "where God sends mouths He sends meat," nor that vicarious charity will cover a multitude of economic sins. We breathe a different atmosphere when we leave the watchful observers of the jumping cat, and consult the men who patiently interrogate the great Sphinx—the "elemental laws" which, as Walt Whitman says, "never apologize," the silent goddess on whose knees are the fates of nations, races, and species, and who makes them or breaks them impartially, according to their skill in reading her riddles, or their wilfulness in disregarding her unspoken but not unacted warnings. Science has not yet come to its own in forming the beliefs and practices of mankind, because it has been too much excluded from politics and too much repressed by religion. It is the purgatory of religion and politics alike, exacting expiation for every sin against truth and every dishonest concession to passion or prejudice. The futile attempts of the last century to "reconcile" it with ecclesiastical tradition have died down. Science has captured a number of indefensible outworks, and religion is not a pin the worse. Science

was materialistic while battling with superstition; since it has won its freedom it has been willing to learn much from idealistic philosophy. The war of the twentieth century is no longer between science and religion; it is between science and the irrational forces which make for social degeneracy and disintegration. It is not for nothing that revolutionists speak with hatred or distrust of "intellectuals." For they themselves are in revolt, not merely against the existing social order, but against economic law, and against society as an organic growth, with its roots in the past.

And yet the prevailing tone and temper of public opinion have always reacted upon the progress and direction of scientific discovery. We have to admit that even the most independent thinker is the child of his age. The dreams of human perfectibility which intoxicated the French towards the end of the eighteenth century gave a stimulus to doctrines of evolution as the law of nature; but while *la carrière ouverte aux talents* was reflected in the theory of Lamarck, the competitive industrialism of the next generation found its supposed justification in Darwin's doctrine of the survival of the fittest. At the present day, the popular faith that everything is possible to organized effort seems to correspond to the physics of energy, and it may be that the political and economic revolt against the belief in fixed laws of nature is more than accidentally synchronous with the theories of Bergson and his school. Few men free themselves from prejudices coming from without; none perhaps from prejudices which have their source within. We never become independent of our temperament; and group-influences, however we may account for them, seem to modify individual temperament in each generation, probably by constantly directing attention to some one aspect of experience.

Two recent books on scientific sociology, which resemble each other in the ability of their authors, in their wide knowledge of biology and kindred sciences, and in their general plan of treatment, may profitably be considered side by side, the more so as their conclusions are strongly opposed to each other. One is Dr. Müller Lyer's

History of Social Development (Phasen der Kultur), written before the war and now translated into English; the other is Dr. Austin Freeman's *Social Decay and Regeneration*, published in 1921 with an introduction by Mr. Havelock Ellis, himself a notable contributor to the scientific study of social problems.

Dr. Müller Lyer contemplates the species to which we belong as rising from insignificant beginnings to more and more elevated forms of life. At first, of course, man knew nothing of the marvellous destiny reserved for him; but a great moment arrived when a knowledge of the path which he was treading crossed the threshold of his consciousness. From this moment instinctive striving began to be transformed into conscious and purposive action. He cherished hopes of being able to control the movement of his own progress. But this control has not yet been achieved, and cannot be ours till we understand the course of social evolution, which has passed through many successive phases. These lines of direction can be traced, and they must serve us as signposts for the future. Dr. Lyer attempts to interpret history in this manner. His subject comprises economic development, the family, the State, the human intellect, ethics, justice, and art.

Culture, he says, is a progressive movement, which we can trace back to its beginnings in the evolution of man from lower forms. The discovery of speech, of the way to produce fire, and of tools, are among the most important points of new departure. The use of tools increases steadily as man moves from the age of stone to that of copper and bronze, and thence to iron. The age of iron culminated in the machine-civilization of our own day, which began in this country about 150 years ago, when a series of discoveries ushered in the industrial revolution. All purely mechanical labour is now in process of being transferred from man to the machine; and we might have expected that the prophecy of Aristotle would be approaching its fulfilment: "If shuttles would work by themselves, and the plectra and zithers could play by themselves, we should need no more slaves" (*Politics*, i, 2, 5). But the development of social organization has

not kept pace with that of technical art and of our general economic life; so that the wage-earners have not yet emerged from quasi-servile conditions. The machine age is only in its preliminary phase.

Capitalism, as he shows, was highly developed under the Roman Empire, private fortunes were on a larger scale than at any subsequent period before the nineteenth century. But its basis was slave labour, not machinery. (He might have added that improvements in machinery are always kept back by slavery.) Accordingly, when the supply of slaves fell off, industry decayed. For the ancients never kept human stud-farms like the planters of the Southern States in America; and without this device, a slave population always decreases rapidly. From the end of the Western Empire till the beginning of the industrial revolution capitalism was on a very small scale. It was discouraged by the Church and repressed by the feudal system. Either the desire for accumulation was weaker in the Middle Ages, or the opportunities for gratifying it were absent. Even in 1825 the whole merchant-fleet of Bremen did not number as many tons as an ordinary steamer of to-day. Until steam came in to perform the work which had hitherto been done by the muscles of men and beasts, the large majority of workmen were small handicraftsmen, and many families were almost entirely self-sufficient. In the new economic era, the first strides were made by those older trades which had previously developed as handicrafts; secondly came such newer trades as those in rubber, sugar, and chemical works. Thirdly, hand labour was driven from spinning, weaving, tanning, brick-making and pottery, which for thousands of years had been common domestic industries. The self-sufficing family disappeared; for the factories herded the workmen together, and the old cottage with its kitchen garden and pigsty was crowded out. Individual production gave way to co-operative production; division of labour destroyed the old craftsmanship and the old independent artisan. The growth^{alt} of success of the capitalistic era has been the immense^{to as} case of export and import trade.

Dr. Müller Lyer is impressed by the truth of Kent's saying, "As progress becomes more rapid its phases are shorter." He thinks that the stage in which we now are will be far briefer than those which preceded it. Amalgamations, both of capital and labour, grow larger; and socialized trade, conducted by the State, becomes more and more important. It is only the strong conservatism of domestic economy that has prevented large experiments in co-operative housekeeping, which would economize the greater part of women's labour. But such experiments, as he sees, are made difficult by "our social sensitiveness, which has become self-conscious through our thousand divisions into classes and sub-classes, and by the tendency to exclusiveness inherent in every family union." Such schemes as those of Fourier "must be relegated to the dim future."

It is impossible not to regret the loss of handiness which the machine age has brought with it. Savages always want to know whether the traveller has made all his belongings himself, and would be surprised if he confessed that he could not make one of them. An English visitor to Tahiti found that the natives could make a hut out of branches and leaves; they readily kindled fire by rubbing sticks together. Clothing was woven during a walk to fetch fruit. Flasks, pails, and casks were scooped out of bamboo in a few minutes. These natives would have been astonished to hear that a houseless Briton has to bully the State into spending a thousand pounds of the taxpayers' money to build him a home, and that he is content to wait months for its completion. Moreover, while in the natural state man is able to live out his own life, employing himself in occupations which make use of all his energies equally, set his limbs in motion, excite his interest, and call forth his sagacity, "we have all developed on one side only, and become slaves of labour, some of whom all their lives do nothing but dig, others bore or polish, or write or tend a machine." Fishing and hunting, the daily occupation of the barbarian, are in civilization amusements which only the well-to-do can enjoy.

But our author finds the greatest evil wrought by

machinery to be the stimulus which it gives to covetousness, or "pleonexia" as he calls it, borrowing a useful word from the Greek. It has created a hard and hateful world, in which industry is regarded as the aim of existence, and time as mere money. This "Americanism," as the Germans call it, has attacked the nations of the West like an epidemic, and though the almost superhuman energy which it has introduced into life must excite admiration, it has brought with it no happiness, but rather envy and bitterness.

Culture in fact has made the lot of the majority worse rather than better. Man in his primitive condition can employ his ability in harmony with his own tastes. He is free from anxiety for the future and contented with his lot; whereas in a highly industrialized community the great mass of people are crowded in a never-ceasing treadmill of specialized labour, hemmed in on all sides by duties and restrictions, consumed either by care or by "pleonexia," and condemned to a troubled and stunted existence which would fill a savage with horror.

And yet there seems to be no escape. For the most highly organized communities have the greatest survival value, and the fate of the individual is immaterial to the advance of the process. Just as, in an earlier state of society, a slave-holding nation, which can devote itself more exclusively to the art of war, is more powerful than a nation of working agriculturists, so a modern nation which forces a majority of its members into the most unnatural division of labour can undersell and starve out another which has preserved simpler and more wholesome methods of production. A people which cares only for such progress as can be measured by statistics is likely to destroy another, higher in the scale of civilization, which aims at making a better quality of life possible for its citizens. The blindly working forces of nature favour perfection of social organization rather than the welfare of the individual. In the most advanced animal communities this process has been carried to a hideous perfection. The beehive is an appalling object-lesson in State socialism carried to its logical consequences.

Mankind, says Dr. Lyer, is in revolt against this doom. The two cries, "individualism" and "socialism," are only different expressions of the demand for happiness. If we take these two ideals as implying respectively, the organization of freedom and the organization of labour, they are complementary to each other rather than antagonistic. It is only in States organized for war that the interests of the individual need be ruthlessly sacrificed. International commercial relations tend to unify the whole of civilization, and when this process has gone further, the State may become, as it should be, the medium for the welfare of its citizens. This will not be brought about till a condition of relative stability is produced. But such a stabilization is probable in the near future, since there are no more empty countries to be exploited, and there are already signs of a "humanizing of propagation," by which the reckless and senseless increase of numbers may be brought to an end. Nothing, our author says, justly, has caused so much needless suffering among civilized nations, and has so completely neutralized the effect which culture should have in promoting happiness, as the swollen birthrates of the nineteenth century.

When "the science of social forces has itself become a social force,"

"we are justified in supposing that future development will rise to undreamed-of heights, and will lead on to an era of perfect culture, in the light of which all the phases of our present half culture put together will seem like a kind of childhood of the human race. We almost receive the impression that throughout the tremendous drama of humanity there has been glimmering a secret plan of salvation and blessing."

Dr. Lyer, it will be seen, is an optimist, and he ends on an almost religious note which sounds oddly from an avowed secularist, who has nothing but contempt for the faiths by which men have lived in the past. His outlook is what we have learned to call *pre-war*; and nothing makes us realize so clearly the profound change which a

terrible catastrophe has made in our judgments about the world in which we live, than the fact that we can tell without difficulty whether a book on social science was written before or after 1914. For Dr. Lyer, the assumptions of evolutionary optimism are taken for granted; the course of civilization has been not only from a simpler to a more complicated structure, but from an irrational to a partially rational order of social life; and though for a time the development of machine industry seems to have diminished human happiness, he has no doubt that this maladjustment will before long be set right. He is not free from the fallacies of Karl Marx, and more than once assumes that the present economic system tends to make the rich richer and the poor poorer. The statistics of the national income in the years before the war entirely refuted this favourite argument of the Socialists. He looks for a solution of the economic difficulty to nationalization and State management. Such a view is intelligible in a German, for State administration in Germany before the war was undoubtedly very efficient, and free from the reckless wastefulness and incompetence which have made public ownership a byword in England. But this efficiency was the result of a bureaucratic system organized from above; it has yet to be proved that national trading under a democracy can be either economical or business-like. And it is generally agreed that the German system was prejudicial to personal initiative, and to that adaptability on which the Americans have long prided themselves, and which we may fairly boast that we displayed during the war. Dr. Lyer is also obliged to postulate a recovery from the evil spirit of "pleonexia," which he considers to be a result of modern industrialism. But it is very doubtful whether the Western European is really more covetous either than his ancestors before the industrial revolution, or than the picturesque and romantic Asiatic. If we are looking for the man who would cut the throat of his best friend for a few dollars, it is not in Chicago or the City of London that we are most likely to find him. We cannot cure the acquisitive spirit by limiting its opportunities. The peasant proprietor is perhaps the greediest skinflint alive.

The unexamined postulate of evolutionary optimism is that all social evils have a natural tendency to eliminate themselves. There is no sanction in history for this assumption. Increasing complexity of organization is not necessarily progress, if by progress is meant the passage from a less desirable state of life to a more desirable. The more complex structure of society may impose itself because it has a greater survival value; it is not certain that any measures of social reform can make life in a highly industrialized community satisfying to the individual without impairing the efficiency on which the existence of such a community depends. This is the great problem of sociology; it must be solved, if there is any solution, without assuming, as Dr. Lyer does, that there is some mysterious power which has already determined that the human race shall advance to some unimagined perfection. It is often forgotten that highly organized animal communities, such as the bees and ants, must have passed through a period of rapid "progress," during which their social life attained its present complexity, and that this period of evolution was followed by a condition of stable equilibrium which appears to be permanent. Our own species probably passed through many millennia without appreciable change, and the restless spirit of progress may, for all we know, come finally to rest at some time when man is once more in complete harmony with his environment. The shocking revelations of depravity which war-conditions have brought to light in many countries have made such a possibility less unwelcome to us than to our fathers. The progress on which they prided themselves now seems to us to have been mainly illusory. This disillusionment has been well illustrated by Mr. Max Beer-bohm. He has drawn for us a picture of the nineteenth century in the person of a large and comfortable man in side-whiskers and a white tie, looking complacently at his vision of the future—a still larger and more comfortable man with an ampler white tie. His companion picture of the twentieth century shows us a young man with a mourning band on his arm, contemplating his vision of the future—a large note of interrogation. So completely

has a sudden convulsion shattered our rosy dreams, and left us gazing anxiously into the void.

Dr. Austin Freeman's book reflects the post-war temper of disillusionment and perplexity. But his main subject is the reign of the machine, and its reactions upon the life of mankind. The part played in human activities by muscular exertion has decreased very rapidly in the last hundred years. A century ago, our muscles were the chief motive power. Now, machinery is finding its way even into the smallest establishments. So with transport. A hundred years ago journeys were chiefly made on foot or on horseback, and our ancestors thought nothing of a thirty miles walk. Now we scramble into an omnibus to escape the exertion of walking a few hundred yards. It is well known that the disuse of function results in loss of function and atrophy of the disused organs; to counteract which the modern man uses dumb-bells and developers, which would astonish a savage as much as anything else in our civilization. The factory hands, the chief victims of the machine, are as a rule of very poor physique; they are small and stunted, with bad teeth, and suffer much from pulmonary and digestive troubles. Their death-rates are far higher than those in rural areas. Dr. Freeman might have added that in spite of the advance in medical science, the expectation of life after sixty, in all classes together, is slightly less than it was half a century ago: a clear proof that we are not living healthy lives. From the point of view of health, our urban civilization is a failure.

Progress, as Dr. Freeman sees clearly, is of two kinds. It may refer to changes in the environment, including the store of transmitted experience; or it may mean those changes by which man himself has been improved. The two aspects by no means coincide.

Intrinsic progress was great, and may have been rapid, when man was first becoming human. The decisive modifications were doubtless due to variations which established themselves, and which definitely lifted our species into a condition in which men could begin their conquest of nature. But from an early date, progress has been almost entirely environmental. The change in the relation

A man to his surroundings has been amazing. The little hairless animal that once crept, naked and forlorn, over the face of the earth, the sport of the elements, the prey of the larger beasts; behold him now in all the opulence of his great inheritance of knowledge, lording it over the world through which he once sneaked in continual peril of his life. He burrows into the bowels of the earth; he traverses its surface at a speed which leaves the fleetest beast as stationary; he follows the leviathan into the depths of the sea; he soars to heights inaccessible to the eagle. In time of peace we congratulated ourselves on the humanizing effects of these discoveries; but we know now that primitive barbarism was only dormant, and ready to be roused into active savagery at the first beat of the drum. And under the conditions of modern warfare, the lives and property of non-combatants are exposed to dangers which are the direct result of the new knowledge. The discovery of flying has so far been an almost unmixed curse to humanity, and is a menace to the very existence of civilization. Nor can we congratulate ourselves without hesitation on the rise in the standard of comfort, which only means that we make increased demands on our environment. "There is much truth in the saying of Diogenes, that a man's wealth may be estimated in terms of the things which he can do without." The accumulation of wealth and the increase of numbers, without any real advance in individual character or mental capacity, do not make for happiness.

The theory and practice of government are divided between sociologists, who have knowledge but no power, and politicians, who have power but no knowledge. "The professional politician whom democracy has brought into existence differs entirely from other professional men. He is totally unqualified." Such knowledge as the old parliamentary hand has acquired teaches him only how to get office and to keep in office; it has no relation to political wisdom or statesmanship. For example, the First Lord of the Admiralty may be a brewer, a publisher, or a stockbroker. And yet this is a time when the functions of government are being extended every year.

The division of Labour has destroyed the old craftsman. Not a man in a boot factory is able to make a pair of boots. Even in the Art Schools the pupils are being trained, not to be artists, but to be Art School-masters and mistresses; and the Technical School scholars are being trained to be Technical School-masters. The old apprenticeship produced very different results at a small fraction of the cost.

Everyone who knows the inside of a Government department notices its incapacity as compared with a private business concern. The business men who joined the Army, and were seldom employed in the work of management, were unanimous in their verdict that "if any private firm were conducted in this way, it would be bankrupt in a week." And yet the clamour for nationalization goes on. It is a clamour to substitute a system of proved inefficiency for one which has worked well as a method of production. Another manifest evil is the splitting up of the community into minor aggregations, each tyrannically ruled from within, antagonistic to each other and to the community as a whole. "A spirit of mutual hostility and of collective selfishness and greed replaces the patriotism, public spirit, and citizenship on which civilization grew and on which alone it can be maintained."

The scheme of elevating the social organism as a whole without improving the individuals who compose it has only the results of degrading the individuals still further; for the "social organism" is a very low type of organism, a simple aggregate of complex units; and by absorption into an organized aggregate of this low type the individual, as we have seen, becomes functionally atrophied.

Having thus dealt faithfully and somewhat severely with our modern institutions, Dr. Freeman girds up his loins for an attack on machinery. These chapters might have been the exhortation which persuaded Samuel Butler's Erewhonians to destroy all their machines and forbid the manufacture even of a watch. "Mechanism is an independent entity governed by its own laws and having no necessary connection with human needs and human welfare." The development of the machine is in the direc-

tion of ever-increasing automatism. The total elimination of the human worker is the goal towards which it is moving. Man is being driven from the principal field of his activity.

The reign of the machine has, for the first time, made the earth hideous. The old town was an improvement to the landscape; the new town is an eyesore. The old sailing ship was a thing of beauty; the new steamer wastes no effort in vain attempts not to be ugly. A more important indictment is that before the age of machines the inroads made by man on irreplaceable material were moderate, and offered no menace to posterity.

“Pre-mechanical civilization had left the original environment of man largely undisturbed, its outward aspect little changed, its store of mineral wealth almost intact; and in so far as it had reacted upon human environment, the result of the reactions was to increase the habitability of the world for man.”

The last hundred years have seen a complete change in these conditions. Pre-mechanical man lived on the interest of his environment; mechanical man lives very extravagantly on the capital. The power-machine is an insatiable consumer of coal and iron. Nobody supposes that the world's supply of coal will last for as much as a thousand years, even if our miners (animated, no doubt, by far-seeing forethought for posterity) refuse, at frequent intervals, to bring it to the surface. The forests of the world are also being rapidly destroyed, largely to gratify the insatiable demands of the newspapers for wood pulp. Many of us will think that “one impulse from the vernal wood” might teach us more than “all the sages” who write for the daily press. But the vernal wood is being cut down. The visible tokens of the triumphant machine are our horrible factory towns with their forests of tall chimneys; their unending rows of mean houses, peopled by crowds of dingy workers; and the pall of black smoke above their heads which pours down a shower of soot through the twice-breathed air, and devastates the country for miles beyond the radius of the town itself. If those

philosophers are right who hold that beauty is an attribute of the Deity, and that ugliness of every kind is displeasing in His sight, our modern civilization is a blatant blasphemy.

Dependence on the smooth working of this complicated mechanism has made Western society much more vulnerable than it was before. Even in Russia the paralysis of commerce has turned the towns into cemeteries; and our trade unions have made the welcome discovery that they can "hold up" the community as successfully as ever Dick Turpin waylaid a coach. A revolution in England would condemn millions to actual death by starvation.

Æsthetically the influence of the machine is bad, because it destroys variety and individuality. We do not want to find the same furniture, carpets, wall-papers, and ornaments in every house; such uniformity is as dull as a picture-gallery filled with replicas of a single picture.

Dr. Freeman sums up the reactions of the power-machine on industry as follows: (1) the disappearance of the skilled craftsman and his replacement by the manufacturer and the semi-skilled or unskilled factory hand; with the like disappearance of the skilled shop-keeper and his replacement by the vendor of factory-made goods; (2) the disappearance of small local industries; (3) the disappearance of commodities made by hand with conscious adaptation to human and even personal needs, and their replacement by goods produced by machinery and adjusted to the needs of machine production. The characteristics of the new production are great quantity and small variety, low price and debasement in the character of products, (4) lowering of standard in production; (5) wasteful habits and disrespect for the products of industry; (6) lowering of public taste by frequent contact with things tastelessly designed and badly made. The worker has hitherto been the chief sufferer; but now the solitary virtue—cheapness—of machine-made articles is passing away, and the consumer also is to be pitied.

Dr. Freeman pursues his relentless attack, and considers the reaction of machinery upon man collectively. The industrial revolution was the greatest revolution that has ever occurred. Formerly, the surroundings of the

worker were usually pleasant. The hours were long, but the conditions of labour were easy, enlivened by chat with neighbours over the loom or through the smithy door. The worker was also a master who determined his own hours of work, and since he dealt directly with the consumer he received the entire profit of his labour. One of the earliest results of machinery was to break up the little society in which the workmen were amicably distributed among the rest of the population, and to concentrate the "hands" in separate aggregates, with habits and sympathies different from those of other classes. The conditions of factory labour were for half a century and more thoroughly bad, and feelings of resentment and antagonism were rooted more and more deeply in the minds of the labourers. The result has been that they have formed combinations held together by a tyrannical organization and discipline, and constantly engaged in acts of war. They lean to collectivism, which is the total suppression of personal liberty; they have no ambition to return to craftsmanship of the old kind; they have never known it and are quite unfit for it. "That the working class consists largely of men of very slight skill was clearly shown during the war, when so-called skilled men were called up for service and easily replaced by admittedly unskilled men, or even by shop-girls and domestic servants." The most sinister development of class consciousness is syndicalism, which is frankly anti-social as well as anti-democratic. It aims at setting up class antagonism and conducting class warfare. It tends to make a good fellow (for so the average workman is) into a very bad citizen.

Another evil of the present system is the opportunity which it gives to a few individuals to amass enormous fortunes which are a curse to themselves and their families and a scandal to the world. Dr. Freeman traces the evolution of an enterprising retailer into the proprietor of shops scattered all over the country, who often becomes his own grower, importer, shipowner, manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer—with profits on every stage of the business. The final stage is the amalgamation of several huge competing concerns of this type into a combine or

trust, holding a virtual monopoly. The spectacle of even a few multi-millionaires of this kind is a *reductio ad absurdum* of our whole system, and a potent factor of unrest and discontent. The plutocrats try to protect themselves by buying up and controlling the press, whereby democracy is poisoned at its source and is even coming to be regarded as an obstacle to social reform.

One other bad result remains to be noted. There are not enough consumers at home to keep the great industries running at their maximum profit, and so the surplus must be unloaded on foreign countries. Hence the scramble for markets, and the constant danger of wars for trade. Population has been stimulated on the assumption that the possibilities of export were unlimited; unfavourable trade conditions produce at once a vast amount of unemployment, which means that a large fraction of the population who, through no fault of their own, are contributing nothing to the wealth of the country, have to be supported by doles levied on the producers. Overpopulation and unemployment are the inevitable result of machine civilization.

Man, individually, is a heavy loser. The majority of workmen are, as it were, parasitic on the machine which has ousted them from natural human occupations. Let us consider the fate of a shipload of factory hands cast on a fertile but uninhabited island. Could they, like the Pilgrim Fathers, found a self-contained and civilized community? Obviously they could not. If they did not die of starvation, they would be found six months later living as savages. Dr. Freeman has watched three hundred African natives caught by a storm on the borders of the great forest in West Africa. The natives, who carried cutlasses, disappeared into the forest, from which they presently emerged carrying bundles of poles and coils of monkey-rope. In about an hour he was amazed to see a village ready for habitation. This story resembles the experience of the traveller in Tahiti, mentioned by Dr. Müller Lyer. Let us turn our thoughts once more for a moment to the Government's "Housing Scheme." Our ancestors "would no more have dreamed of asking

the State to build their houses than to comb their hair."

A melancholy chapter follows on Social Parasitism. Dr. Freeman spares no class in this part of his indictment; but he sees the greatest danger in what he considers the evident intention of "Labour" to become parasitic on the community. The essence of parasitism is the demand for remuneration determined by the desires of the producer, irrespective of the value of the work which he produces. He has no difficulty in showing how the blood of the industrious is sucked in a dozen places to feed the idle or incompetent, and the egregious bureaucracy which exists mainly to extort and squander the fruits of productive toil.

"That fabulous community whose members lived by taking in each other's washing was an economically sound concern compared with one in which a vast majority should subsist parasitically on the earnings of a dwindling minority. Yet this is the social state towards which our own society is advancing."

Dr. Freeman next (after an adverse criticism of collectivism, which he has anticipated in some earlier chapters) gives his experiences of the British "sub-man" as he saw him while inspecting conscripts. The evidences of degeneracy were painfully apparent.

"Compared with the African negro, the British sub-man is in several respects markedly inferior. He tends to be dull; he is usually quite helpless and unhandy; he has, as a rule, no skill or knowledge of handiwork, or indeed knowledge of any kind. The negro, on the contrary, is usually sprightly and humorous. He is generally well-informed as to the flora and fauna of his region, and nearly always knows the principal constellations. He has some traditional knowledge of religion, myths and folklore, and some acquaintance with music. He is handy and self-helpful; he can usually build a house, thatch a roof, obtain and prepare food, make a fire without matches,

spin yarn, and can often weave cotton cloth and make and mend simple implements. Physically he is robust, active, hardy and energetic."

Over-population is a phenomenon connected with the survival of the unfit, and it is mechanism which has created conditions favourable to the survival of the unfit and the elimination of the fit.

The whole indictment against machinery may be summed up in Dr. Freeman's own words :

"Mechanism by its reactions on man and his environment is antagonistic to human welfare. It has destroyed industry and replaced it by mere labour; it has degraded and vulgarized the works of man; it has destroyed social unity and replaced it by social disintegration and class antagonism to an extent which directly threatens civilization; it has injuriously affected the structural type of society by developing its organization at the expense of the individual; it has endowed the inferior man with political power which he employs to the common disadvantage by creating political institutions of a socially destructive type; and finally by its reactions on the activities of war it constitutes an agent for the wholesale physical destruction of man and his works and the extinction of human culture. It is thus strictly analogous to those anti-bodies by which the existence of aggregates of the lower organisms is brought to an end."

We turn eagerly from this terrible diagnosis to the consideration of remedies. "The ultimate anti-condition is the suspension of natural selection." To deal with this, elimination of the unfit is more practicable at present than eugenic attempts to breed supermen. Nevertheless the adoption of Dr. Rentoul's method of sterilization is beset with difficulties. (Personally, I think that public opinion would be so much shocked by the advocacy of it that it would set back incalculably the whole cause of racial hygiene.) So Dr. Freeman falls back on the Old Testament doctrine of a "remnant." A "nucleus of superior individuals" might render possible, even at the eleventh

hour, a social reconstruction. He suggests a "voluntary segregation of the fit," a society of men and women who would determine to lead healthy lives under natural conditions, free from the tyranny of mechanism, and supplying each other's modest needs by hand labour.

It is much to be feared that this scheme is quite unworkable. To collect a society of eugenic craftsmen and professional people in local centres would surely be impossible in such a country as England. And even if they could establish themselves in certain districts, they would not escape the burdens which the State is imposing on all hard-working citizens. They would be taxed, as Dr Freeman says that they are now, to support the swarming progeny of the unfit, to make the wastrel comfortable, and to provide soft jobs and pensions for the civil servant and the politician. The experiment would be started under conditions which would foredoom it to failure. Moreover, the trade unions would certainly attack and destroy the new society before it could grow. And lastly, from the point of view of stirpiculture, the effect of the experiment, while it lasted, would be to drain off the best, leaving the residuum worse than before.

These objections seem fatal to the establishment of a segregated "remnant" in Great Britain. But there is no reason why the experiment should not be tried in a new country. A Company might be founded to acquire a sufficient tract of land in Rhodesia, Tasmania, Western Canada, or Southern Chile, on which a community of picked emigrants might settle and try to live in the good old fashion, as Dr. Freeman wishes. It is most desirable that sociological experiments should be freely tried; for it is only by experiment that the value of proposals for an ideal commonwealth can be tested. The trade unions might easily put their theories into practice if they wished; they could start co-operative production without paying any toll to "functionless capital"; but apparently they are too prudent. The Communists, to do them justice, have not shrunk from experiments; and they have demonstrated conclusively that on a large scale Communism means the swift death of all human industry except agriculture.

Dr. Freeman's society would be less ambitious. It would aim only at reproducing the simple, self-contained social life of the age before machinery. In any country where unoccupied land of good quality can still be bought, such a community might live very happily; but not in England.

The constructive part of the book which we have been considering is therefore very disappointing. It leaves us with no remedy for a state of things which the author thinks almost desperate. So lame a conclusion to a very able social diagnosis should make us realize how deep and difficult the problem is. Civilization is faced with a great dilemma. It has grown, like every other organism, in response to its environment. It has strengthened itself by utilizing that environment to the uttermost. The secrets of nature have been penetrated, and its forces, one after another, have been harnessed to a car of Juggernaut, which seems now to be crushing its own worshippers. No society which has refused to use the new mechanical discoveries can hold its own in competition against the highly industrialized societies. Even in Europe, the Latin countries, which are poor in mineral wealth, have fallen behind in the race. The quick-witted and ambitious Japanese have bowed the knee to Baal, and their ancient culture, so pretty and gracious, is being vulgarized and brutalized before our eyes. Some of the nature-peoples, like the South Sea islanders, have withered at the first touch of the men with the machines, and seem to be dying of mere despair. And yet the all-conquering civilization of the West now appears to be stricken itself. In Dr. Freeman's language, its own activities have generated toxins which are poisoning it. The machine, though it is our master, cannot work without human auxiliaries; and these, at the moment when they seemed about to be themselves thoroughly mechanized in its service, are in violent revolt.

The Erewhonian policy of breaking up the machines is manifestly impossible in this country. It would condemn *more than half the population to starve*. We are and must remain the slaves of our machines, so long as we are unable to feed our own population.

But a mere check on natural increase will not solve the problem how we are to return to a more natural and healthy type of civilization. The remedy may be partly in our own hands. If, for example, we chose to clothe ourselves in homespun which would last half a life-time instead of in cheap machine-made garments which wear out in two or three years, one old industry might be revived. There is much to be said for making national dress reform a practical question. Women would no doubt resist it furiously, and it could not be forced upon them; but the male sex cannot be enamoured of the ugly, costly and inconvenient garments which fashion compels them to wear. An exhibition of new costumes would be very interesting, and would be popular enough to cover expenses. There are many other ways in which life could be simplified; and every unnecessary concession to fashion increases our slavery to the machine. We have seen a welcome improvement in the furniture of living rooms, which forty years ago were so encumbered with useless tables and chairs and cheap ornaments that there was hardly room to turn round. We ought to accustom ourselves to think of the conditions under which everything that we buy is produced. We should then take much more pleasure in a hand-made article, with some individuality in it, than in a standardized product of a great factory, which speaks of nothing but soulless and irksome labour. There are still opportunities of encouraging good craftsmanship, in wood-carving, for instance, and house decoration. The real difficulty is that the uneducated do not seem to wish for good articles, unless they can boast of the price they paid for them. We are now suffering from standardized minds as well as from standardized commodities; and they suit each other. It would be a very wholesome sign if workmen were to refuse to be bound either by trade union rules or by the "customs of the trade," and were to insist on working according to their own bent, and selling the works of their own hands. So far, the outcry against mechanism has come mainly from artistic disciples of Ruskin and Morris; the workman aims not at humanizing the quality of his labour, but at diminishing its quantity.

We may, however, trust with confidence to the permanence of that best side of human nature, which makes good and beautiful creation one of the chief pleasures of life. Opportunity only is needed.

Behind all this, there is the strange question whether man the toolmaker did not, when he made that momentous choice, forfeit the possibility of further intrinsic progress. Can we say that as is the photographer to the painter, so is man as he is to man as he might have been? We all admit the blunder of slavery; it is not good for man to compel other men to fetch and carry for him till he becomes almost as helpless as Lord Avebury's slave-holding ants, which cannot even feed themselves. But must we also pay the penalty for our lavish use of "lifeless instruments," as Aristotle called our non-human slaves? Is the man of the machine age condemned to progressive functional atrophy of all the aptitudes which are useful to the savage but unnecessary for himself? And is this functional atrophy the beginning of a deplorable atavism such as Dr. Freeman found in his British "sub-men" when compared with his West African negroes? We seem to be getting near the position of Edward Carpenter's *Civilization: its Cause and Cure*. And yet, if we were given our wish, and transported back to a century when human muscles did nearly all the work that was done, we should be intensely irritated at the waste of time and energy which we should find everywhere. It would not be long before we began to write a book called *Barbarism: its Cause and Cure*, for the benefit of our benighted contemporaries.

It is probably very much too late to reverse the decision which our ancestors made tens of thousands of years ago, and which may, for aught we know, have preserved our valuable species from being nipped in the bud. For better or worse, man is the tool-using animal, and as such he has become the lord of creation. When he is lord also of himself, he will deserve his self-chosen title of *homo sapiens*. It is something that we can see before us the dilemma of civilization. Diagnosis is not the same as cure; but in some diseases it is more than half of the physician's task. The two anthropologists whose books we have been

considering agree in their diagnosis, though they differ as to treatment. Both are convinced that civilized man, in enslaving the forces of nature, has become less of a man than he was before. He has succeeded in partially super-seeding himself; many of his natural activities are left unused; and in consequence he is neither healthy nor happy. Outraged nature, as Gibbon says, has her occasional revenges; and civilization is in danger of becoming a systematic and sustained outrage against nature. The German savant sees the remedy in more perfect organization; in other words, our conquest of our environment is to be made more complete. The Englishman advocates the practice of eugenics and of the simple life for those who are willing to submit to this discipline; he has, apparently, no hope that the mechanization of life can ever be turned to the real improvement and happiness of mankind. It may be that as the German, writing before the cataclysm, under-estimates the disruptive forces in society and proposes to "heal too slightly" the wounds of modern life, so the Englishman is too ready to assume that the disorders which have followed the war indicate a final break-up of our whole social order. The future will show whether civilization, as we know it, can be mended or must be ended. The time seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life, which may remould society, as no less potent force would have the strength to do.

NOTES

PATRIOTISM

P. 22. *Mr. Grant Allen* : (1848-1899), novelist and writer on scientific subjects. Author of *Physiological Aesthetics* ; *The Evolutionist at Large* ; *Force and Energy, a Theory of Dynamics* ; *Charles Darwin* ; *The Evolution of the Idea of God*, etc., etc.

Mr. Havelock Ellis (b. 1859) : A leading writer on sociological and psychological subjects ; chiefly known for his elaborate studies in the psychology of sex.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) : The founder of the Synthetic Philosophy, an attempt to co-ordinate the results of evolutionary science in one all-embracing system of thought. The Philosophy is contained in a series of volumes published between 1862-1896, and falls in four main divisions : I, Biology ; II, Psychology ; III, Sociology ; IV, Ethics.

The Aristotelian Canon : In the early years of Greek philosophic speculation one of the most frequently debated questions was that of the comparative claims of *phusis* (Nature) and *nomos* (Custom) as a guide for the conduct of life. In other words, should men obey the primitive instincts which had been implanted in them by Nature, or those modifications and acquired ideas which culture and civilization had brought in their train ? Echoes of this controversy are to be found throughout the Platonic Dialogues, particularly in the *Republic*, where we have the Socratic doctrine of Justice set against the "nature" doctrine of "Might is Right." Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), with his usual clear-sightedness, was the first to see that the word "nature" is capable of three interpretations :— (1) what anything has been, its origin ; (2) what it is ; and (3) what it is destined to become—and showed that the last is the most important of the three.

Marcus Aurelius (121-180) : The second of the Antonine Emperors of Rome and perhaps the truest type, afforded by history, of the philosopher-king. His famous *Meditations*, which breathe the noblest spirit of Stoic philosophy and are nowadays perhaps the most widely read of the ethical works of antiquity, were written in the intervals of campaigning against the barbarians. It was not without reason that

Marcus Aurelius was proud of being "an Antonine"; for under the four successive Emperors (Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and himself), A.D. 98-180, historians are generally agreed that the world was better governed than it has ever been before or since. Fielding, in *Tom Jones*, refers to the Age of the Antonines as the one Golden Age that mankind has ever enjoyed; while for Gibbon's opinion of this memorable epoch the reader should consult Chapters I-III of the *Decline and Fall*. Much of Marcus Aurelius' reign was spent in fighting against the savage races on his frontiers, amongst them the Sarmatians, a nomad people which roamed over the plains of Eastern Europe. Cecrops, in Greek legend, was the first King of Attica and the founder of Athens. What Marcus Aurelius means is that, whereas for most men their city or state is the object of their patriotic love and devotion, the sage will look upon the whole world as his city and will reverence God as its Founder.

P. 23. *Whether any good thing can come out of Nazareth*: A phrase, which has now become proverbial, typifying the local arrogance which refuses to believe that anything of merit can come from foreign or unfamiliar parts. Nazareth, a small town in the district of Lake Galilee, was the home of Jesus Christ and the words, which are taken from the first chapter of the Gospel of St. John, verse 46, were used by Nathaniel, a Jew, when called by the Apostle Philip to see Jesus of "whom Moses did write."

Pepys: Samuel Pepys (1632-1703), the famous diarist. His *Diary*, which was begun in 1659 or 1660 and continued down to the year 1669, records the minutest happenings of his daily life and gives an extraordinarily vivid picture of the England of the Restoration period. Written in cipher, it was only deciphered by the Rev. J. Smith in 1825, in which year a first, and incomplete, edition appeared. Since then fuller editions have been published; but the nature of some of the contents makes a complete edition impossible.

Defoe: Daniel Defoe (1660-1731), known to most readers as the author of *Robinson Crusoe*, was in reality one of the most voluminous writers in the whole history of English literature. Historically he is the founder of the English novel. The remark quoted is from *A New Voyage Round the World*, published in 1725.

Cleveland: John Cleveland, the satirical poet, lived from 1613-1658. According to the Biblical story (Genesis, chap. iv) Cain, the eldest son of Adam and Eve, murdered his brother Abel and was thereupon condemned by God to be a homeless wanderer. "A fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth."

P. 24. *Dr. Johnson's gibes* : Dr. Johnson, on a memorable occasion, characterized patriotism as "the last refuge of a scoundrel." In considering this remark we should, of course, make allowances for the Doctor's surly fits and also recollect that there was much in the political life of that time to invest the claim to "patriotism" with a certain dubiousness.

Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) : Prime Minister of England from 1855-1858 and again from 1859-1865, was the typical "John Bull" among politicians and the idol of the British public. As Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1830-1841 and 1850-1854) he exercised an enormous influence on the continent of Europe, but was apt, as Dr. Inge suggests, to wield the bludgeon. Cp. *The Victorian Age*, p. 103.

Goldsmith describes, etc. : From the *Traveller*, ll. 325-6.

Michelet : Jules Michelet (1798-1874) the most picturesque and vigorous of French historians. His most notable works are the *History of France* in eighteen volumes (1833-1867) and the *History of the Revolution* in seven volumes (1847-1853).

Milton's opinion, etc. : In his *Areopagitica*.

Sale of Wives at Smithfield : Smithfield was an open space in the City of London, used for many centuries as a cattle market, but closed in 1855; now the chief centre of the meat trade. For actual cases of the sale of wives in England see *Chambers' Book of Days*, Vol. I, p. 487.

P. 25. *Purgation of the emotions* : Referring to the famous dictum of Aristotle in his *Poetics* that the chief function of Tragedy is to purge the emotions through pity and terror. The word "purgation" (in Greek, *Katharsis*) has been the subject of much controversy, but its meaning would seem to be that of the draining away of all ignoble elements in the spirit of the spectator, by the presentment of some noble tragic theme, which should flood his heart with a pure emotion of pity for the suffering hero, while at the same time filling him with deep awe at the just judgment of heaven.

P. 26. "*Mehrer des Reichs*" : i.e. "Expander of the realm."

P. 27. *Atavistic and pathological* : i.e. motives which are either derived from instincts inherited from the savage past of the race, or are due to some kind of morbid derangement.

The moral instinct of the ancient Greeks, etc. : This refers to the famous Greek doctrine of "Nemesis." Nemesis, or "retribution," the ancients regarded as the eternal law which restores equilibrium in human affairs and which, therefore, visits with a tremendous judgment any kind of *hybris*, or "insolence," i.e. such arrogance as, arising from power or prosperity, tempts man to believe himself immune from the

Moral Law and capable of defying the Gods. The dramatic downfall of *hybris*, by the sudden stroke or silent pressure of Nemesis, was the constantly recurring theme of Greek Tragedy.

Thucydides: Thucydides (471-circa 400 B.C.), the great Athenian historian, wrote the *History of the Peloponnesian War* (431-404 B.C.), in eight books. The pleadings of the envoys from Melos, when the Athenians were planning an attack upon that island in 416, and the arrogant replies of the Athenians are to be found in the fifth book of the History. Mytilene, or Lesbos, which in 476 had joined the Athenian League, revolted against Athens in 429, and was swiftly reduced to obedience and visited with the harshest penalties. Both these incidents are recorded by Thucydides as examples of "the pride that goeth before a fall." The fall, as Dr. Inge mentions, came with the great expedition, under Nikias, against Syracuse, the capital of Sicily (415-413 B.C.), which ended in complete disaster for Athens and destroyed, once and for all, the hopes of an extended Athenian Empire. Thucydides' account of the ill-fated expedition is one of the most powerfully dramatic episodes in all written history.

Machiavelli's "Prince": Niccolo dei Machiavelli (1469-1527) was the author of several historical and political works, as well as a treatise on the Art of War. But the work by which he is universally known is *Il Principe* ("The Prince"), which was designed as a manual of instruction in statecraft and the art of absolute government, and took, as its type of the successful autocrat, the famous (and infamous) Cesare Borgia, natural son of Pope Alexander VI. The general character of the advice given in this work has made the word "Machiavellian" a synonym for ruthless and unscrupulous cunning. But, for a rather more modified judgment on the book and its doctrines, see the opening pages of Dr. Inge's essay on *The God-State*, pp. 46-49.

Seneca: Lucius Annaeus Seneca (circa 4 B.C.-65 A.D.), Roman philosopher and man of letters. Seneca was appointed tutor to the youthful Nero, who afterwards, as Emperor, ordered him to commit suicide, in consequence of his supposed complicity in the conspiracy of Piso. Seneca's writings include many philosophical treatises and eight tragedies. His philosophy was a blend of Stoicism and Epicureanism, and his ethical writings are lofty in tone.

Poland (Partitions): Poland suffered no less than three partitions at the end of the eighteenth century. The first was in 1772 when 72,000 square miles of her territory were appropriated and divided by Russia, Prussia and Austria. The second was in 1793, when the two first of these Powers

seized another 118,000 square miles. The third and last partition came two years later, when in 1795 the three Powers, already mentioned, divided up the remainder of her country, an area of 85,000 square miles. With that, Poland, as a nation, ceased to exist, until its restoration in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles.

P. 28. *We hauled down the French flag in Canada*: French Canada, after a long struggle, was finally ceded to the British by the Treaty of Paris, 1763. Families in French Canada show extraordinary statistics, the same parents having often as many as twenty children—a striking contrast to the French race in its own country and in other parts of the world.

The Americans have made Cuba: Cuba, which had belonged to Spain since its discovery by Columbus in 1492, became an independent Republic, under the protection of the United States of America, after the total destruction of the Spanish fleet in August 1898—a victory which ended the brief Cuban war.

Tenon, Dufau, etc.: Modern writers on Sociology and Eugenics.

P. 29. *Schiller*: Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), poet and dramatist; after his friend and contemporary Goethe, the leading name in German literature. The words quoted mean, in English: "War always swallows up the best."

Socrates said to Polus: Polus was a sophist and rhetorician of the fifth century B.C., a native of Agrigentum in Sicily and a pupil of the famous Gorgias of that town. The words quoted are from the *Gorgias* of Plato, in which dialogue Polus is introduced as one of the speakers and as an advocate of the "might is right" doctrine, so generally associated with Sophistic teachings.

St. James: The "judgment of the Epistle of St. James," to which Dr. Inge alludes, is to be found in the fourth chapter of that Epistle, verses 1 and 2. "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not."

P. 30. *Bacon is frankly militarist*: The passage quoted is taken from his essay *Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates*.

Shakespeare's "Henry V": Owing, of course, to the splendid and heart-stirring martial ardour of King Henry's famous exhortation to his troops (Act III, Sc. 1) and his noble speech to Westmoreland on the eve of the Battle of Agincourt (Act IV, Sc. 3).

The "bankruptcy of Christianity" : Cp. Dr. Inge refers to the same point in another of his essays, *The Indictment against Christianity*. He there remarks : "It was not generally felt to be a scandal to Christianity that England was at war for 69 years out of the 120 which preceded the battle of Waterloo." But the reason he gives for the change is somewhat different; for he attributes the shock, given by the Great War of 1914 to the educated conscience, to the deadly blow which its savage ferocity inflicted upon the modern complacent belief in progress. Here, however, he would appear to look upon it as due to a growth in sensitiveness of conscience. But the true reason probably is that the boldness of thought which could raise the question, "Has Christianity failed?" was not so generally diffused a hundred years ago.

The Greeks, who at last perished : The Greek States, as free and independent entities, perished in the conquest of Greece by Philip of Macedon (357-336 B.C.), in which conquest Philip was undoubtedly enabled to achieve success by the private ambitions and independent action of such States as Thebes, Thessaly, Sparta, and Athens, which persisted in pursuing their own several policies and refused to combine. The final extinction of Grecian liberties came with the Lamian War and the battle of Crannon (322), won by Alexander's General, Antipater, immediately after the death of his master.

In their day of triumph over the Persians : The crowning glory of the early history of Athens was her defeat of the two great Persian expeditions of the beginning of the fifth century B.C., which threatened destruction not only to herself but to Greek civilization as a whole. The decisive victory which frustrated the first invasion was the land battle of Marathon in 490 B.C.; that which repulsed the second was the naval battle of Salamis in 480.

P. 31. *The "Persæ"* of Æschylus (525-456 B.C.), the earliest in time of the three great Athenian tragic poets, was awarded the first prize at the Dionysiac Festival in 472. Æschylus himself had fought both at Marathon and Salamis.

"Virtus" and "gravitas" : Such characters as those of the two Catos, or of Cincinnatus, the hero who was called to the dictatorship from his plough and returned to his farm after it was over, ever appealed to the Roman sentiment. As the Roman power developed and luxury and self-indulgence increased, the pages of the poets are full of laments for the *prisca virtus*, "the ancient virtue," and the old sternness and simplicity of life.

Claudian : Claudius Claudianus, the last of the classical Latin poets, flourished in the last part of the fourth century

A.D. and the first few years of the fifth. The date of his death is supposed to have been the year 408. Some Christian hymns have been attributed to him; but it is certain that these are spurious and that he was a Pagan. The translation of the passage in the text is as follows: "She (Rome) it is, who alone received the conquered into her bosom and fostered the whole race of men under a common name, even like a mother, not a mistress of slaves; and who called those, whom she had tamed, her citizens and, through all her length and breadth, knit them together in a bond of filial love." Only sixty-eight years after the death of Claudian the last ruler of the Western Empire, Romulus Augustulus was deposed by Odoacer, King of the Heruli; and with him ended the old Roman Empire (A.D. 476).

Cockpit of rival empires: Such rival empires were those of Assyria, Babylonia and Egypt. A "cockpit" was originally a pit in which matches were fought between game-cocks—a sport very popular in England in the eighteenth century. Hence the word has come to be metaphorically used of any territory which, owing to its geographical position, has been the scene of constant wars between the neighbours which hem it in. Such a territory, in European history, has been that of Belgium, which has had the misfortune to be placed between the two great countries of France and Germany and which also lies on the direct line between England and the continent of Europe.

A theocracy: A Theocracy is a form of government in which the whole of life is ordered in relation to a religious idea and in which the chief authority centres in the priesthood. This was true of the Jews, whose whole polity was governed by what they believed to be the divinely given laws of Moses, and among whom the Sanhedrim, or College of Priests, over remained the internal authority, whatever might be the secular government under whom the race might happen to find itself. The theocratic form of government is fully discussed in the first of Dr. Inge's four essays on *The State Visible and Invisible*, of which the essay on *The Modern God-State*, included in this selection, is the third.

In the first century of our era: The Jewish conception of the Messiah, to whose advent the whole race had for ages looked forward, was of a divine God-sent national Hero and Liberator, who should free the Hebrew race from foreign rule. Nothing could be further from their traditional preconceptions than the figure of Christ. Nor were the teachings of Christ likely to appeal to a people whose whole religion was inseparably bound up with nationalism.

P. 32. *In the East she displaced monarchies no less alien*: Such as, for example, the Seleucids in Persia, Bactria and

Asia Minor, and the Ptolemies in Egypt, both of which dynasties were descended from generals of Alexander the Great and were Greek in race.

The lesson has its warning: The train of thought is not, perhaps, quite clear at first sight. What Dean Inge means is that the encouragement of a spirit of healthy nationalism in the several units composing an empire makes eventually for the strength and well-being of that empire. The "modern theorists," to whom he refers, are those short-sighted prophets of a denationalizing imperialism who hold the opposite views. Had the countries which lay nearest to Rome enjoyed, in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., an indigenous life of their own, he thinks that they might have rallied to the support of the Western Empire in the hour of its peril, and so prevented its destruction.

The grand idea of an universal state: From the date of the coronation of Otto the Great in 962, there existed, theoretically, in Europe, two universal Powers, which between them shared the government of the world: the secular power, represented by the Holy Roman Empire, and the spiritual power, represented by the Catholic Church. Each was supreme in its own sphere: for just as all ecclesiastical authorities everywhere acknowledged the universal sovereignty of the Pope, so all lesser monarchs were held to be feudatories of the Empire and to derive their authority from the Emperor himself. This unification of the Western world into a single polity, which is here rightly called "a grand idea," is the subject of the second of Dean Inge's Hibbert Lectures on *The State Visible and Invisible*. In that lecture he sets forth the ideal as it presented itself to the medieval mind—an ideal which is perhaps most completely expressed in the conception of Nicolas of Cusa, who held that "the Church and Empire are inseparable and interdependent, like body and soul, under the unity of the Spirit"—and shows why it failed of realization. The reason was that, unfortunately for the idea, the conception of two co-equal powers never appealed to either Pope or Emperor; and the history of Europe up to the fourteenth century was that of an unceasing struggle for supremacy between the civil and spiritual monarchies—the Popes contending that the Empire was but the secular arm of the Papacy; the Emperors, that the Church was merely the ecclesiastical arm of the Empire. The victory (if it could be so called, in a conflict that was never ultimately decided) went to the Popes. The two rival parties became known as the Guelfs and Ghibellines. But the whole controversy was ere long rendered academic by the rise of independent monarchies strong enough, on the one side, to defy the Emperor, and on the other side, if occasion arose, to disregard the authority of the Pope—such monarchies, e.g., as those of France, Spain and Bohemia.

France became a nation : The "Hundred Years" war between France and England began in 1339, in the reign of Philip VI, when Edward III of England put forward his quite unjustified claim to the throne of France. It continued sporadically till the reign of Charles VII, and ended with the complete discomfiture and withdrawal of the English in 1453. With Louis XII, who succeeded Charles VII, begins the rapid consolidation of the monarchy and the welding of the French people into one nation.

Spain achieved unity : The conquest of Spain by the Moors began in 714 and lasted till 732, by which time they had become masters of the whole country. The Moorish occupation, which, in the Dark Ages, made Spain the only civilized country in Western Europe, lasted for over seven centuries, only ending, after a long period of gradual dislodgement, in the expulsion of Boabdil, the last King of Granada, in 1492. One event which did much to help Spain to liberate herself from Moorish rule was the uniting of the two Spanish kingdoms of Castille and Aragon, by the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon with Isabella of Castille, in 1469.

Holland found herself in the heroic struggle : The first blow in the great struggle, by which Holland freed herself from Spanish tyranny and the horrors of the Inquisition, was struck in the capture of Briel in 1572 by the "Beggars of the Sea." The struggle lasted seventy-six years, ending in 1648, when, by the Treaty of Munster, Holland became an independent country. The heroic figure of the conflict is William the Silent, Prince of Orange (1533-1584). Its darkest figure is the terrible Duke of Alva (1508-1582), Philip II's Vicoroy and Generalissimo in the Netherlands. The story of Holland's long fight for freedom has been nobly told in Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*.

P. 33. *Lord Acton* (1834-1902): Professor of History at Cambridge from 1895, and the most learned but least productive of historians. His chief work was the inauguration of the great *Cambridge Modern History*, which has been written entirely on the lines laid down by him. Lord Acton's vast and unique library of historical works came, after his death, into the possession of Lord (then Mr. John) Morley, who presented it to Cambridge University.

Marriage or conquest : Charles V (1500-1558) was the greatest and most powerful of the Emperors of the House of Hapsburg. His enormous heritage had come to him largely from matrimonial alliances. Thus, the marriage of his grandfather, Maximilian II, with Mary of Burgundy, had brought with it the possession of the Low Countries; while that of his father, Philip I, with Joanna of Spain carried with it the still mightier dowry of the Kingdom of Spain and Naples and the Spanish conquests in America. These and other

successful marriages were the occasion of the well-known line: *Bella gerant alii; tu felix, Austria, nube.* "Let others wage wars; do thou, O Austria of happier fate, marry instead!"

An uprising took place: The Spanish uprising began soon after the capture of Madrid by Napoleon's Marshal, Murat, in 1807 and developed into the Peninsular War, which eventually, with the assistance of the English armies under Sir Arthur Wellesley, drove the French out of Spain. Prussia, which had been completely crushed at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 and humbled to the dust by the Treaty of Tilsit, 1807, soon began to recover under her military leaders, Scharnhorst and Stein. The recovery culminated in the part she was able to take in the great defeat of the Napoleonic armies at Leipzig in 1813, followed, during the Hundred Days, by the decisive assistance lent by Blücher at Waterloo.

Mere doctrines, like those of Rousseau: Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), was the famous doctrinaire who, in spite of a contemptible private character, exercised an enormous influence on the ideas of his time and is generally held to have been one of the main factors in the complex movement of thought which prepared the way for the Revolution of 1789. His most famous works are *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1760), *Le Contrat Social* and *Emile* (both published 1762). See note on p. 164.

Tilsit: The Treaty of Tilsit (see above) was made between Napoleon and the two countries of Prussia and Russia. The Treaty was favourable to Russia, but by it Prussia lost half her territory and was subjected to the most humiliating conditions.

The Congress of Vienna: The Congress of Vienna sat from the 20th September, 1814, to the 10th June, 1815. Its business was to clear up and re-order the affairs of Europe after the final overthrow of Napoleon. Dominated by the dynastically-minded Austrian Minister, Prince Metternich, it restored to alien rulers a number of territories for which it might have arranged a different future. Naples was given back to the Bourbons; Sardinia to the House of Savoy; Tuscany, Modena and Parma to Austria; while the latter Power also extended its empire over Lombardy, Venetia, Illyria, Dalmatia, Tyrol, Salzburg and Eastern Galicia; and Prussia obtained, amongst other territories, Swedish Pomerania and Rhenish Province.

P. 34. *It was only by slow degrees:* Italy, which had never been, since the disruption of the old Roman Empire, anything but a congeries of independent states, achieved national unity, under the House of Savoy, in 1860. The unification of the German States under the suzerainty of Prussia was the work of Bismarck and was achieved in 1866. Germany became an

empire after the Franco-Prussian War, King William of Prussia being proclaimed German Emperor on the 18th of January, 1871.

In Austria-Hungary : By the Treaty of Versailles most of the several national units composing the old Austrian Empire have been made into independent States. Thus, Hungary has now broken away from Austria, and Bohemia has become the Czecho-Slovakian Republic.

The "organic" unity of a political or geographical enclave : In other words, they attribute to an artificial political unit, or to a territorial area, a corporate life of its own, as though it were an actual entity. "Enclave," a French word, means anything shut in, or circumscribed; hence, here, any unit artificially produced by drawing a line round it—whether that line be drawn by Nature, in the shape of geographical boundaries, or by politicians, in the shape of delimitations by treaty. Such units, Dean Inge says, are not really living organisms and cannot be legislated for as such.

The Fabian Society : A Socialist Society founded in London in 1883, and still existing, which aims at the re-ordering of society, in the light of Socialist ideals, by a gradual and cautious policy rather than by any sudden upheaval. It derives its name from the celebrated Roman General Quintus Fabius Maximus, who, having been elected dictator in 221 B.C., overcame Hannibal by a policy of long-continued guerilla warfare, and thus acquired the name *Cunctator* or "The Delayer."

A sort of Platonic idea of coercive authority : According to Plato, the ultimate reality of life is to be found in a super-sensible world of Ideas which embody themselves partially and imperfectly in this lower world of objects and phenomena. Thus, e.g., all beautiful objects are beautiful in so far as they participate in, and embody, something of the supreme Idea of the Beautiful. In much the same way, Dr. Inge says, the modern ruler is a kind of abstract Authority, of which all lower authorities in the State are the embodiment, or partial expressions.

P. 35. *The belief of the Germans* : The theory would appear to be based on the exploits of the Northmen, or Normans, who in the tenth and eleventh centuries gave monarchs and aristocracies to so many European countries, and whose original home was in Scandinavia. Dean Inge apparently uses the term Nordic as equivalent to Aryan, which in turn seems in the text to be made equivalent to Germans. But it should be noted that this last is the theory of the Germans themselves, and not of Dr. Inge. The Nordic race may be a branch of the great Aryan family; but the two terms are not synonymous.

P. 36. *Nietzsche*: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), the famous German philosopher. His philosophy denounces all religion and regards the ordinary laws of morality as a Christian superstition invented for the self-protection of the weak against the strong. Nietzsche's ideal is the ruthless and non-moral superman. His most famous work is *Thus spake Zarathustra*, published in 1896. It is from the "great blond beasts" or "Nordic giants" that the Superman of the future is, according to Nietzsche, to be evolved.

The Huns and Tartars: The Huns were a race originally seated in Mongolia, who from the end of the second century B.C. began to extend their empire westwards. Under Attila, who reigned from 433 to 453, the Hunnish Empire extended over a great portion of the known globe, from China in the East to the Danube in the West. Attila alone, says Gibbon, "among the conquerors of ancient and modern times, united the two mighty kingdoms of Germany and Scythia." After his defeat by Aetius in 451 his onerous empire rapidly crumbled to pieces. The Tartars, who also originally came from China, built up in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a vast empire right across northern and central Asia and beyond the eastern confines of Europe. Under their most celebrated leader, Genghis Khan (1162–1227), they achieved the conquest of Upper India.

P. 37. *Julius Caesar said*: "*Duas res*," etc.: From Caesar's *Gallie War*, Book I. "Two things before all else the Gauls pursue with the utmost industry, namely, the art of war and the study of eloquence."

Madame de Staël (1766–1817): Daughter of Necker, the French statesman, and a celebrated woman of letters of the Napoleonic era. Having incurred the enmity of Napoleon by her political views and writings she was forced to spend the latter years of her life in exile. She paid two visits to Germany, in 1803 and 1807.

Prince Bismarck: The founder of the German Empire, was born on the 1st April, 1815, and died 30th July, 1898. He held the office of Imperial Chancellor from the foundation of the empire up till March 1890, when growing disagreements with the Emperor, William II, forced him to resign.

P. 38. *Bishop Berkeley* (1688–1753): Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland, the famous idealistic philosopher. Berkeley's chief works were his *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), the *Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) and *Alciphron* (1732).

The great words of Abraham Lincoln: Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), President of the United States of America from 1860 to the time of his death by assassination. The Civil

War, which arose out of the determination of the North to abolish slavery in the Southern States, and the consequent secession of the South from the Union, lasted from 1861 to 1864. The victory of the North was, in large measure, made possible by the noble statesmanship and unflinching courage of Lincoln, whose greatness of character has established him, next to George Washington, as the national hero of America.

P. 39. *St. Paul's willingness to be accursed* : The reference is to the Epistle to the Romans, chapter ix, verse 3 : "For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh." The difference between this and Machiavelli's utterance is that Machiavelli regards secular national interests as higher than spiritual interests, even those of his own soul; whereas it is St. Paul's very conviction of the all-importance of spiritual things which makes him ready to give up all, in order that his countrymen may share in them—even to the point of sacrificing his own private salvation for their sakes.

Lowell's Hosea Biglow : James Russell Lowell (1819-1891), American poet and essayist. Hosea Biglow is a character in Lowell's *Biglow Papers*, which were a satire on Slavery and the Mexican War.

So Socrates said : In Plato's *Republic*. Compare the words quoted from Marcus Aurelius at the beginning of the present essay.

P. 40. "*Copperheads*" : i.e. sympathizers with the South living in the North during the Civil War in the United States. The copperhead is a poisonous serpent that gives no warning of its approach. The term was therefore used to describe a secret foe.

Every enemy of England : The reference is to a number of wars in which Great Britain has been engaged in the course of the past half-century. The Mad Mullah was a religious chief who succeeded in conquering a great part of the Soudan. His forces were finally defeated at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. The Boer War lasted from October 1898 to May 1902. The international expedition against the Boxer rebels in China was sent out in 1900 and completed its work in September 1901. There have been a number of Mahdis in Mohammedan history, all of whom have claimed to be the "hidden Imam" and the long-expected regenerator of the world. The one referred to here is the conqueror of the Soudan, who killed Gordon in Khartoum in 1882. The Afriids are a tribe or clan on the North-west Frontier of India, about the Khyber Pass. "Afrikander," originally the name given to South African settlers of European parentage, came to be used for the political party in favour of the extension of Dutch.

as against British, influence in that country. Matabeloland is a territory lying to the north of the Transvaal. The Matabele War lasted from October 1893 to 1894.

À bas la patrie : "Down with the fatherland !"

P. 41. *Tolstoy* : Count Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), the famous Russian novelist, mystic and social reformer. Although wealthy and of a noble family, from the year 1862 onward he voluntarily lived the simple life of a peasant. The quotation in the text is from his *Patriotism and Christianity*, published in 1896.

P. 42. *Molière* (1622-1673) : The great French comic dramatist. The line quoted means : "The friend of the whole human race isn't at all in my line."

Brunctière : Ferdinand Brunctière (1849-1906), French literary critic. Philosophically he was an idealistic pessimist. The words in the text mean : "Neither Nature nor History would, in fact, have all men brothers."

Chauvinism : The French equivalent for "Jingoism." The word is derived from a character named Chauvin, in the comedy of *La Cocarde Tricolore* ("The Tricolour Cockade"), by the brothers Cognard, produced in 1831, in which Chauvin, a young recruit, is continually venting a flamboyant, fire-breathing patriotism.

M. Paul Bourget : M. Bourget, who was born in 1852 and is still living, is one of the most distinguished of modern French novelists, famous for the subtlety of his analyses of character. The Neo-Catholic movement in France was started by Le Maistre and Chateaubriand in the early years of the nineteenth century and aimed at bringing France under the control of the Papacy. See note on p. 196.

P. 43. *Mazzini* : Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) was the fiery Italian patriot and champion of liberty, whose eloquent pen and unceasing activities played so great a part in the unification of Italy and in freeing her from the Papal, Austrian and Bourbon yokes. Mazzini's life was one long romance of hair-breadth escapes from capture and imprisonment. Much of his time was spent in England, which was the only country in which he could find security.

Pitt paid for the great war : William Pitt (1759-1806), second son of the celebrated Earl of Chatham, and Prime Minister of England from 1783-1801 and 1804-1806. The reference is to Pitt's manipulation of the Sinking Fund, a fund originally established by Sir Robert Walpole in 1716 for the gradual repayment of the National Debt by putting aside annually so many millions for that purpose. During the Napoleonic Wars, when an enormously increased indebtedness had to be

faced (the wars cost England about £600,000,000), the maintenance of the Sinking Fund meant that, in addition to every sum of money borrowed for immediate war purposes, a further sum had to be borrowed for paying into the Sinking Fund, thus enormously increasing the burden of debt and also, incidentally, putting up the rate of interest at which the loan was secured.

Hague Tribunal : An International Court of Arbitration to settle disputes between nations, set up at the Hague in 1899 at the instance of the Czar, Nicholas II, of Russia. It must be remembered that this essay was written by Dr. Inge in 1915, some years before the present League of Nations came into being.

P. 44. *Henry V's speech at Agincourt* : "Gasconade" is boastful, blustering talk. The Gascons had a reputation for boasting. The speech referred to is that addressed to Westmoreland (Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Act IV, Scene 3). See note above on p. 143.

The scene where John of Gaunt takes leave : in Shakespeare's *Richard II*, Act II, Scene 1, containing the famous lines in which the dying Duke of Lancaster apostrophizes his native country :

"This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,

This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England."

"*If I forget thee, O Jerusalem*" : From Psalm 137, which is an impassioned and beautiful lament composed during the captivity of the Jewish race at Babylon, whither it had been carried off after the storming of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, in 588 B.C. "How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning. If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy" (verses 4-6).

Eton.—Eton and Winchester are two of the most famous of English Public Schools.

THE GOD-STATE

P. 46. *Troeltsch* : Dr. Ernst Troeltsch (born 1865). German historian. Author of the *Political Ethics of Christianity*, etc.

The great struggles for freedom : Such struggles, for example, as that between the Parliament and the King in England, and

the great revolt against medievalism which culminated in the revolution in 1789 in France. The last vestige of the Middle Ages may be said to have disappeared when Napoleon abolished the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.

The Peloponnesian War : See note on page 142.

P. 47. *The Protestant Doctrine of total depravity* : The belief that every human being is born in sin and has no merit of any kind, except what may be imparted to him by the grace and mercy of God through Jesus Christ.

Tarde : Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904), sociological writer.

Anatole France (1844-1925) : Poet, novelist, and satirist, and the most distinguished man of letters in France of the last half-century. The quotation is from his *Isle of the Penguins*.

Pecus : is the Latin for a "herd" and is used here of mankind in the mass.

Of forms of government : This natural process of deterioration in forms of government is referred to by Plato in his *Republic*, and by Aristotle in his *Politics*. The truth, which history abundantly illustrates, is that no form of government has any special or particular merit in itself. All depends on the manner in which it is wielded. Compare Popo's well-known couplet :

"For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administered is best."

This profound observation : Some of the most successful rulers, in this sense, have been men whom history would regard as, in themselves, bad kings, e.g. Louis XI of France, or Henry VIII of England.

P. 48. "*The observance of the ordinances of religion*" : This sentence is likely to come as a surprise to readers whose idea of Machiavelli is based merely on the popular tradition associated with his name.

Plotinus (A.D. 205-270) : The greatest of the philosophers of the Neoplatonic school. See note on page 181.

I am afraid we must admit : In spite of Dr. Inge's statement, it is difficult to see how any thorough-going application of the principles of Christianity to practical politics would have been possible, at any period during the Christian era, in view of the general level of thought and feeling among the peoples of Europe. The same thing could be said of any part of the world and of the principles of any of the great religions. Machiavelli's opinion is probably that of nine out of ten politicians even at the present day.

The desperate state of his country's fortunes : Italy in the time of Machiavelli, as for a long period before and after, was broken up into a number of warring city states, each at the mercy, not merely of any combination of its neighbours, but of any ambitious adventurer who could gather sufficient power to make himself master of its government. Most of the Italian dynasties had been founded by military adventurers like the Sforzas and Viscontis at Milan, the Malatestas at Rimini, etc.

P. 49. *The Inquisition* : The Inquisition, which was a tribunal in the Roman Catholic Church for the detection and suppression of heresy and unbelief, was first established as a permanent institution by Pope Innocent IV, in 1248. Its final abolition in Spain, the last country to retain it, was in 1835. The last infliction of the death penalty was as recently as 1820, when a schoolmaster in Barcelona was burned for deism. By universal consent, the Inquisition was the greatest blot on the religious history of Europe. It reached the height of its infamy in Spain, and the territories under Spanish rule, in the sixteenth century.

Grotius : Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is one of the most celebrated names in the history of International Law, his great work on the subject remaining, for a long period, the standard authority. In it he developed anew the old Greek idea of a "natural law" as the foundation of the law governing the intercourse of nations, and worked this out into a carefully formulated and detailed system of rules. Although, with the growing complexity of modern civilization, many new rules have had to be developed by international jurists, the principles of Grotius still remain the bed-rock of the science.

Bacon acknowledges : In his essay *Of Empire*. By the "Schoolmen" is meant the thinkers of the great medieval system of Scholastic Philosophy, the aim of which was to unite Christian Theology with the highest philosophical thought of ancient Greece.

P. 50. *Hobbes* : Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), besides his greatest work, the *Leviathan* (1651), also wrote the *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society* and *Behemoth* and the *Common Law*, in 1670.

Clarendon : Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon (1608-1674), was one of the leaders of the Royalist party in the House of Commons, and was made Chancellor of the Exchequer by Charles I in 1643. Later he accompanied the Prince of Wales, afterwards Charles II, into exile, and at the Restoration was appointed by him to be High Chancellor. His great work is the *History of the Rebellion in England*, published after his death, in three volumes (1704-7).

Locke : John Locke (1632-1704), the author of the famous *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). His political views are contained in his *Treatise on Civil Government*, also published in 1690.

Milton : Milton's defence of the "contract" theory of Government is to be found in certain of the pamphlets which he wrote supporting the justice of the execution of Charles I, e.g. *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649), and his *Defence on behalf of the English People* (1651), written to refute the treatise of the famous French scholar Salmasius, who had come forward as the champion of the divine right of kings.

P. 51. *It is plain that there is no necessary connection* : To understand this paragraph it is necessary for the student to keep carefully in his mind the distinction between the three terms "State," "Nation" and "Race."

(1) The State is any governmental unit.

(2) A Nation is the sum total of the population inhabiting any single governmental area.

(3) A Race is a body of people all of one blood.

It has nothing to do with language : The languages of the Scots are English and Gaelic; of the Belgians, French, Flemish and Walloon; of the Swiss, French, German and Italian. The many languages spoken by Americans (by whom Dr. Inge means citizens of the United States) are, of course, those of the different elements of the country's vast immigrant population, chief among whom are the Germans and Italians.

Some ill-conditioned province : It would seem that Dean Inge here is making a covert reference to Ireland.

Mazzini : See note on page 152.

The Congress of Vienna : See note on page 148.

P. 52. *Lord Acton* : See note on page 147.

Spain wished to re-establish : The reference is particularly to Philip II of Spain (1527-1598), a fanatical bigot, whose whole policy was directed towards making Spain the champion of the Roman Church. In Philip's time, throughout the whole vast collection of territories which he ruled, the Inquisition went hand in hand with secular government. His aim was to bring the whole of Europe, and of European possessions overseas, under the spiritual autocracy of the Pope.

France under Louis XIV : Most of the wars of the reign of Louis XIV, it may be said, were undertaken for personal aggrandizement. The outstanding example of "dynastic ambition" was the placing, by that monarch, of his grandson, Philip of Anjou, on the vacant throne of Spain, after the death of the last Hapsburg King of that country in 1700. This act, which was in defiance not only of strict hereditary right but of

Louis's own most solemn promises and engagements, led to the war with England and Austria which is known as the War of the Spanish Succession.

The Revolutionary Wars : It is too often forgotten that the first victories of Napoleon were gained at the head of a Revolutionary Army and in support of a doctrinaire theory of Liberty. It is significant that one of the political results of his Italian Campaign of 1796-7 was the establishment of the Venetian Republic. It was only as Napoleon's personal ascendancy increased that the French campaigns changed their character and motive and became openly for conquest and glory.

P. 53. *Fichte* : Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), the celebrated German idealistic philosopher. The lectures referred to were his heart-stirring *Addresses to the German Nation*, of 1807, in which he declared that the regeneration of the German people could only be effected by a thorough-going system of National Education which should enter into and direct the whole of its private and public life. In these was first formulated the Prussian system of absolute State control, which became so striking a feature of German life under the Empire and was only shattered by the Great War.

P. 54. *Civitas civitatis lupus* : "Every State is a wolf to its neighbour."

Hegel : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), the most widely influential of German Idealistic philosophers, whose speculations form the basis of the greater part of modern Idealistic thought. Hegel held that the living and ultimate Reality of the universe, which he called the Absolute, is ever unfolding and realising its own nature through the world of Becoming, i.e. our world of phenomena. It is in this sense that he may be said, as suggested in the text, to draw no distinction between the Ideal and the Actual; for the whole of phenomenal, or actual, existence is nothing more nor less than a projection of the Ideal, or Absolute Existence, and has thus no antitheses of "higher" or "lower," since it all subserves the same purpose.

Hegel's deification of the State rests upon his doctrine, in other respects undoubtedly true, that, in the evolution of anything, the process of growth can only be truly explained in the light of higher developments towards which such growth is tending. Thus, e.g. the man explains the child, not the child the man. From this it follows that any higher, or fuller, self-expression of the Absolute must take precedence of any that is lower or more limited. The State is such a complete self-expression, since in it the all-embracing unity of the Absolute is more completely realized. Here again the weakness lies in the identification of the real with the ideal, as Hegel's theory allows for no distinction between a good State and a bad State;

the authority of the State, as such, being derived simply, from the fact of its being the larger unit.

Præsens ditus : "Present deity." The title *ditus*, in imperial Rome, was officially given to every emperor after his death. But the servile spirit of the age generally anticipated this posthumous honour and deified the emperor during life. In the case of Augustus there was, however, a real sense of the benefits which his rule had bestowed on the Roman world, and the apotheosis was inspired by a genuine reverence and gratitude.

P. 55. *The quasi-mystical conception* : The conception of the "will of the people," as constituting the expression of a definite living entity, is to be found in Rousseau and certain other of the writers of the pre-revolutionary period in France. Dr. Inge calls it "quasi-mystical," because any such conception is a kind of reflection, on a smaller scale, of the traditional mystical doctrine of a single Divine Intelligence and Will pervading the entire universe. For "platonically" see note on page 149.

Is not the notion of a General Will a mere metaphor? i.e. is it not the attribution of real existence to something which exists merely as a concept of the mind, and not in substantive actuality? For any such collective life to be substantive, it would have to possess its own apparatus of consciousness (*sensorium*) and to refer all its experience to itself. But, as Dean Inge points out, all living and actual experience is confined to the separate individual entity, and every such entity is a centre in itself and is thereby precluded from ever sharing its experience fully with any other.

P. 56. *Why should the state be the unit?* Dr. Inge's argument from this point down to the end of the paragraph perhaps needs explanation. The argument is not that other social organisms, to which we may happen to belong, have a higher claim to be deified than the political organism which we call the State. It is that no such organism at all has a right to be deified, even though many of them may be intrinsically worthier of allegiance than the State is. No collective grouping of human beings, in other words, should ever demand allegiance up to a point where (a) the freedom of the individual is completely negated, or (b) where all counter-claims, of other relations or associations, are dismissed as invalid.

The choice is an accident : That is to say, it arose, as already explained, out of the special conditions pertaining in Germany as a result of the Napoleonic campaigns. (See above.)

Karl Marx (1818-1883) : The founder of modern international socialism. Although Marx bases his doctrine on the Hegelian theory of organic development, yet, in a sense, he turns it upside down, and re-interprets it in purely materialistic terms.

To quote his own words: "According to Hegel, the thought-process, which he transforms into an independent subject under the name *idea*, is the creator of the real, which forms only its external manifestation. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material transformed and translated in the human brain." Marx regarded Socialism as the inevitable next stage in the unfolding process of humanity; and the "general will to power," referred to in the text, was for him merely the indication that that stage was due. His sole desire, as a propagandist, was to convince people of its inevitability and to smooth, as far as possible, the passage from the present to the future.

Moloch: A cruel deity mentioned in the Old Testament as worshipped by the aboriginal tribes of Canaan, such as the Ammonites and Moabites. Part of the worship of Moloch consisted in human sacrifice; hence the name of this deity has come to be used proverbially for any ignoble object of worship which demands of its votaries inhuman and bloodthirsty deeds.

P. 57. *Trade guilds*: One form of modern Socialism finds the solution of the social problem in the restoration of the medieval Craft Guilds, i.e. in the organization of the several trades into separate self-governing associations (a) for self-protection; (b) for maintaining a high standard of workmanship. The weakness of the Trade Unions, as at present constituted, it finds in the fact that they are organized simply for the first of these aims, and not for the second; the consequence being that every victory of the workers tends to produce a falling off in both the quantity and quality of the work done. The truth of this is abundantly evident at the present time.

Chemosh: Another national deity of the Moabites worshipped with blood-thirsty and licentious rights.

P. 58. *The "Antigone" of Sophocles*: Sophocles (485-406 B.C.), the great Athenian tragic dramatist, in his *Antigone*, relates the heroic action of Antigone, daughter of Œdipus, king of Thebes, who, when Creon, the successor of Œdipus, would not allow her brother Polynices to be buried, defied his tyrannous edict and buried the body herself. For this, Creon ordered her to be imprisoned in an underground cave, where she killed herself. In a famous passage in the play Antigone appeals, as against man-made laws, to those great "unwritten laws" of righteousness, which are the bedrock of human morality.

Non-resistance: This doctrine of non-resistance finds its typical-expression in the ethics of Tolstoy, who held it in an extreme form, declaring that it was wrong to interfere by force even to prevent a murder. For Tolstoy see note on page 152.

Mr. Norman Angell's views first appeared in his well-known book *The Great Illusion*, published some years before the War.

Although the author's name was anathema in vociferously patriotic circles, especially during the earlier part of the War, the War itself and subsequent events have completely proved his case, which would now, one imagines, be accepted as axiomatic by all sensible people. Victory in a great modern war can never be, financially and economically, advantageous to the victor.

P. 59. *The position actually taken up by the State in this country:* The British Government's attitude in endeavouring to establish a distinction between "conscientious" and other forms of objection was undoubtedly due to the existence of one or two recognized and respected communities, such as that of the Quakers (see below) with whom to keep aloof from bloodshed was a matter of religious faith. In spite of what Dr. Inge says, the ordinary man will probably see a difference between an objection on moral or religious grounds and one which is based merely on an intellectual opinion derived from a survey of current tendencies. The illogicality (if any) of the British Government lay in the greater respect which, in practice, it showed to the doctrines of organized bodies, such as the Quakers, as against identical doctrines when held by individuals. But the difficulties of its position at the time have to be admitted and taken into account.

The Quakers: The popular name given to the Society of Friends, a Christian sect founded by George Fox (1624-1691). They believe in the continuance of direct divine inspiration and have abolished set forms of worship. The profession of arms they regard as absolutely contrary to the spirit of the teachings of Christ.

A misleading parallel: Gibbon, in the famous sixteenth chapter of his history, explains the difference in the treatment accorded to Jews and to Christians as follows: "The Jews were a nation, the Christians were a sect . . . by embracing the faiths of the Gospel, the Christians incurred the supposed guilt of an unnatural and unpardonable offence. They dissolved the sacred ties of custom and education, violated the religious institutions of their country, and presumptuously despised whatever their fathers had believed as true, or had revered as sacred. . . . The whole body of Christians unanimously refused to hold any communion with the gods of Rome, of the Empire, and of mankind. It was in vain that the oppressed believer asserted the inalienable rights of conscience and private judgment. Though his situation might excite pity, his arguments could never reach the understanding either of the philosophic or of the believing part of the Pagan world."

Shall publicly eat beef: Orthodox Roman Catholics are not permitted to eat meat on Fridays. To eat it on Good Friday

would be the most heinous of offences, since this is of all Fridays the most sacred, being the day which commemorates the crucifixion of Christ.

P. 60. *St. Thomas Aquinas' maxim*: St. Thomas Aquinas (circa, 1226-1274) is generally regarded as the greatest of scholastic theologians. The authority of his writings ranked, throughout the Middle Ages, as co-equal with that of the Bible itself, and was taken as the standard of orthodoxy.

How far ought Catholics and Anglicans. The Roman Catholic Church has never recognized divorce, while in the Anglican Church many of the clergy, holding that a marriage once made is sacred and cannot be dissolved, still refuse to celebrate a marriage ceremony where one of the parties has already been married and divorced. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister was for a long time unrecognized in law and has only recently (1907) been legalized by Act of Parliament.

P. 61. *Lord Eustace Percy*: A Conservative politician and brother of the present Duke of Northumberland. He is Minister of Education in Mr. Baldwin's Cabinet.

The Reformation: The Reformation, as an effective European force, is generally dated from Martin Luther (1483-1546). Before the end of the sixteenth century practically all the Teutonic peoples, starting with Germany herself, had broken with the Papacy. Denmark and Sweden became Protestant between 1525-1560, Belgium and Holland in 1581. England had revolted in 1532.

Next an attack was made: In England this happened in the great revolt against the Stuarts. In France no real attempt was made to curb the powers of the monarchy until the reign of Louis XVI. As against this, France was the first country in which a decisive blow was struck against the aristocracy. It was only in 1832, forty years after the French Revolution, that the Reform Bill struck a similar, though milder, blow in England.

In the wake of America: The phrase "Making the world safe for democracy" is quoted from one of the late President Wilson's pronouncements during the great War.

"*Fly-blown phylacteries*" is a proverbial phrase for pompous and worn-out platitudes. A "phylactery" is the name given in the New Testament to a little box, containing verses from the Scriptures written out on parchment, worn by all Jews on weekdays during the time of prayer. These boxes are considered highly sacred. Hence the name has been transferred to formulae which are clung to with superstitious reverence long after they have lost all meaning.

looked upon as showing progress or decadence, according to the particular points, or qualities, which we happen to have in mind. Thus every growth in material civilization is, in one of its aspects, a positive gain, while, in another, it is a departure from a primitive simplicity of life.

Among the Jews : The reference is, of course, to the story of the temptation and fall of Adam and Eve, as related in the opening chapters of the first book of the Bible. The theory of decadence was, however, in the case of the Jews, balanced by a belief in the future coming of a Messiah, who should restore righteousness to the world and exalt the Jewish Race to the height of splendour—a belief which is still held by orthodox Jews. Perhaps in speaking of the “tenacious optimism of this extraordinary race,” the writer is thinking of the stubborn vitality which has enabled it to emerge unscathed from centuries of unexampled persecution and oppression, with its belief in the greatness of its own future unimpaired.

Hesiod : Hesiod is, after Homer, the earliest of the Greek poets whose works have come down to us. He lived in the second half of the eighth century B.C. and was the author of the *Works and Days*, a poem dealing with the days which are auspicious and inauspicious for the farmer, and of the *Theogony*, which gives the story of the creation of the world and the history of the gods. According to Hesiod humanity has passed through five ages :—(1) The Golden, (2) The Silver, (3) The Brazen, (4) Heroic, (5) The Iron, in which last it now is; but later classical writers, and classical tradition generally, omit the Heroic and count only four ages.

Sophocles : For Sophocles see note on page 159. The chorus referred to is to be found in his *Œdipus Coloneus*.

Aratus : Aratus, a Greek didactic poet of the first century B.C., wrote the *Phænomena*, an astronomical treatise, and the *Diosemeia*, a poem containing rules for predicting the weather. His account of the Four Ages is in the *Phænomena*.

Dike : Dike, or Astræa, was, in Greek Mythology, the goddess of justice and the daughter of Zeus and Themis. Just as her final disappearance from the Earth signalized the beginning of the Iron Age, so, according to the ancients, the rebirth of the Golden Age was to be inaugurated by her return. If we substitute the word *Dharma* for *Dike*, the Hindu student will at once recognize the close parallel between the theory of the Four Ages and his own traditional doctrine of the Four Yugas. Both, in their completest form, are doctrines of cyclic recurrence, but in both cases the emphasis is popularly laid on the fact that the world is at present in the worst and darkest of its successive æons.

Horace : Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65-8 B.C.), a celebrated Roman lyric and satirical poet of the age of Augustus. His chief works are the *Odes*, in four books, the *Epistles* and the *Satires*.

P. 66. *Thucydides* : See note on page 142.

Lucretius : Titus Lucretius Carus (exact dates unknown, but lived in the first part of the 1st century B.C.) was the author of the great philosophical poem, *De Rerum Natura* (*Concerning the Nature of Things*), in which he expounds the origin and nature of the Universe in the light of the philosophy of his master, Epicurus. The aim of Lucretius, set forth in one of the noblest passages in Latin poetry, was to rescue mankind from the slavery of superstition and to bring a new freedom and happiness into the world by leading it into the paths of Reason. The lines quoted may be translated thus :

"Practice it is, and the experience gathered by the unresting intellect, which have been the gradual teachers of men, as they have progressed cautiously step by step. In this way the passage of time draws each thing slowly into open view, and Reason lifts it into the realms of light."

Pliny : There were two Plinies, uncle and nephew. The one referred to here is Caius Plinius Cæcilius Secundus, the elder (A.D. 23-79), a distinguished Roman man of letters known to us by his *Natural History*, in which he has collected the information available in his time on the various branches of science, together with an account of human inventions and institutions and a brief history of the fine arts. Pliny perished, overcome by the fumes, in the famous eruption of Vesuvius, which buried the cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum.

Seneca : See note on page 142. Compare with the sentiments, here expressed, the saying attributed to Socrates, that the wisest man is he who knows that he knows nothing, and Sir Isaac Newton's famous confession, at the end of his life, that, so far from having achieved anything, he had only been picking up pebbles on the shore of the ocean of knowledge.

Rousseau : See page 148. Rousseau believed in a Golden Age to be attained by a return to Nature, i.e. to a pastoral simplicity of life, such as he imagined to have existed in primitive times. It was Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1760) which set the fashion for that cult of the highly ornamental "simple life," which spread through French society for a time in the late eighteenth century, and inspired Marie Antoinette and her ladies to play at being shepherdesses and milkmaids.

Condorcet : Jean Antoine Nicolas, Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), was a prominent contributor to the celebrated *Encyclopædia* and the author of a work entitled *The Progress of Human Spirit*, in which he set forth the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of Man. According to Condorcet, such ultimate perfection was to be attained through a continuous extension of the lines already indicated by modern civilization.

Freeman : Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892), from 1884 Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, was a voluminous historical writer and the champion of the so-called "scientific" school of historians. His chief work is his *History of the Norman Conquest*, in five volumes (1867-1876).

Some paradise or other : Referring to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Paradise in consequence of their sin in eating of the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. A "fool's paradise" is a proverbial term for a state of blissful ignorance, i.e. a happiness which appears to be solid and substantial, but is really illusory.

Dürer : Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528), the father of German Art and one of the greatest of draughtsmen and engravers. His well-known drawing, *Melencolia*, belongs to the year 1514. All who have seen reproductions of it will testify to its impressiveness.

P. 67. *The Fourth Eclogue* : This famous Eclogue was written in 40 B.C. to celebrate the birth of a son to Virgil's friend and patron Asinius Polio, consul in that year. It is an exalted vision of a new Age of Gold, to be inaugurated by the newborn child under the auspices of the principate of Augustus, then recently opening. The early Christian Fathers interpreted the Eclogue, quite without justification, as an inspired prediction of the birth of Christ.

Goethe : Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), the author of *Faust*, is the greatest name in German literature. His conversations with his young friend and disciple Eckermann (1792-1854) are recorded by the latter in two volumes, which are perhaps the best authorities for the thought and the character of the great poet.

Nietzsche : See note on page 150.

Kierkegaard : Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the most distinguished thinker of Denmark and an influential figure in Scandinavian literature, was the author of many works of which the best known are *Either—Or* and *Stadia in Life's Way*.

Shelley : The poem referred to is the concluding chorus of his dramatic lyric *Hellas*. The line quoted in the text is from its first stanza :

"The world's great age begins anew
The golden days return ;
The earth doth like a snake renew
Its winter skin outworn."

P. 68. *Damnosa quid non imminuit dies* ? "What does not the costly day diminish ?" i.e. What is there which time, in its passage, does not spoil and deface ? The line is from *Horace Odes*, book III, vi, 45.

The Dark Ages : The name given to a period of several centuries, in which the light of culture and civilization was practically extinguished in Europe. The line that separates the Dark Ages from the Middle Ages is difficult to draw with any precision. If we date the former, as Dr. Inge does here, from the fall of the Western Empire in A.D. 476, then the seven centuries mentioned in the text will carry us up to the latter part of the twelfth century. Thus is perhaps as satisfactory a division as could be made, since, with the thirteenth century began a period of remarkable spiritual vigour in Europe, that century being generally regarded as one of the great ages of the Church. The belief that the world was destined shortly to come to an end was widely diffused during the last years of the tenth century, large numbers of people throughout Christendom believing that the year A.D. 1000 was fixed for its dissolution. The essentially religious character of the civilization of the Middle Ages accounts for the fact that men's hopes, at that time, were centred on the next world rather than on this. Life on earth was regarded merely as the prelude to the true life in heaven.

Roger Bacon : Roger Bacon (1214-1294), a monk of the Franciscan Order, is traditionally celebrated as the inventor of gunpowder and the magnifying glass. He also worked out a scheme for rectifying the calendar. He was the author of several philosophical and scientific treatises, of which the most celebrated is his *Opus Majus* (*Greater Work*), written in 1265.

Antichrist : In the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew is recorded a prophecy of Jesus Christ that, just before His Second Coming, false Christs would appear in the world. This crystallized later into a belief in a single powerful messenger of evil, who would deceive the unwary into thinking that he was the true Christ, and whose coming would signalize the approaching end of the world. But popular Christian superstition has, from time to time, varied this view and identified with Antichrist several prominent enemies of the Church, or personages whom it regarded as instruments of widespread evil in the world. Thus, to the Christians of the 1st century A.D.

the emperor Nero was Antichrist. As recently as the late War, the belief in Antichrist reasserted itself, many devout people seeing him in the person of the Kaiser. Still later, there have been not a few who identified him with Lenin, the Russian Arch-Bolshevik. The belief is of the kind which can be readily adapted to suit the occasion; and doubtless there are many "Antichrists" still to come.

The Renaissance: The Renaissance, or revival of classical learning, is dated historically from the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, which scattered numbers of Greek refugees over Western Europe, carrying with them a knowledge of the ancient classical literatures. Dean Inge would seem to include the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the first half of the fifteenth in his "glacial age of the spirit"; but many will consider this not quite just to the very remarkable civilization of the Middle Ages, which, even though we admit it to have been restricted in type and scope, certainly exhibited no lack of spiritual life.

A long literary battle: A reference to the famous controversy on the relative merits of the classical and modern writers, immortalized by Swift in his *Battle of the Books*. Prominent names on the side of the Ancients were those of Temple and Boyle, while on the side of the moderns was the much greater name of Richard Bentley, whose *Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris* achieved a crushing victory for the Moderns. Readers of Pope's *Essay on Criticism* will remember the poet's advocacy of the Ancients, in that Essay, as the only true models of literary excellence.

Millennium: Originally a term arising out of a belief in the mysterious prophecy contained in the Book of Revelations, chapter xx, verse 2, of a period of a thousand years during which the Devil, or Satan, should be bound and impotent and Christ's Kingdom should be established on Earth. Hence it has come to be used of any Golden Age of happiness and virtue. Traditional belief held that the millennium would come about through a supernatural event, i.e. the personal appearance of Christ on earth. The eighteenth-century idealists thought that it would come as the culmination of a process of natural growth.

In France: The cult of Reason in eighteenth-century France may be said to have started with the writings of Voltaire and with the publication by D'Alembert, Diderot and others, of the famous *Encyclopædia*, 1751-1772, the purpose of which was to subject to the searchlight of Reason all current human institutions and beliefs. The Revolution adopted the Goddess of Reason as its patron deity, and one of the quaintest incidents of that extraordinary convulsion was the great festival held in the Champs de Mars on Nov. 10, 1793, for the

inauguration of the official worship of the Goddess. Maximilian Marie Isidore Robespierre (1758-1794) was the supreme figure in revolutionary France from April to the end of July 1794, when he was overthrown and guillotined.

P. 69. *The industrial revolution*: This name, which, as Dr. Inge tells us on page 92, was first used by Mr. Arnold Toynbee, is now generally given to the epoch-making changes which were brought about in the industrial world by the mechanical inventions of the latter part of the eighteenth century in England. For some of these see below.

Mr. Mallock: W. H. Mallock (b. 1849), Author of *The New Republic*, a celebrated satire of the 'eighties, in which a number of prominent worthies of the late Victorian era are introduced under assumed names and converse, each in his own peculiar style, on problems of the day. The scientist here referred to is Prof. Clifford, who appears in the book under the name of "Mr. Saunders from Oxford." (N.R., Bk. I, chap. 3.)

Statistics: e.g. of population, wealth, imports and exports, etc.

Mechanical Inventions: James Watt (1736-1810) was the first person to turn steam to practical account and was the inventor of the separate condenser, the air pump and the steam jacket for cylinders; Sir Richard Arkwright (1732-1792) invented the spinning frame; Samuel Crompton (1753-1827) invented the spinning mule and was the earliest of the spinners of fine unbroken yarn; George Stephenson (1781-1849) built the first steam locomotive in 1814 and was appointed principal engineer, in 1826, of the Liverpool & Manchester Railway.

Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834): Author of the *Essay on the Principle of Population*, in which he endeavours to gather together and systematize the factors determining the fluctuations of population, tracing historically the conflict between the natural impulse towards the increase of life and the restraints imposed upon this by a number of checks, such as war, pestilence, infanticide, celibacy, etc., together with the general relation of population to food supplies.

Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680): An early apostle of free thought, was the author of *The Vanity of Dogmatizing* (1661) and of a couple of books on witchcraft and apparitions. Readers of Matthew Arnold's poetry will remember that the story of the *Scholar Gipsy* is taken from Glanvill.

"And near me on the grass lies Glanvill's book—
Come, let me ^{to} the oft-read tale again."

f. set. 1st

Scholar Gipsy, line 31.

44-1803): German philosopher,
work is his *Ideas on the*

Achievements of Mankind (1784-1791) in which he goes far to anticipate modern evolutionary theories. Herder regards Man not merely as the culmination of all previous developments, but as the first indication of still loftier stages in the scale of existence, with which it is his duty gradually to identify himself by the cultivation of his spiritual nature.

Determinism : Sometimes called the doctrine of Necessity, i.e. the doctrine which denies to man the possession of any kind of free-will and holds that every detail of his life is determined by external causes over which he has no control. Hume, James Mill and John Stuart Mill—who may be called the representative thinkers of the period of the industrial revolution in England—were all Determinists.

P. 70. *Hegel* : See note on page 157, and on page 176.

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) : A noted French philosopher and the author of the celebrated *Philosophie Positive* (1842). For the relation of Positivism to the idea of progress see below, note on page 177.

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) : The discoverer (with the late Sir Alfred Russel Wallace, who hit upon it independently) of the principle of evolution through natural selection—a discovery which changed the whole current of modern scientific thought. Of Darwin's many works, which cover the various kingdoms of evolving organic life, the most celebrated are his *Origin of Species* (1859) and *Descent of Man* (1871).

Sir John Frederick William Herschel (1792-1871) : A distinguished writer on astronomy, meteorology and chemistry and a valuable contributor to the undulatory theory of light. His father was the still more famous astronomer, Sir William Herschel (1738-1822), whose great work was the systematic mapping of the heavens and the cataloguing of the stars.

Mr. Bradley : Professor F. H. Bradley (b. 1846), Fellow of Merton, Oxon. His chief works are his *Principles of Logic*, 1883, *Ethical Studies*, 1876, and *Appearance & Reality*, 1893. Professor Bradley has for many years been the most prominent of the English Hegelians. Quite recently he was the recipient of the very distinguished honour of the Order of Merit.

Darwinism : The main point where the Darwinian theory parts company with any doctrine of a law of progress is to be found in the accidental nature which Darwin assigns to the successive changes which, according to him, produce the gradual adaptation of the organism to its environment. These changes, he says, happen purely by chance, but, when tried and found useful, tend to become permanently established. Thus (to quote an instance purely at random) the

Sparsely sown : As a rough idea of the distances separating the heavenly bodies from one another, it may be mentioned that, supposing the distance from the earth to the sun to be one inch, the nearest fixed star, Alpha Centauri, would be about five miles away. One may safely assume that at least an equal distance separates any star from its nearest neighbour.

P. 72. *Lucretius* : See note on page 164. The lines quoted from his *De Rerum Natura*, Book V, line 96, may be translated : "Whose three-fold nature, O Memmius, with its three bodies, its three shapes so unlike each to each, and its three fabrics, such as I have described, a single day will give over to destruction; and the dead bulk and mechanism of the world will for ages be carried along blindly on its impetuous course through space."

A brief episode : Very little is at present known as to the comparative ages of mankind and of the Earth upon which it dwells. A recent estimate gives a thousand million years as the time which it took the Earth to cool down sufficiently for any kind of life to appear on it, and many geologists would assign an existence of several million years to the human race. But all this is little more than conjecture. All that can be said is that the tendency is for scientists, as their knowledge increases, to assign a longer and longer past both to the globe and to humanity.

Samuel Butler (1825-1902), Wit, satirist, scholar and novelist. His *Erewhon* (the title being the word "nowhere" pelt backwards) is an amusing and caustic Utopia. His one novel, *The Way of All Flesh*, published posthumously, is a brilliant achievement, which has exercised a considerable influence on modern fiction.

P. 73. *As a universal law* : The reader should note carefully here that the writer is not attempting to indicate that the parasite, as such, proves that the true law of evolution is survival by simplification. The illustration is chosen merely as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the Spencerian doctrine of "complexity," when linked to the Darwinian doctrine of "survival." The point of the whole of this paragraph is that the "survival" test is a demonstrably unsound one, since it breaks down when applied, not merely to the lowest organisms, such as microbes, but also to what are generally admitted to be the highest products of human evolution, i.e. aristocracies and civilizations.

Alexander the Great : Alexander the Great died at Babylon in 323 B.C. in his thirty-second year. According to Plutarch's account his death was caused by drinking a draught of iced wine when heated by exercise. But Dr. Inge attributes it, with far more likelihood, to a microbe. It was possibly a typhoid germ. At the time of his death, Alexander was at the very

prominent feature was its belief in two separate and original Principles—the one good, the other evil—from which all manifested things are derived. Life, according to the Manicheans, was an eternal struggle between these two opposing forces. St. Augustine belonged to this faith for nine years before becoming a Christian. The Founder of Manicheism was Mani, who is said to have been born in Persia in 215 and to have been crucified by King Bahram I of that country in 276.

Mr. Bertrand Russell: The Hon. Bertrand A. W. Russell (b. 1872) is one of the greatest of living mathematicians and, in many ways, one of the most distinguished intellects of the day. His philosophy, which he has modified from time to time in the light of his maturer thought, is to be found in his *Philosophical Essays*, *Problems of Philosophy*, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, *Mysticism and Logic*, etc. Mr. Russell belongs to what is known as the Realist School.

P. 76. *Cato*: Marcus Portius Cato (95–46 B.C.), the typical example of Stoic integrity and high-mindedness, is popularly celebrated chiefly through his death; for he committed suicide by stabbing himself, rather than submit to the indignity of yielding to his great opponent, Julius Cæsar. According to Plutarch, he spent the night previous to his death in reading Plato's *Phædo*, a dialogue on the immortality of the soul. Cato is the hero of Addison's once famous tragedy of that name.

Seeley: Sir John Robert Seeley (1834–1895), appointed Professor of Modern History at Cambridge in 1869, was a prominent representative of the imperialist school of historians. His best known works, along these lines, are the *Expansion of England* (1883) and his *Growth of British Policy* (1892).

"*Sedet, æternumque sedebit*": "Unhappy Poland lies low, and will for ever lie low" is a free translation of these Latin words, which are borrowed from Vergil, *Æneid*, VI, 617. In other words, Poland, having been annihilated as a nation by the Partitions of the last decade of the eighteenth century, had obviously, according to Seeley, deserved her fate and would, for that reason, never rise again. The prophecy was unfortunate, as Poland has recently been re-established in her entirety and independence by the Treaty of Versailles. But, as Homer remarks, "these things lie on the knees of the gods," and he would be a rash man who would prophesy the perpetuity of Poland's restoration. For the various Partitions of Poland, at the end of the eighteenth century, see note on page 142.

Forms of Government: For example, at the present time the old forms of monarchic and aristocratic government are popularly considered to have been permanently abolished.

But, as Dr. Inge wisely remarks, it would be far safer to predict their ultimate return than to imagine, as so many unthinkingly do, that the whole future of civilization must necessarily be democratic. Democracy has only (as it is extremely like to do) to discredit itself by a practical exhibition of its limitations, and mankind will automatically substitute some other ideal of government.

P. 77. The Christian Fathers : Both these and the Encyclopedists were the representatives, in their own very different ways, of the current of thought which was gathering strength in their respective ages—the Fathers of the rapidly growing stream of Christianity in the first few centuries A.D.; the Encyclopedists of the equally rapidly growing stream of free-thought in the eighteenth century. Thus the word "progressive" implies no particular inherent quality—what is progressive, at one period or another, being determined entirely by the circumstances of the time.

The Roman Stoics : The Stoics, during the first two centuries of the Empire, furnished perhaps the noblest types of character to be found in that generally corrupt age. (The word "perhaps" is used, since the Cynics also furnished some very noble characters.) Politically, nearly all the Stoics of that period were Republicans, looking back with keen regret to the simpler, manlier and more virtuous life of the earlier centuries of Rome. The modern use of the word "stoical," as denoting calm endurance under suffering or misfortune, gives only a very small fragment of the genuine Stoic philosophy.

Fabius : For Fabius "the Delayer" see note on page 149. Giuliano della Rovere, who became Pope, under the title of Julius II, in 1503, was one of the ablest and most energetic occupiers of the Papacy and remarkable for the impetuosity and masterfulness of his character.

Mæcenas : C. Cilnius Mæcenas, the friend and minister of Augustus, and the literary patron so often addressed by the poets, Virgil and Horace, is mentioned here as a typical enthusiast for the newly founded imperial regime. Brutus and Cassius, on the other hand, the murderers of Caesar, had put forward, as the plea for their crime, their love for the ancient liberties of republican Rome and the traditional Roman hatred of monarchy. The example would seem to come rather under the first of the possible interpretations of the words "progressive" and "reactionary," here suggested by Dr. Inge, since Mæcenas was obviously on the side of the future, and Brutus and Cassius on that of the past.

An empire of the Asiatic type : The Roman Principate, which had originally preserved the republican titles and offices

and had clothed itself in the legal fiction that the ancient republic was still in being, became gradually more and more an open despotism. The climax was reached under Diocletian (A.D. 285-306) and his successors. Diocletian entirely destroyed the authority of the senate, and was the first emperor to take the title of *Dominus* or "Supreme Lord" (a title hitherto confined to the owner of slaves), and to assume the diadem, the traditional emblem of Royalty (see Gibbon, book I, chap. 13).

P. 78. *Hegel*: See note above on page 157. Hegel, seeking to discover an all-inclusive formula for human history, found it in the conception of history as working out the self-realization of one aspect of the Absolute, viz. Its freedom, and regarded this as taking place through a kind of cyclic process marked by three stages, which he calls *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis*. According to this theory, freedom, starting as absolute licence (*thesis*), passes out into its opposite, viz. complete, external control (*antithesis*) and, by and through this self-negation, ultimately achieves realization by attaining self-determination (*synthesis*), which is a blending of licence and external control. Applying the theory to actual history, it may be said that human society has never, as a whole, passed beyond the first of these stages, tempered and held in check by the second; nor does it seem possible that the third stage can ever be reached, except in the case of an ideal society which shall have advanced to the point where no external compulsion is any longer necessary, but has been completely replaced by the internal compulsion of the perfectly directed will. Consequently, it would be idle to seek for the complete Hegelian process in the course of European events—an argument which, Dr. Inge would apparently think, tells against the theory as such. But surely we see the process exemplified, with the necessary limitations, in the case of individuals?

As for the objection mentioned on page 79—that the view that the universe as a whole is progressing is "nonsense, unmeaning or blasphemous"—it may be suggested that Dr. Bradley is possibly wrong here in treating the created universe as a *whole* in the metaphysical sense. There is a well-known text in an Indian scripture which supplies an alternative conception of the universe: "With one fragment of Myself I created all this, and I remain." There is an echo of this conception in one of Dr. Inge's own essays, his *Confessio Fidei*. "The Divine Logos," he there writes, "through Whom the worlds were, made and Who sustains them in being, is not exhausted in His creation, but remains transcendent as well as immanent in it." If this be so, then this universe, even though it be in a certain sense a self-contained whole, is of its very nature finite; and, being finite, may therefore conceptionally be brought under some law like that of progress.

Moreover, as regards the Creator of the Universe, the fact that His immanent life is engaged in working out towards perfection something into which It has projected Itself, would not seem necessarily to cast any reflection upon the eternal perfection of His transcendent life. A perfect sculptor, if we could conceive of such, would still have the task of mastering his materials and modelling them to his will, without thereby negating his perfection.

Comte: See above, note on page 169. Comte's theory is briefly that human thought passes through three great stages which he calls (1) theological, (2) metaphysical, (3) positive. In the first of these stages, Man makes the wish the father to the thought and creates a God or Gods for his own satisfaction. In the second, he passes beyond this and constructs abstract generalizations which he proceeds to apply deductively to the problems of life. In the third, he takes his stand on the only sure bedrock of truth, and constructs his theories of life inductively, on the evidence of ascertained facts. This last is the "positive" stage which represents the consummation of human development. Each of these stages is marked by a corresponding ordering of human society. When society reaches the third, and final, stage it will have for its rulers, says Comte (echoing Plato), a body of thinkers and philosophers in whose hands will be the entire moral government of the community. Against the decisions of this august body the Man in the Street will not be allowed to raise objections. This is what is meant on page 79 by the statement that Comte does not permit "unlimited freedom of thought." But to say, as Dr. Inge does, that the third phase of the Comtest social evolution is therefore, strictly speaking, a "theological stage" would not appear to be quite accurate, for the simple reason that the wisdom of this philosophical governing body is assumed, on the theory, to rest upon scientific fact, not on mere doctrine or opinion. Comte's whole effort was to produce a world in which the ordering of life should be entirely based on knowledge and in which nothing should be left to chance or conjecture. This is the basis of his "Religion of Humanity," which was to be the working faith of society in its positive stage, and consist in the worship and emulation of such great men in the past as had definitely proved their claim by their acts and lives. Where Comte seems to exceed his limits is in the assumption that the world can ever reach a point at which all its working philosophy is a matter of actual knowledge, without any margin of guesswork or uncertainty.

P. 79. *Would see the whole world of appearance as a "progress"*: The last half of this paragraph is difficult. Professor Bradley's theory, as interpreted by Dr. Inge, is that the perfect philosopher, lifted above the illusions of time and space and matter, would

see the whole of the phenomenal world as a fixed hierarchy of ideas—"fixed," in the sense that each such idea has its appointed place in the scale. The relations between these ideas are, therefore, permanent and unchangeable. The higher is eternally higher, the lower eternally lower—the whole series existing quite outside any such process as that of time, and therefore being unaffected by it. Dr. Inge compares this hierarchical order of ideas to the so-called "progressions" of mathematics (e.g. the "arithmetical" progression 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., and the "geometrical" progression 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc.) in which the relations between the various terms are similarly "fixed" and have nothing to do with any temporal process. The difficulty of Professor Bradley's theory, for the reader not trained in philosophical speculations, lies in his complete denial of reality to all existence conditioned by temporal and spatial relations. When he says that the perfect philosopher would see the whole world of appearance as a "progress," what he really means to say is that the philosopher in question would see the whole world of appearance as illusory, and that his eyes would pierce through this unreal show to the true world of Being which lies behind the apparent world of Becoming. In a world of Being there can be no progress in a temporal sense, for the simple reason that there is no time. Dr. Inge rightly remarks that, even though this be true, the use of the word "progress" for the internal interrelations of a hierarchical order of ideas is misleading and "a trap for the unwary."

Tantalus: According to the Greek legend, Tantalus was the son of Zeus, and was punished by him for having divulged to mortals the counsels of the gods. The punishment consisted in an insatiable thirst, rendered all the more desperate by the fact that he was placed up to the neck in water, with bunches of fruit above his head. Whenever he tried to reach them, both water and fruit receded from him and eluded his grasp.

P. 80. *The discussions*: The discussions, that is to say, whether a perfect character, like that of Christ, could have existed in an age which (according to the complacent assumption of the disputants) provided so far less suitable an environment than ours does. If we accept the theory, which we find in Aristotle, that the perfect character can only function freely and fully in a perfect environment, an imperfect age *ipso facto* precludes the existence of human perfection.

The secularization of religion: This refers to a point on which Dean Inge feels very strongly and to which he makes several references in his essays, i.e., the tendency on the part of the present-day clergy to identify themselves with such secular causes as the labour movement and to think and

speak in terms of an approaching "Kingdom of Christ on Earth," to be brought about by economic or social reform. Dr. Inge's view is that Religion, as such, belongs to a Platonic world of Ideas, or absolute values, which entirely transcends our world of space and time.

The unauthorized belief : i.e. the belief that, after death, the soul passes through a purgatorial period, in order to fit itself for the life of perfection which is to be found in heaven.

The papal syllabus of 1864 : This Syllabus, which accompanied the famous Encyclical sent by Pope Pius IX to all Catholic bishops on December 8th, 1864, contained a list of all the various modern heresies and errors which it was the duty of the Roman Church to combat. The list numbered eighty in all. The syllabus is perhaps the most striking manifesto against freedom of thought ever issued by the papal authority. It preceded by six years the official establishment of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility.

Cro-Magnon : A prehistoric race still to be distinguished in Europe particularly among the Eskimo and Basques (Pyrenees region). They had large and very long heads, and were above the average in height with somewhat Mongoloid features.

P. 81. *Lord Bryce's Commission* : The Commission appointed by the Allies in 1917, under the presidency of the distinguished historian and publicist, Lord Bryce (1838-1922) to inquire into the truth of the reports concerning the German atrocities in Belgium. The Commission found that the reports were substantially accurate.

Subsidizing the unsuccessful : i.e. supporting those who are incapable of earning a livelihood for themselves, by means of insurances, etc., which come from the pockets of those who are self-supporting. The most flagrant instance is the dole for the unemployed, which costs the public many millions a year in taxation, and which undoubtedly enables large numbers of undeserving recipients to live in comparative comfort without doing any work at all.

P. 82. *Attacks upon civilization* : Of the names mentioned in this sentence, Crates and Pherocrates were two dramatists belonging to the Old Comedy at Athens, of whose works hardly anything survives. They were contemporaries of the more famous Aristophanes in the fifth century B.C. Antisthenes, who lived at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth, was the founder of the sect of the Cynics. The Cynics professed to despise all the luxuries and refinements of civilization; and it was the extravagance, in this respect, of some of their more extreme members (e.g. Antisthenes' best

known pupil, Diogenes) which earned for them the popular name of cynic or "dog-like." For Lucretius and Rousseau see notes on page 164, and page 148. Walt Whitman (1819-1892), the American poet, was an apostle of clean, vigorous, primitive simplicity. Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), the friend of Emerson, forsook the life of cities and lived in a wooden hut by Walden Pond, near Concord, in solitary communion with Nature. His best-known book *Walden, or Life in the Woods*, gives a record of his experiences and reflections during this woodland life. John Ruskin (1819-1900) and William Morris (1834-1896), the poet and craftsman, both revolted against the ugliness of our modern industrial civilization, which they held to be a sure sign that something was rotten at its heart. For Ruskin's views see *The Victorian Age*, page 98. Edward Carpenter (b. 1844 and still living) is a well-known essayist and writer of free verse. His hostility to modern civilization may be gathered from the title of one of his books, *Civilization, Its Cause and Cure*.

P. 83. *What the Greeks called its "nature"*: See note on page 139. It is important to note here the difference between the Greek use of the word "perfection," in this sense, and the more ordinary modern use. For us, "perfection" usually signifies something which, while we can draw nearer to it, can never be finally attained. It is, in other words, infinite, and so, unrealizable. But to the Greeks (e.g. Aristotle) it meant only that which each thing is destined by Nature to be, when it has attained its full growth. Thus the "perfection" of the bud was the flower; of the puppy, the dog. Such perfection is clearly finite and (if nothing happens to impede Nature's processes) certain of realization. And because it is the inevitable goal of natural growth, the Greeks saw in it, quite justly, the "nature" of the thing in question. Everything most truly is that which it is meant to become.

An immanent teleology: i.e. a purposive force, residing in human nature and directing it, from within, towards some far-off end, which it will reach naturally by a process of gradual growth. Many thinkers, to-day, have substituted an "immanent teleology" of this kind for the earlier Darwinian doctrine of "accidental variation"; and there is no doubt that the importation of this principle into Darwinism gives to the whole conception of evolution a new force and significance.

Lamarck: Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), the great naturalist, foreshadowed, in his *Philosophie Zoologique* (1809), many of the more modern evolutionary theories. His most interesting contribution to the subject was his doctrine that organic changes, in any creature, are the result of forces set at work from within, i.e. new needs which, by their pressure,

gradually create the organs and functions which are necessary for their satisfaction. This inner compulsion is sometimes called "vitalism" (i.e. inhering in the life itself) as here, to distinguish it from the merely mechanical and external compulsion of environment, such as we find in the Darwinian theory.

The Philosophy of naturalism : What Dr. Inge means here is that those philosophers and scientists, who attribute the sole motive-forces in evolution to "natural causes" (i.e. causes produced by Nature, not by Man), are too often inclined to forget that "human nature" is a part of Nature, and, in an equal degree, a product of Nature. Any strong and permanent factor in human nature, therefore (e.g. its propensity to hope), must be reckoned among the "natural causes," and must be given its full weight and significance, as such.

Prudentius : Marcus Aurelius Clemens Prudentius was born in Spain in A.D. 348. When he died is not known. He was the author of a number of poetical works, including hymns, memorial odes, and polemical discourses. The very uncouth Latin of the two verses quoted in the text may be translated thus : "Does not one wide difference separate men from beasts? namely, that, while all the good things that four-footed creatures desire are placed before their eyes, I, on the contrary, hope."

P. 84. *Lord Brougham* (1778-1868): English politician and essayist, Lord Chancellor from 1830-1834, and one of the most powerful agents in the passing of the great Reform Bill of 1832.

Margaret Fuller (1810-1850): American authoress and a prominent member of the Transcendental Movement. In later life she travelled to Italy, married the Marquis Ossoli, and took part in the struggle for Italian freedom. She was drowned at sea, off New York, on July 16th, 1850.

The pessimist cannot condemn : The fact that the pessimist finds the world evil means that it does not come up to some standard which he has already tacitly conceived; while the fact of his having conceived such a standard shows that, in spite of himself and his theories, he is really an optimist.

St. Paul's deliberate verdict : "That at the time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenant of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world." *Epistle to the Ephesians*, ii. 12.

The later Neoplatonists : e.g. Proclus and his successors. Neoplatonism was the last great school of Greek Philosophy and had its birth at Alexandria. It was, in its main features, a synthesis of Platonism with oriental mysticism. The great names associated with it are those of Plotinus, Proclus and Porphyry.

P. 85. *St. Paul's triad* : The reference is to a famous passage in the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians. In this passage Love, or Charity, is extolled as the greatest of all the virtues; but with it, at a slightly lower level, are joined the virtues of Faith and Hope. "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity" (verse 13).

In an isolated but extremely interesting passage : "Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." *St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, viii. 21.

A compromise between Jewish and Platonic eschatology : Eschatology is the name given to any doctrine about the "last things," i.e. the final destiny, or ultimate future, of Man. The Jews (see note on page 145) believed in a divine kingdom to be founded on earth by their coming Messiah. The Platonists held that this world of ours is merely the imperfect shadow or embodiment of the divine world of Ideas. If, however, we can pierce through the shadows to the true perfection behind it, then, in the act of realization, the world becomes perfect. Such direct realization the Platonists conceived to be the true goal of philosophy and, given the necessary conditions, to be possible for the human soul, even during earthly life.

Millenarianism : See note on page 167.

Materialised into a supraterrrestrial, etc. : As in the popular conception of heaven as a place, or city, or country, with scenery and characteristics of its own derived from terrestrial analogies.

A Deuteronomic Religion : The Book of Deuteronomy is the fifth book of the prophet Moses, in the Bible. It is a long exhortation to the Jewish people, who were about to enter the land of Canaan, to keep the commandments of God, in order that, by so doing, they may enter upon their inheritance as the Chosen People, defeat and dispossess their enemies, and be generally powerful and prosperous.

P. 86. *As its greatest and most representative poet said* : The reference is, of course, to the well-known words which Tennyson puts into the mouth of the departing King at the end of the *Morte d'Arthur* :

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new
And God fulfils Himself," etc.

Clough : Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-1861), a poet, not of the first rank, though the author of a few memorable shorter pieces. It would hardly be untrue to say that Clough's name is immortalized less by his own work than by the fact that he is the subject of Matthew Arnold's splendid elegy, *Thyrsis*.

P. 87. *Anatole France* : See note on page 154. His *Isle of the Penguins* is an extremely witty and ironical satire on modern social and political life.

Eventu rerum : From the Roman poet, Claudian. See note on page 144. "The foolish have to be taught by events," i.e. they are not wise enough to anticipate, and so avoid, evil consequences.

Architecture reached its climax : i.e. during the period when the great medieval cathedrals were being built; roughly between A.D. 1000-1400.

Roman Law : The greatest codification of Roman law was that undertaken by the Emperor Justinian (A.D. 529-565) and consisted of three parts, the *Codex*, the *Digest*, and the *Institutes*, which were gathered together under the general title of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, or "Body of Civil Law."

Pericles : Pericles (born early in the fifth century, and died 429 B.C.) was the greatest of Athenian statesmen. He was the ruler of Athens during the period of her highest supremacy in literature and art. The Age of Augustus, Emperor of Rome from 29 B.C. to A.D. 14, was the most distinguished epoch of Roman literature, including the great names of Virgil and Horace. The term "Augustan Age" is sometimes applied, as a generic term, to periods of pronounced literary excellence, though devoid of the highest creative originality, e.g. the age of Dryden and Pope in England, or that of Racine and Corneille in France.

P. 88. "*Carent quia vate sacro*" : "Because they lack an inspired bard" to celebrate their glories. The words are from Horace.

Emerson : Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), the great American Essayist and an original, if somewhat indifferent, poet.

In Milton's grand words : In his *Areopagitica*.

Nicholas of Cusa : (1401-1464) was one of the greatest thinkers of the Middle Ages. Long before Galileo, he taught the movement of the earth round the sun. In spite of his heterodox views, such as his pantheism, he became a Cardinal of the Church and a Papal legate.

P. 89. *The absolute values* : Truth, Goodness and Beauty are called "absolute" values, because they cannot be resolved into anything more ultimate than themselves, while all other values in the world are merely secondary and derivative and can be resolved into one or other of these three. Plato selected the Good, the True and the Beautiful as the supreme trinity in his hierarchy of Ideas, though in places he achieves a Unity by subsuming the two latter under the Idea of the Good.

The Sermon on the Mount : The longest, and the most important, of all the recorded utterances of Jesus Christ. It is given, in its fullest form, in St. Matthew, chapters v-vii; but portions of it appear in the other Gospels.

THE VICTORIAN AGE

P. 91. *Epigoni* : The name given in Greek Mythology to the sons of the Seven Heroes who died in the war against Thebes; now used figuratively for the descendants, or successors, of men in the past greater than themselves.

The fanatical nationalism : After the sack of Jerusalem by the Roman Emperor Titus in A.D. 70, in consequence of the rebellion of the zealots or fanatical national party, large numbers of the Jews were expelled from their country, but many were allowed to remain. As soon as they had recuperated their strength they revolted anew under Bar-Cochba in A.D. 135. This insurrection was put down with enormous bloodshed and led to the final expulsion of the race from Judea. From that time the Jews have had no country.

Sybel : Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895), German historian. His greatest work is his *History of the Revolution from 1789-1795*.

Tocqueville : Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), one of the greatest of French political philosophers. Among his chief works are *Democracy in America* and *The Old Regime and the Revolution*.

P. 92. *Arnold Toynbee* (1852-1883): Philanthropist and Social Reformer. The phrase "The Industrial Revolution" was first used as the title of a book of his collected addresses on the *Economic History of England*, published in 1884.

A variety of mechanical inventions : For a list of these see the essay on the *Idea of Progress*, page 69.

The French monarchy : The decline of the French Monarchy can really be dated from the latter part of the long reign of Louis XIV, when a series of unsuccessful wars practically reduced the kingdom to bankruptcy. Moreover, the policy instituted by that monarch, of concentrating the nobility at Versailles and removing them from all contact with the peasants on their estates, undoubtedly precipitated the social crisis which ended in the Revolution.

The riding-horse and pack-horse : Coaching dates from the great improvement in the English roads brought about by John Macadam (1756-1836). Macadam started work as surveyor of the Bristol district in 1816 and from then until 1836

was consulted all over the country on the question of road improvement. In consequence of his labours there were in 1836 fifty-four mail coaches running in England. Before this date, however, railways had started—the earliest line, the Stockton and Darlington, having been opened for public traffic in 1825. The next fifteen years saw the opening of practically all the present English railway lines.

Fast-sailing clippers : The first vessels to use steam power exclusively, without the help of sails, were the Great Western and Sirius which crossed the Atlantic in April, 1838.

P. 93. *A superstitious belief* : See the Essay on the *Idea of Progress*, page 69.

There were no large towns, except London : For the relative size of London and the other chief cities of England at the end of the seventeenth century, see Macaulay's *History of England*, chapter iii, vol. I, "England in 1688."

The population was sparse : In a foot-note to his essay on *The Birthrate*, Dr. Inge mentions that the population of England and Wales is said to have been 4,800,000, in 1600, 6,500,000 in 1750 and 8,890,000 in 1801. In 1901 it was 32,530,000 and in 1914 37,000,000.

Dean Colet : John Colet (1467–1519), Dean of St. Paul's from 1505 and the founder of St. Paul's School. One of the most familiar instances of an enormous family none of whom lived beyond early childhood was that of Queen Anne, who had nineteen children.

The deathrate rapidly declined : The birthrate and deathrate in England seem to have stabilized themselves at a proportion of roughly 7 to 5, by about the middle of the century, as the following figures will show.

In England and Wales.

	<i>Births</i>	<i>Deaths</i>
1840	502,303	356,634
1845	543,521	349,366
1849	578,159	440,839
1853	612,391	421,097
1856	657,453	390,506
1858	655,481	449,656
1859	689,881	441,790
1860	684,048	422,721
1861	696,406	436,114
1862	712,417	436,573
1863	727,275	473,837
1864	740,275	495,531
1865	748,069	490,909

the high price of corn due to the war with France. In addition to supplementing wages out of the Rates, relief was granted in proportion to the number of children in a family, thus encouraging, as Dr. Ingo says, improvidently large families. These doles, which soon led to the anomalous position that idle paupers were better off than working people, were abolished on the 14th August, 1834.

In Ireland : There were great potato famines in Ireland in 1822 and 1846-7.

The vital statistics : i.e. in countries of this type both the birthrate and the deathrate tend to be high. In 1912 the birth and deathrate of Russia were 44.0 and 28.9, while India, with a practically similar birthrate, had a still greater mortality. In China, it is said that seven out of ten children die in infancy. These figures are taken from Dr. Ingo's essay on *The Birthrate*.

P. 97. *The dominions beyond the seas* : The white population of Australia, for example, increased from 1,030 persons in 1788, to 80,000 in 1835, and 350,000 in 1851. Canada, a much older colony, had, in 1800, a white population of 240,000, which had risen in 1825 to 581,920, and in 1851 to 1,842,285.

The novels of Dickens, Charles Reade and Kingsley : e.g. such novels as *Oliver Twist*, *Nicholas Nickleby* and *Little Dorrit* by Charles Dickens; *It is Never too Late to Mend*, *Hard Cash*, *Foul Play*, *Put Yourself in his Place* and *A Woman Hater* by Charles Reade (1814-1884); *Alton Locke* and *Yeast* by Charles Kingsley (1819-75).

Major prophets : The name "major," or greater, prophets, is given to the authors of the first five books of Prophecy in the Old Testament, viz. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Nehemiah, and Daniel.

Carlyle was a Stoic : This refers to the general quality of his ethical teaching, e.g. of the stern claims of duty; of the doctrine that man is in the world not to enjoy himself but to work; and of the superiority of human nature to such external influences as fate. In this general character of austerity the gospel of Carlyle resembled that of the ancient Stoics, the sect founded by Zeno of Elea at the beginning of the third century B.C., and in a certain degree the teachings of Jean Calvin (1509-1564), the Swiss Reformer and founder of the harshest and most extreme form of Protestantism.

His studies of German idealism : e.g. of the writings of such mystics and idealists as Fichte, Schelling and Novalis.

Westminster Hall : This ancient building is part of the palace built by William Rufus and was made the seat of the Law in 1224. In course of time the three superior Courts of Common Law, viz. the King's Bench, the Common Pleas and the Exchequer, were all established on one side of Westminster Hall, while the Court of Chancery or Equity occupied the other side. By the Judicature Acts (1873-76) the three former became divisions of the High Court of Justice.

John Doe and Richard Roe : These two personages were invented by Jurists as an imaginary Plaintiff and Defendant, in cases under the Law of Ejectment (i.e. where an individual's claim to a piece of landed property was challenged by another person), in order to allow the dispossessed person to claim not merely damages for ejectment, but possession of the actual property as well. Gog and Magog are the names given to two statues of mythical giants which stand in the Guildhall in London.

P. 100. *Dickens' pictures of the English law* : As, for instance, in *Bleak House*, which satirizes the expense and delays of Chancery Law.

The horrors of the debtors' prison : The chief debtors' prison was at the Marshalsea in Southwark, in S. London. Imprisonment for debt was abolished by an Act of 1869, with a single exception in the case of debtors who refuse to pay when they have the means. The name chiefly associated with the reform of the miserable conditions prevailing in these prisons was that of the philanthropist John Howard (1726-1790). For the most descriptive picture of such a prison see Charles Dickens' *Little Dorrit*. The reader will also remember the imprisonment of Rawdon Crawley for debt in Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*.

Condemned to death : In the eighteenth century there were more than two hundred offences on the Statute Book punishable by death, but in practice these had been reduced to twenty-five by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1823 about a hundred of the earlier long list of crimes were exempted from capital punishment, while in 1837 forgery was similarly exempted. Since 1861 there are in England only four crimes which come under the death penalty, viz. arson in dockyards or arsenals, piracy with violence, treason and murder.

Public executions : By an Act of 1868 all executions were henceforth to take place within the walls of prisons. The last public execution was that of the murderer, Muller, in the previous year.

The Mathematical and Classical Triposes : The Mathematical Tripos is far more ancient than the Classical. The latter was established in 1824, while the Mathematical Tripos Lists have been preserved since 1747.

P. 101. Abolition of all Anglican privileges : Up to the year 1854 no student, who was not a member of the English State Church, could be admitted to Oxford and Cambridge Universities. The Test Oath was, however, retained for the M.A. degree until 1871, when it was abolished by the Oxford and Cambridge Tests Repeal Act.

Permission of Fellows to marry : By an Act of 1877 two Executive Commissioners were appointed, whose report was issued in 1882. They remodelled the whole system of College Fellowships at both Universities. Most of these were attached to University or College offices; but about a hundred sinecure Fellowships were retained, terminable in seven years and subject to no restrictions of residence or celibacy.

The Civil Service : Up to 1859 appointments to the Civil Service were made entirely by nomination, with or without an examination to test the fitness of the candidate so nominated. The first office to hold a yearly open Competition was the India Office in 1859. The principle was adopted for the whole Civil Service on the 14th June, 1870.

The Volunteer movement : This movement began in 1859, at a time when there was some fear of invasion of England, and within a few months over 100,000 men had been enrolled. The Volunteers had to find their own equipment and pay their own expenses, and received no reward of any kind.

The Prince Consort : For a just estimate of the character and abilities of the Prince Consort (1819-1861) the reader should consult Mr. Lytton Strachey's brilliant biography of Queen Victoria.

The Crimean War (28th March, 1854, to March 1856) was marked by quite incompetent generalship in the field and by hopelessly inadequate commissariat and hospital arrangements, the latter due to the parsimony and indifference of the Home Government. At the battle of Inkerman, November 5th, 1854, 8000 British troops were taken by surprise and fought desperately for many hours against about 50,000 Russians and finally, with the help of 6000 French, succeeded in completely routing the enemy.

P. 102. Publius Syrus : Flourished in the middle of the first century B.C. He was born as a slave and afterwards obtained his freedom, to become the leading writer of mimes. His improvisations, which contained a number of brief moral maxims, became exceedingly popular and were later collected under the title of *The Opinions of Publius Syrus*. The line here quoted runs :—"Where nothing is feared, that which is to be feared is being born."

Lecky : William Edward Hartpole Lecky (1838-1903), the well-known English historian and philosopher.

Disraeli's scheme : i.e. his Reform Bill of that year, which gave universal suffrage in the boroughs and extended the county franchise, thus out-doing the Whigs or Liberal Party in the cause of democracy.

P. 103. *Legally sacrosanct* : Members of Parliament are by law free from arrest on any civil process in coming, going, or returning to the Houses of Parliament, and cannot be prosecuted for slander on account of anything said in parliamentary debate.

The Bradlaugh case : Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891) was in 1880, after being elected M.P. for Northampton, refused the right of taking his seat in the House because of his unwillingness, as a freethinker, to take the oath upon the Bible. It was only after having been thrice re-elected by Northampton that he was in 1886 eventually allowed to take his seat on affirmation.

Wilkes : John Wilkes (1727-1797), the famous demagogue, was expelled from the House of Commons on the 19th January, 1764, on suspicion of being the author of an article in the *North Britain*. In 1768, having been re-elected by the county of Middlesex, he was declared by the House ineligible to sit, and Colonel Luttrell was given the seat in his place. In 1774, however, having become Lord Mayor and again been returned unopposed for Middlesex, he was permitted to take his seat. In 1782 the resolutions which had annulled his previous election were expunged from the records of the House.

The opium war against China : This was the war undertaken by Great Britain in order to force China to import opium from India. It lasted from 1840-1842.

Flahault : Augusto Charles Comte de Flahault (1785-1870) was aide-de-camp to Napoleon and won distinction in the Peninsular and Russian Campaigns. He was appointed ambassador in Vienna 1842-48 and ambassador to Great Britain 1860-1862.

The settlement after 1815 : See note on page 148.

The disturbances of 1848 : After the abdication of Louis Philippe in 1848 there was an insurrection of the red Republicans in Paris, and the revolutionary wave spread in that year through most of the countries of Europe. In Italy, Milan and Venice witnessed a revolt against Austrian rule, Naples and Sicily rebelled against their Bourbon rulers, and Pope Pius IX had to fly from Rome, where a republic was set up in February 1849. In Austria, the authority at Vienna passed into the hands of the National Guards and the Students' Legion, an insurrection broke out in Prague, and Hungary revolted under the leadership of Kossuth. In Germany, a general movement of unrest was only stayed by hasty concessions made by the ruling princes of the Independent German States. In spite of

this, the German people elected a National Congress of their own representatives, which in 1849 offered the imperial crown to the King of Prussia; but he refused to accept it from such a body, and soon afterwards the Assembly began to lose its power and was finally dissolved. The popular movement had been further weakened in Prussia and Saxony by the savage use of armed forces on the part of the governments of these States.

P. 104. *The Pope wobbled:* The Pope was Pius IX, who had been elected to the Papal throne in 1846 and held the Papacy for no less than thirty-two years, dying on the 8th February, 1878. Pius IX had started as a champion of Liberalism, and for the first two years of his reign was the idol of the Roman populace; but the outbreak of revolutionary disturbances in Rome gave him a fright and caused him to fly for safety to Gaeta on November 24th, 1848. He did not return until April 12th, 1850. From this time, under the influence of his Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli, he became an extreme reactionary, both in civil and ecclesiastical policy.

Chartism: A political movement of the working-class in Great Britain, which arose out of widespread national disappointment at the results of the Reform Bill of 1832. The workers put forward in 1839 a "People's Charter," which demanded, amongst other things, manhood suffrage, vote by ballot, the abolition of property qualification for members of Parliament, and payment of Members. The refusal of the House of Commons to consider a petition, presented in June 1839 and signed by a million and a quarter names, was followed by threats of a universal strike. Disturbances took place all over the country and gathered strength during a number of years, reaching their highest point in the "Year of Revolution," 1848, necessitating military measures on the part of the Duke of Wellington. From 1848 Chartism rapidly died down, chiefly owing to the reviving prosperity of the country, incident upon the rapid colonial expansion which took place at that time.

While Macaulay was showing: This refers to the celebrated chapter in Macaulay's *History of England* on the "State of England in 1685" (chapter iii, vol. I).

Sir Joseph Paxton's great glass house: This was the gigantic structure of iron and glass built for the Great Exhibition in Hyde Park, London, in 1851, and opened by Queen Victoria on May 1st of that year. Its architect, Mr. Joseph Paxton (1801-1865), had achieved fame by the building of the great conservatories at Chatsworth, the Duke of Devonshire's palatial seat in Derbyshire. He was knighted at the opening of the Exhibition. When the Exhibition was over, the glass structure was taken down and re-erected at Sydenham, in the

South-east of London, where it became the familiar Crystal Palace, which still stands.

The enragés of Europe : The founder of revolutionary anarchism in Europe was Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) whose writings exercised a powerful influence in the middle of the century. His most prominent disciple was the Russian Bakunin (1814–1876), the founder of international Nihilism with Karl Marx (1818–1883).

P. 105. *The Romanticist revolution* : The characteristics of the Romantic movement in European literature are thus summed up in an article in *Chambers' Encyclopædia* :—

“It was a revolt against pseudo-classicism; a return from the monotonous commonplace of everyday life to the quaint and unfamiliar world of old Romance; a craving for the novel, original and adventurous; an emphasising of the interesting, the picturesque and the ‘romantic,’ at the expense, if need be, of correctness and elegance and the current canons of good taste. Deep humour, strong pathos, profound pity are amongst its notes.”

Readers will be familiar with the leading names of the movement, so far as English literature is concerned. In France the chief names are those of Rousseau, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Dumas, George Sand and Victor Hugo, though one or two of these fall after the date, 1825, mentioned in the text. In Germany the chief apostle of Romanticism was Novalis. Other names connected with the movement in that country are those of the Schlegels, Tieck and Hoffmann, though tendencies towards Romanticism may be traced in the earlier work of Lessing, Schiller and Goethe and in the philosophy of Schelling.

By a strange chance : Byron died in 1824, aged 36; Shelley in 1822, aged 30; Keats in 1821, in his twenty-sixth year.

Wordsworth alone : Wordsworth lived for eighty years (1770–1850). The period during which his greatest work was produced is somewhat generously extended by Dean Inge, most critics considering that practically all of Wordsworth that will live was written between 1798 and 1808. The “fifteen years,” mentioned in the text, stand for the period between 1825, the date mentioned at the beginning of the paragraph for the completion of the Romanticist Revolution, and 1840. The latter year may be roughly taken as marking the beginning of Tennyson's fame. As a matter of fact, Tennyson had published his volume, *Poems, chiefly Lyrical*, in 1830, but, strictly speaking, the beginnings of his fame cannot be placed earlier than the epoch-making 1842 volume of poems, which contained a carefully revised selection of his earlier work, together with a number of new pieces, several of which represent his finest work.

P. 106. *On nature and history*: On nature by the poets, and on history by such romantic novelists as Scott.

Tennyson: Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* are, as Dr. Inge calls them a little further on, Novelettes, and the same description may be given to such poems as *Enoch Arden*, *Dora*, or *The Gardener's Daughter*. Browning's most notable effort as a story-teller is *The Ring and the Book*, which is not merely a novel, but a novel in which the story is re-told a number of times from the point of view of different characters taking part in its action.

Let them set up: Of the list of names given by Dr. Inge here, some readers might be inclined to question the inclusion, on physiognomic grounds, of Charles Darwin and possibly of Burne-Jones. These are purely matters of taste. It may perhaps be mentioned that Manning (1808-1892) is the celebrated Cardinal of that name, who left the Church of England for the Church of Rome in 1851; Martineau is the theologian, James Martineau (1805-1900); Burne-Jones is the famous painter and member of the pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (1833-1898).

P. 107. *Prisca iuvent alios*: The lines quoted may be translated thus:—

"Let what is ancient delight others: for my part I congratulate myself that I was born thus late in time; this age suits my disposition."

And he reigned: Lord Tennyson's literary reign lasted half a century, from 1842 to his death in 1892, while that of Queen Victoria lasted from 1837-1901.

The great Attic tragedians: Tennyson lived to eighty-three, Browning to seventy-seven. Of the great Attic tragedians Æschylus lived eighty years, Sophocles ninety-one, and Euripides seventy-four.

Greek philosophers: e.g. Plato lived to be eighty, Aristotle to be sixty-two. The longest-lived of ancient philosophers seems to have been the Cynic, Demonax, of the time of Hadrian, who is said to have lived a hundred years. Legend has it, however, that three of the Seven Wise Men were also centenarians. Of Victorian theologians Martineau, who lived to be ninety-five, and Pusey who lived to the age of eighty-two, are good examples of longevity amongst a long-lived class.

The man with a muck-rake: A character in Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*.

Modred: The villain of the Arthurian story. According to the usual account he was Arthur's nephew. But in an early eleventh-century Arthurian cycle (that of Walter of

Oxford, translated by Geoffrey of Monmouth) Modred not only revolted against his uncle but seduced his wife Guinivere. It was in fighting against Modred that Arthur received the wounds which led to his being carried to the Isle of Avalon.

Œdipus-legend : As a story of incest. According to the Greek legend Œdipus, King of Thebes, unwittingly married his own mother.

Rex quondam rexque futurus : "King of old and destined to be king in time to come." These words referred to the belief that Arthur was destined to reappear in some future age amongst men. The same belief was held, in medieval times, about the great Emperor Frederick Barbarossa.

Malory : Sir Thomas Malory the writer of the great prose romance of the *Morte d'Arthur*, which is Tennyson's chief authority for his *Idylls*. The *Morte d'Arthur* was completed in 1470 and is the greatest work of its kind in the English language. The name Malleor in the quotation is merely a poetical alternative of Malory.

P. 108. *Camelot* : The legendary capital of Arthur's Kingdom and the headquarters of the Knights of the Round Table.

Parliamentary debates in "Paradise Lost" : e.g. the debate of the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost*, book II.

The children born of thee : These lines are taken from Tennyson's *Guinevere*, and are spoken by King Arthur.

P. 109. *No graver than a schoolboys' barring out* : From Tennyson's *Princess* :—

"Revolts, republics, revolutions, most
No graver than a schoolboys' barring out;
Too comic for the solemn things they are,
Too solemn for the comic touches in them,
Like our wild Princess with as wise a dream
As some of theirs—God bless the narrow seas!
I wish they were the whole Atlantic broad."

September massacres : e.g. the terrible massacres in the prisons of Paris which continued from September 2nd to September 7th, 1792.

Pantisocracy : The name given to the Utopian scheme of founding a colony of kindred souls, on a communistic basis, on the banks of the Sasquehanna River in America, which engaged the enthusiasms of Coleridge as a young man, and of others like Southey and Lovell.

Years brought : All these four writers had been strongly stirred by the French Revolution when it first started, but all alike were alienated by its further developments.

The second Locksley Hall: The poem entitled *Locksley Hall Sixty Years after*. The title is not quite accurate as the first *Locksley Hall* was published in 1842 and the second in 1887.

Many a backward-streaming curve: A quotation from *Locksley Hall Sixty Years after*. The complete verse runs:—

"Forward then, but still remember how the course of time will
swerve,

Crook and turn upon itself in many a backward streaming curve."

Novels of George Eliot: Such as *Felix Holt* (1866) and *Daniel Deronda* (1876).

P. 110. *George Gissing*: A novelist who took his subjects chiefly from the lives of the poor in the large towns. Author of *Thyrza*, *Unclassed*, *The Nether World*, *Private Papers of Henry Ryecroft*, etc.

Thomas Hardy (b. 1840): Considered the greatest among living English novelists and pre-eminent in his studies of rustic life. It cannot be said that Thomas Hardy was ever an optimist, but it is quite true that in his later novels, such as *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (1891), *Jude the Obscure* (1895), and *The Pursuit of the Well-beloved* (1897), his outlook on life is coloured by gloomy fatalism which almost amounts to despair.

Neo-Catholicism: See note on page 152. The movement proclaimed a reversion to an ordered theocracy, under the leadership of the Pope, as the only remedy for the social and religious anarchy which had been brought about by the Revolution. Joseph Marie Comte de Maistre (1754-1821) was perhaps the most uncompromising leader of this movement. Sent as ambassador by the King of Sardinia to Russia in 1803, he wrote, during his long stay in St. Petersburg, three of his chief works, viz. the *Constitution Politique* (1810), *Of the Pope* (1821), and *To the Gallican Church* (1821-22). François René, Vicomte de Chateaubriand (1768-1848), was a distinguished writer and one of the greatest names in the French Romantic movement. Like de Maistre, he was an ardent Royalist and in his *Le Génie du Christianisme* he pleaded eloquently for a revival of the ancient religious allegiance to Rome. From 1822 to 1824 Chateaubriand was ambassador in London.

Tractarians: The name given to the adherents of what is known as the Oxford Movement, who issued their propaganda in the form of ninety *Tracts for the Times*, published at Oxford between 1833 and 1841. The Oxford Movement aimed at a revival of the primitive Christianity of the first and second centuries A.D. and at a recognition of the sacred character of the priestly office. Its most prominent leader was John Henry Newman (1801-1890), Vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, who in

1845 left the English Church and was received into the Church of Rome. Newman was made a cardinal in 1879.

"*German theology*": The chief seat of German theological scholarship about this period was the University of Tübingen in Württemberg, which under the leadership of Bruno Baur (1809-1882) became the centre of what is known as the Higher Criticism.

Who admired: i.e. Ruskin had a purely æsthetic admiration for the architectural magnificence of a cathedral, but no feeling for its religious significance.

"*There lives more faith*": These lines are from Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, canto xevi:—

"Perplexed in faith, but pure in deeds,
At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds."

Samuel Butler: See note on page 171.

Clough: See note on page 182. Clough had been an ardent disciple of Newman in his early days, but after Newman's secession to Rome, reacted against these earlier influences and became altogether unsettled in his religious views.

Amiel: Henri Amiel (1821-1881), Professor of Æsthetics and French literature and afterwards of Moral Philosophy at the University of Geneva. His best-known work is the *Journal Intime*, which is, as its name shows, an intimate confession of his reflections about life.

P. 111. *Matthew Arnold*: The fullest expression of Arnold's religious views is in his *Literature and Dogma* published in 1873, in which he endeavours to sift what is essential from what is unessential in religion and to set forth a residuum which men of reason and men of piety could equally accept.

Sir John Seeley: See note on page 174. Seeley's *Ecce Homo* appeared in 1865 and was a brilliant attempt at treating the life of Jesus Christ from a purely human point of view, divested of all elements of the supernatural.

Intolerance was very bitter: The best-remembered instance of such intolerance was the persecution of Bishop Colenso (1814-1883) for his unorthodox views about the accuracy of the historical books of the Bible. Colenso was deprived of his See (the Bishopric of Natal) in 1863. The Privy Council reversed this decision, but the Council of the Colonial Bishops Fund nevertheless refused to pay him his income. In 1866 the Council was ordered by the Master of the Rolls to make this payment. In reply to this order the Metropolitan Bishop of Cape Town publicly excommunicated Dr. Colenso and in 1869 consecrated another bishop in his place.

Before the growth of the towns : The whole of the country had been divided into parishes long before there was any really large town except London. The rapid springing up of towns with large populations, owing to the industrial revolution, meant that the rural parishes were denuded of their people, while the machinery of the Church, as it then was, was incapable of coping with the vast populations in the towns themselves.

Lecky's charming description : This is to be found in *Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century*.

His method of facing : The reference is to Browning's resolute clinging to a sturdy optimism, in spite of all doubts and difficulties, such as we find for example in his *Prospice* and *Rabbi Ben Ezra*.

P. 112. *The palmiest day of English novel-writing :* The following passage may be quoted here from Sir Leslie Stephen's *George Eliot* in the English Men of Letters series : "Some of us can still look back with fondness to the middle of the last century, and recall the period which seems—to our old-fashioned tastes at least—to have been a flowering time of genius. Within a few years on either side of 1850 many great lights of literature arose or culminated. By *David Copperfield*, which appeared in 1850, Dickens' popular empire, one may say, was finally established; and if his best work was done, his admirers steadily increased in number. Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*, *Pendennis*, *Esmond*, and *The Newcomes* came out between 1847 and 1855. Miss Brontë's short and most brilliant apparition lasted from 1847 to 1853. The versatile Bulwer was opening a new and popular vein by *The Caxtons* and *My Novel* in 1850 and 1853, preaching sound domestic morality and omitting the True and the Beautiful. All Charles Kingsley's really powerful works of fiction—*Alton Locke*, *Yeast*, *Hypatia* and *Westward Ho !*—appeared between 1850 and 1855. Mrs. Gaskell had first made a mark by *Mary Barton* in 1848, which was followed by *Cranford* and *North and South*, the last in 1855. Trollope, after some failures, was beginning to set forth the humours of Barsetshire by the *Warden* in 1855; and Charles Reade became a popular novelist by *Christie Johnstone* in 1853, and *Never too Late to Mend* in 1856. In 1855, I may add, Mr. George Meredith's *Shaving of Shagpat* was praised and reviewed by George Eliot; but the author had long to wait for a general recognition of his genius."

Mr. Mudie's catalogue of fiction : Mudie's Library, established in 1842, is the largest circulating library in Great Britain.

P. 113. *Guy Fawkes (1570-1606) :* The ring-leader in the famous Gunpowder Plot of 1605. Since that date up till fairly recently, November 5th, the day on which the conspirators

intended to blow up the Houses of Parliament, was celebrated as Guy Fawkes' Day and effigies of Fawkes were carried in procession through the streets and afterwards burnt. The practice seems largely to have died out.

The short-lived greatness : The history of Venice began as far back as A.D. 697 and passed through various periods of power and decline. The greatness, to which Dr. Inge seems to refer here, is that enjoyed by the Venetian State from the middle of the fifteenth century up to the date of the League of Cambrai, 1508; that of Genoa was in the twelfth century; Holland rose to its greatest height between the middle of the seventeenth century and the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.

Froude and Dilke : James Anthony Froude (1818-1894), Professor of Modern History at Oxford from 1892. His greatest work is his *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, published in twelve volumes in 1869. Sir Charles Dilke (1843-1904) was an exceedingly able politician who held various Government posts under Gladstone. His imperialist views are strikingly set forth in his *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890).

Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914): Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1903 and the leading champion of Imperial expansion and development.

Indian Nabobs : The name given to rich merchants, in the days of the East India Company, who had returned from India and settled down in their own country.

Corn Laws : i.e. Statutes enacted for the production of home-grown corn by the regulation of prices and the consequent restrictions upon imported corn. Such statutes had been passed from time to time throughout English history; but the reference here is to the special enactments of the last part of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, which were occasioned by the war with France. The Corn Laws were abolished in 1846, the commercial party favouring their abolition, the landed gentry being opposed to it. On the other hand, in the case of the Factory Acts (see note page 186) the industrial capitalists were opposed to reform, while the landed class were in favour of it.

P. 114. *This problem* : For a full description of this problem see the next essay on the *Dilemma of Civilization*. To Ruskin, as also to Morris, it was equally one of the ominous problems of the age.

THE DILEMMA OF CIVILIZATION

P. 115. *Natural selection* : This is the name given in the Darwinian theory to the process in Nature which tends to preserve favourable variations, i.e. those which are helpful in the struggle of existence. "Counter-selection," in Nature, is the negative form of this, i.e. the natural process which tends to cause unfavourable variations to die out. "Rational selection," on the other hand, is the deliberate application by human agency of these laws of natural selection and counter-selection, as observed in Nature, for the improvement of the race.

Vicarious charity : Dr. Inge is here referring to such mistaken specifics as the subsidizing by the State of classes who have only come into existence through the ignorant disregard of economic laws. Thus, what is known in modern social life as the "submerged tenth" ought, economically speaking, not to exist. To subsidize it by doles, etc., only makes the evil worse, because it tends to establish this class in existence and to encourage it to propagate freely.

Watchful observers : "To watch which way the cat jumps" is a proverbial phrase for an unprincipled opportunist, i.e. for a policy which is based on no reasoned principles but which simply accommodates itself to events.

The great Sphinx : i.e. Nature. According to the Greek legend, the Sphinx was a female monster, with the winged body of a lion and the head and bust of a woman. She is said to have propounded a riddle to the people of Thebes and to have murdered all who were unable to guess it. *Œdipus*, King of Thebes, solved it and thereupon the Sphinx slew herself. "The riddle of the Sphinx" is a phrase commonly used to denote the mysterious laws of Nature, ignorance of which is fatal in the battle of life.

Purgatory : According to the Roman Catholic belief, Purgatory is an intermediate stage of purification through which the soul must pass after death in order to prepare itself for the bliss of Heaven. What Dr. Inge means here is that no religion and no political system can ever come into its own until it has paid the penalty for, and thus been purged of, all elements in it which are in conflict with science, or truth.

Futile attempts : e.g. controversies about the miracles recorded in Bible history. Such questions, according to Dr. Inge, have nothing to do with religion as such, and it consequently makes no difference to religion which way they are decided.

P. 116. *The war of the twentieth century*: At first sight it would seem, from these words, as though Dr. Inge regarded religion as no longer a vital factor in the solution of the twentieth-century problems. But this is not his view at all (see the concluding sentence of this essay). What he has said a few lines above shows that he regards true religion and science as more or less synonymous terms, and that he looks upon science as the representative of religion in this lower world, engaged in winning victories on the latter's behalf.

It is not for nothing: It is a point worthy of remark that it is only recently that revolution has declared war on the intellectuals. In the French Revolution, for example, the intellectuals were, on the whole, on the side of the revolutionary elements. What is the explanation of this? Dr. Inge's view seems to be that the revolutionaries, conscious of the unsoundness of their beliefs, are anxious to destroy in advance their most competent critics. But may it not be that the hatred of the intellectuals springs from the vague idea that the intelligentsia, being, as the term implies, the highly educated class, are thereby associated, in the popular mind, with the prime necessity of any kind of high education, viz. money; hence capitalism?

Reacted upon: i.e. have reflected or been determined by. The point suggested by Dr. Inge in this rather difficult paragraph is that man's social, political and economic views are, at any given period, closely related to the dominating scientific views of the time. (Under "scientific" here he includes such views as those of Lamarck and Bergson which, while not belonging to pure science, are yet an endeavour to formulate theories of life on a scientific basis.) Thus he sees in the "career open to talents," of the Napoleonic epoch, a reflection of the Lamarckian theory of unimpeded progress towards perfection; in the cut-throat competition of modern industrial life, the visible illustration, in the world of economics, of that law of survival which Darwin hold to be operative throughout Nature; in the modern belief in organization (i.e. in the production of a single foreseen result by the co-operation of many individuals for that one end) a close parallel to that harnessing and co-ordination of complex forces for a single end, which is the essence of all modern machinery; and in the modern impatience of tradition and eagerness to make social and economic experiments, a reflection of that new theory of life which the French philosopher Bergson has lately given to the world, i.e. of a universe with no fixed goal of development, but which is at every moment embarking blindly upon some fresh adventure.

Bergson: Professor Henri Louis Bergson (b. 1858), perhaps the most distinguished of modern philosophers, is Professor

of Moral Philosophy at the Collège de France in Paris. His most notable book is his *Creative Evolution* in which he develops the idea of a "vital urge" (*élan vital*), which is ever carrying the unfolding life of the world into new and unknown regions—in other words, is constantly "experimenting."

P. 117. *Dr. Austin Freeman*: A retired officer of the R.A.M.C. Author of *Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman* (1898), *The Eye of Osiris*, and many other works.

Dr. Müller Lyer: Franz C. Müller Lyer (b. 1857).

The Age of Stone: i.e. the primitive age in which man's weapons were made of roughly chipped stone, e.g. the flint arrow-heads which are so often dug up on the site of ancient settlements.

About 150 years ago: See *The Idea of Progress*, page 65.

Shuttle: An instrument used for shooting the thread of the woof between the threads of the warp in weaving.

Plectra: quills, or in some cases pieces of metal, fixed to the thumb, by which the strings of the ancient Greek Lyre were struck.

Zither: The zither or ancient *cithara* was a flat-stringed instrument which was held on the knees, or placed on a table, while being played.

P. 118. *Capitalism*: Even under Republican Rome a citizen like Marcus Licinius Crassus, the Triumvir, could become a multimillionaire by speculation in house property. Under the Empire, still more enormous fortunes could be accumulated by imperial treasurers or favourites.

For the ancients never kept: On the other hand, both in ancient Greece and Rome, slaves were allowed to marry, but the automatic keeping up of the supply of slave labour, which might have resulted from this, was neutralized by the ease with which it gradually became possible to obtain "manumission," or release from slavery, either by purchase or at the free-will of the master. Moreover, the breeding of slaves was never definitely cultivated in ancient times, since there was always a ready supply available—in the case of the Greeks, by barter; in that of the Romans, from conquest.

The first strides: To what older trades than those mentioned below under "3rd," is Dr. Müller Lyer referring?

P. 119. *Amalgamations*: Thus, in the world of Capital, the tendency has been to group a number of small businesses together into one big business and, in America, to collect a number of big businesses into what is called a Trust. In that of Labour, modern times have already witnessed (1) the grouping of a number of kindred trades into a single Trade Union,

(2) the federation of Trades Unions into a single body for purposes of political action, (3) the efforts to extend even this amalgamation by linking up the national Trades Union movement into a single great international organization.

Co-operative housekeeping: i.e. the plan of a number of different families having common meals together, thus getting rid of the labour of separate cooking arrangements.

Fourier: François Marie Charles Fourier (1772-1837), the French social idealist, believed that the perfect social life was to be brought about by the collection of individuals into communities which he called "Phalanges." Each such community, or Phalange, was to consist of 1,800 persons, subdivided into series and groups, and all were to dwell together in a common *phanlansteric*, i.e. a vast and beautiful building, in the midst of a highly cultivated piece of land of not less than three miles square in extent. The life of the community was to be spent in congenial labour, the rewards of which were to be distributed among the *phalange* in general in certain definite proportions—those employed in necessary labour getting the largest share, those performing essential labour coming next, and those whose labour was entirely pleasant coming last on the list.

Tahiti: The name is given to a group of islands, sometimes called the Society Islands, in the Pacific Ocean, about two thousand miles North-east of New Zealand, and divided into two parts, known respectively as the Windward and the Leeward Islands. The islands were visited by Captain Cook, the explorer, in 1769.

A houseless Briton: Dr. Inge here comments caustically on the modern post-war housing problem in Great Britain and on the various "housing schemes" which have been put forward by British Governments since 1918. Largely owing to the obstinate stand of the Bricklayers' Union, which opposes the idea of diluted labour in the building trade, the normal cost of a house reaches the large figure mentioned in the text; and the practical problem of the moment is that the ordinary householder of the working class, even if such houses were to be built, could not afford to pay the amount of rent which would bring in a reasonable interest to the Government on so large an outlay.

P. 120. "*Pleonexia*": Literally "the having of more," and so the desire to possess more than one has at present.

Time as mere money: The axiom "time is money" is the central idea of the modern American cult of business "efficiency." In such gigantic concerns, for example, as the Ford Motor Manufacturing Company, much of the extraordinary efficiency of the organization has been achieved

by knocking off odd minutes here and there from the time which the various processes take to perform. In a business like this, a couple of minutes gained per day may mean a corresponding gain of many thousand dollars per month. The fallacy of this attitude towards time lies of course in its denial of all value to leisure—the latter being, from a cultural point of view, one of the most valuable factors in life. To put the matter in a nutshell, man's true value lies in what he is and not merely in what he produces.

Treadmill: A cylindrical wheel, arranged in steps, which is turned by the weight of a person treading from one step to the next. Up till a few years ago it was used as an instrument of prison discipline, but has now been discarded in the light of the modern recognition that all purposeless labour, even in the case of a convict, is degrading to human nature.

So a modern nation: The reason is, of course, that any article of manufacture, which is produced by dividing up the process into its component parts and assigning each of these parts to a separate worker, can be turned out in far greater quantities and hence more cheaply than where a single man makes the whole article from start to finish. And yet the latter method, as sociologists are beginning to see too late, is, from the variety of interest which it affords, far more suitable to human nature. It is this problem of speed and efficiency versus human nature which Dr. Inge singles out, in more than one place, as one of the fundamental problems of the age.

The beehive: The beehive is taken here as an example of a community in which the life and energies of every single individual are completely subordinated to the life of the whole, and is thus, as Dr. Inge points out, a striking example of what a socialistic State would be if the commonly accepted principles of theoretical socialism were to be completely carried out in practice. For Socialism has, as its prime tenet, the conception of a State organized as a single unit in which the activities of every citizen are completely absorbed by the needs of the community.

P. 121. *Mankind, says Dr. Lytt*: Dr. Lytt's theory is that Socialism, which he defines as the organization of labour, must continue to be the dominant principle of modern life, until all the world's productive sources have been tapped; then the world of labour will know definitely what it has to deal with, each country having its apportioned share of the whole. When this point is reached, every country will be able to take stock of its resources and of the amount of labour necessary for dealing with these things, and will soon be able to fix a definite minimum in respect of the demand which the State must make upon the time and energies of its citizens. Over and above this minimum, all that is left will be given

to "personal freedom," i.e. there will be a considerable portion of every man's time and energy which he will be free to use for his own ends and in the developing of his personal life. Before this end can be achieved, however, there must be some guarantee that the population of a country will not increase out of all proportion to the capacity of that country for supporting it. The only real check on excessive population is that it should be brought under control by the exercise of reason and restraint on the part of the citizens themselves; and this, Dr. Lyer seems to think, is already beginning to come about. Dr. Inge would hardly agree with him here, as in many places in his essays he points out that while the best elements of the population to-day are being forced for economic reasons to restrict their families, the parasitic classes and the biologically unfit are notably reckless in this respect.

His outlook: Dr. Inge's remark could only be justified here, in its application to Dr. Müller Lyer, if it could be ascertained that Dr. Lyer has actually abandoned his social philosophy in consequence of the War. Dr. Inge would seem to take it for granted that he must have done so; but there is no proof of this. Surely any theory of human life and development, which could be entirely changed by such a happening as the recent War, must obviously be a somewhat shallow one. The late War was undoubtedly the most terrible of all wars in some respects, but it need not be held to have had any more relevance to the general evolution of humanity than a severe attack of sickness need be held to be relevant to the general health of an individual. One cannot help feeling that, in various places, Dr. Inge makes too much of the Great War. After all it revealed the heights of human nature just as much as the depths.

P. 122. *Assumptions of evolutionary optimism:* For this see *The Idea of Progress*, pages 69-70.

Karl Marx: See notes on pages 158 and 193.

The statistics of the national income: It is not easy to reconcile Dr. Inge's argument here with his previous statement on page 118 that private fortunes were, in consequence of the industrial revolution, higher in the nineteenth century than at any time since that of the Roman Empire. As for the increasing poverty of the poor, it should be remembered that statistics may possibly not be a completely safe guide, since what we have to consider here is not the mere amount of money earned by a poor person per annum, but also the purchasing power of the money thus earned.

But it is very doubtful: Most sensible readers will agree with Dr. Inge here. The quality in the European which

excites the hostility of other nations is probably not so much his love of money as his capacity for working and organizing in order to gain it. The only real cure for pleonexia is the recognition of, and consequent willingness to strive after, higher values than that of material gain; and such recognition can only be brought about by religion or philosophy. Wherever life is without such recognition, covetousness naturally exists. In his reference to the peasant proprietor, Dr. Inge is probably thinking of the class of peasant land-owners in France, whose avarice and parsimony is not only proverbial but furnishes a perennial problem to the financial authorities of that country.

P. 123. *Increasing complexity of organization*: The whole of this paragraph represents Dr. Inge's comment on what Dr. Lyer has to say about the conflicting claims of the organization of freedom and the organization of labour on page 120. Dr. Inge seems to assume that a completely organized industrial system would follow the analogy of bees and ants and produce a condition of society in which the individual would be left with no freedom at all. Dr. Lyer, on the other hand, as we have seen, regards such a perfected industrial organization as merely a prelude to a period of stability in which men would be free, owing to the very fact of such stability, to devote themselves to the development of their lives as individuals. Influenced by the passing phenomenon of the War, Dr. Inge even suggests that a state of organized stability would be welcomed by the world to-day, for the simple reason that the principal ideals which it has pursued for a hundred and fifty years have been tried and found wanting. But surely to set stability against movement, simply on the grounds that a passing phase of the world's movement has proved unsatisfactory, is hardly a courageous attitude! To call the beehive "an appalling object-lesson in State socialism," as he does on page 120, and then to say that after all even a condition like this would be preferable, for most of us, to the mistaken "progress" of the nineteenth century, is a piece of pessimism which, one would think, Dr. Inge would, if challenged, hardly adhere to. In point of fact, it conflicts with several of his more optimistic utterances in these essays, and perhaps the best criticism upon it is to be found in the last three sentences of the present essay.

Max Beerbohm (b. 1872): One of the most accomplished essayists of the present time and a famous caricaturist.

P. 124. *The part played in human activities*: One cannot help asking oneself whether this statement is after all as true as it seems to be at first sight. Even the most mechanical process involves a certain amount of muscular exercise, e.g. lifting and carrying, feeding the machine, etc.; while, as regards

mechanical transport, it would seem unsafe to argue from conditions in London to those generally prevailing. Moreover, there is no doubt that, at least in recent years, vastly greater numbers of the population take part in games than was the case previously. No doubt savage life has no need of dumb-bells and developers; but surely all that Dr. Austin Freeman is concerned with is the changes instant upon a mechanized civilization, and not those which have come about by the passage from savagery to civilization as such. The real difficulty seems to be that, in this life, one cannot have everything. The development of civilized interests naturally subtracts something from the life of purely physical energy lived by the savage. Finally, one might venture to remark that the signs of physical degeneracy, which are mentioned here as visible in factory hands, are probably due less to the kind of work on which such hands are employed than to the economic conditions under which the manual worker has in most cases to live—bad air, bad food and drink and insufficient housing and space being the most harmful of these.

Changes in the environment: i.e. in the physical conditions in which people have to live. Progress, here, will include everything which comes under the head of increased comfort, increased efficiency and labour saving. The store of "transmitted experience" is nothing more than the knowledge how to procure these things, as handed down from one generation to another. The dilemma of civilization, which is considered in this essay as (a) the choice between individualism and socialism, or (b) between the machine and the healthy creative instincts of man, is really a more fundamental thing than either of these and the present sentence indirectly states what it is. The real antithesis is between environmental improvement, as above defined, and intrinsic improvement, i.e. the civilizing of human nature itself. The experience of the past century would seem to indicate that the two are mutually exclusive. If so, which are we to choose? Or is there possibly some means, as yet undiscovered, by which the two can be combined?

But from an early date: Here again a question must be raised as to whether what Dr. Freeman calls environmental progress is not, more truly considered, intrinsic progress. Thus, the long list of triumphs over physical Nature, which have to be set to the credit of humanity, may be equally regarded as developments of function, i.e. of the capacity to achieve such triumphs. We have to remember (1) that, for what may be called statistical purposes, such changes are more easily recorded in external terms, e.g. that scientific progress is more easily recorded as a series of discoveries than

as a subjective process of increased intellectual efficiency, also (2) that very many thinkers are apt to regard moral progress as the only form of intrinsic improvement. Where, therefore, they observe a long series of intellectual triumphs without any corresponding development of the moral instincts, they are apt to deny intrinsic progress altogether. The truth may be, however, that intrinsic progress, like many other things, is a matter of alternating phases, of recurring ebb and flow, and that an age is yet to come which will witness as rapid a general moral development as the history of the past two or three thousand years has witnessed in the realm of intellect. Our difficulty in judging of these matters is that the history of humanity, as we know it, is far too short to form a basis of assured generalization. To sum up, it is quite possible that the past few thousand years have been merely engaged in preparing the environmental conditions which will make possible, let us say, in a few thousand years from now, a great age of moral and spiritual progress.

P. 125. *Leviathan* : A huge sea monster mentioned in the forty-first chapter of the book of Job in the Old Testament.

The conditions of modern warfare : It is generally agreed that in the next great war (whenver that may be) the non-combatant will be in just as much danger as the combatant, owing to the enormous developments in chemistry, as applied to warfare, which have taken place since 1918. For all we know, the next war may be purely and simply a contest between rival poison-gases and explosive bombs.

Diogenes : (See note on page 179.) This celebrated philosopher, who lived from about 412 to 323 B.C., was a pupil of the Cynic Antisthenes, and carried to its furthest extreme the Cynic ideal of the repudiation of civilized life. Legend tells us that he lived in a tub and that he was never tired of showing his complete contempt for such civilized amenities as cleanliness and refinement, literature and the fine arts.

The professional politician : The point here might perhaps be more clearly stated. In so far as politics is a profession, it cannot be denied that the professional politician is, as a rule, extremely highly qualified in the intricacies of that peculiar art; so much so, that it would be extremely difficult for any other kind of professional man to step into his shoes. The real point, however, is that politics, as the word is usually understood, are by no means the same thing as statesmanship, which requires (a) a sound political philosophy, (b) an expert knowledge of the various fields to which that knowledge has to be applied. And here it is worth remembering that the second of these requirements, without the first, is by no means a guarantee of good government. The statesman without expert naval knowledge would be a better First

Lord of the Admiralty than the Admiral without statesmanship. The technical knowledge can be adequately supplied by his subordinates. The statesmanship cannot.

P. 126. *The old apprenticeship*: The system by which a tradesman or craftsman, in return for a lump sum down, took a youth as a pupil and trained him in all the mysteries of his business or craft. The usual term of such apprenticeship was seven years.

The clamour for nationalization: The Trade Union demand for nationalization is in England at present limited to national ownership of mines, railways and land. The real crux of the problem is to be found (as so often) in the conflict between abstract generalities and practical efficiency. Theoretically it may be admitted as fair that the nation should own these properties; but the nation, as owner, and the nation, as managing director and organizer, are two very different things; and most people are agreed that State control, which would be without that goad to efficiency which is provided by competition, would soon lead to careless and profitless management.

Minor aggregations: Dr. Freeman is evidently here thinking of the Trades Unions.

Elevating the social organism: What is meant here is that the more highly developed the social organism, the more partial and particularized is the demand which it makes on the individual unit; hence the more extended the danger of an atrophy of such of his functions as are not directly needed for the corporate life. Thus, in the perfectly organized industrial community, the man whose job it is to put the buttons on a pair of boots exists, so far as the community is concerned, as a button-fixer and nothing else. To put the matter still more bluntly, a thoroughly mechanized society has no need for any human function which it cannot mechanize in its own service.

P. 127. *Pre-mechanical man*: The analogy would only be completely exact if we imagine pre-mechanical man to have used only such of the earth's substances as renew themselves automatically by the processes of Nature, e.g. such growing things as wood. But from the earliest ages men have used stone for building purposes; and stone once removed from the earth cannot be replaced. The point, however, really is that mechanical man uses up, for ephemeral purposes, certain special types of minerals which are by their nature limited in amount, e.g. coal and iron. Thus the real contrast is between the pre-mechanical man, who draws upon nature's illimitable resources, and mechanical man, whose chief demand is upon resources that are limited.

"One impulse" : The reference here is to the well-known words from Wordsworth's poem, *The Tables Turned* :

"One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil, and of good,
Than all the rages can."

Shower of soot : It has been estimated that no less than sixty tons of soot fall annually on London alone.

P. 128. *If those philosophers* : Plato and all the Platonic Schools.

Dick Turpin (1705-1739) : The most celebrated highway-man of his age.

Dr. Freeman sums up : This paragraph should be of interest to Indian readers, as it epitomizes in a few words the effect of a mechanical civilization, when imposed upon a society which has hitherto existed entirely on handicrafts. In England the industrial revolution is now a matter of more or less ancient history; but in India the process is going on before our eyes, and there will be few observers who will not have noted some or all of the changes mentioned in Dr. Freeman's list.

The skilled shop-keeper : i.e. one who knows everything about the goods in his shop, how they are made, what their distinctive qualities are, etc., as distinguished from the man who is merely concerned in selling and knows nothing about the manufacture of the things which he sells.

P. 129. *Acts of war* : The reference here is not of course to actual warfare, but merely to acts designed to disorganize the smooth routine of ordinary life, e.g. strikes.

Collectivism : In ordinary use, the word "collectivism" is applied to the Socialistic theory that industry shall be carried on by means of collective, instead of individual, capital. But here the word is used to denote "mass action," i.e. political action entered upon by an organized aggregate of individuals, without reference to the personal opinions of the units composing the mass. This is illustrated very pointedly in the delegate system which prevails in Trade Union Conferences, according to which each delegate is taken officially as representative of many thousands of workers, and his single vote is regarded as their vote.

Skilled men : This statement as to the ease with which skilled workmen were replaced by unskilled during the war is open to question.

Syndicalism : The most extreme form of modern Socialism, which may be regarded as the last outpost before the whole thing degenerates into mere anarchy. It is a comparatively

recent development, of French origin, and demands that all industries should be controlled by the workers.

P. 130. *The scramble for markets* : It would not be an over-estimate to say that all modern wars are, under one disguise or another, due to this cause.

Unfavourable trade conditions : Thus, if, as often happens, the manufacturers in a country have been producing a larger quantity of goods than, for some reason or other, they are able to sell, obviously they must for a time restrict their output, which means that they must employ fewer workers. The fact of the matter is that all mass-production of goods is essentially a speculation. It assumes that purchasers for such goods will be forthcoming. Consequently, it is, and must be, at the mercy of all those obscure economic fluctuations which from time to time make large numbers of people, either at home or abroad, unwilling or unable to buy.

Parasitic on the machine : i.e. they have depended entirely for their livelihood on the machinery with which their work is associated and are quite helpless apart from it. Consequently, if, for economic reasons, the machine has to cease working, there is nothing else to which they can turn in order to provide themselves with their daily bread.

Pilgrim Fathers : The first colony of English settlers in America. A party consisting of men, women and children, and numbering a hundred in all, sailed in the *Mayflower* from Plymouth in Devonshire on September 6th, 1620, and, being driven out of their course by violent storms, landed at Cape Cod in Massachusetts and there founded the settlement of Plymouth.

P. 131. *To become parasitic* : As Dr. Inge explains in the next sentence, this means to demand wages out of all proportion to the value of the work produced. The history of the Labour movement up to date has consisted in a series of demands (a) for higher wages, (b) for shorter hours of work. Technically, parasitism commences the moment pay begins to be in excess of value; but since the only workable test of value is the amount which the public are willing to pay voluntarily, and not the intrinsic worth of the work, such highly remunerative work as that of the fashionable physician or successful barrister cannot be classed as parasitic, even though it may be possible to regard the fees charged by these as excessive. For in both cases it is always open to the patient or client to select a cheaper physician or a less famous counsel.

Sub-man : The anthropological term for any specimen of a race who has degenerated below the normal level of the race.

Conscripts : The conscripts referred to here are men called up for compulsory military service during the late War. A very large proportion of these had to be classed as C3, i.e. as physically unfit for active military service.

P. 132. *Over-population is a phenomenon* : In a natural-condition of society the unfit tend automatically to be eliminated, whereas the artificial conditions of modern civilized life have the effect of keeping in check the factors which make for such elimination. If we add to this the acknowledged fact that the lowest dregs of the population, having, as Dean Inge explains in another place, no particular standards of life to keep up, do not mind how large their families are, we arrive at the phenomenon alluded to here, (1) that the unfit, under modern civilized conditions, propagate out of all proportion to the fit, (2) that the large families thus produced are fostered, instead of dying out, as they would naturally do in other circumstances.

The structural type of society : It is exceedingly difficult to frame any theory determining the relative claims of the individual and the organized group in society. The only suggestion that seems possible, with our present knowledge, is that all *permanent* groupings tend to be harmful, while *temporary* groupings for a special cause (e.g. a civilian army specially gathered together for a war) are on the whole beneficial. The injurious character of a mechanized civilization seems to lie largely in the fact that the mechanical worker becomes, from the very nature of his work, a mere unit in an organization for the *whole* of his working life.

Anti-bodies : This term is commonly used to denote foreign bodies in the blood; but in the sense in which it is used here, it alludes to the white corpuscles, the scavengers of the blood.

Ultimate anti-condition : i.e. whereas natural selection (according to the term used in the Darwinian theory) tends to the preservation of favourable variations and the destruction of harmful ones, the whole effect of machinery upon society is to do the very opposite. In other words, machinery is regarded by Dr. Freeman as setting up a law directly counter to Nature's own law for the preservation of the fit.

Sterilization : A suggestion advocated by Dr. Robert Reid Rentoul that all individuals of clearly proved unfitness, e.g. criminals, mental defectives, etc., should be rendered incapable of perpetuating their line.

The Old Testament doctrine of a "remnant" : i.e. of a favoured few preserved, by divine agency, from the general destruction. Cp. Ezekiel, chap. vi, verse 8: "And yet will I leave a remnant, that ye may have some that shall escape the sword among the nations, when ye shall be scattered

through the countries"; and Micah, chap. ii, verse 12: "I will surely assemble, O Jacob, all of thee; I will surely gather the remnant of Israel."

P. 133. *Stirpiculture*: The improvement of the stock or race.

The trade unions: According to Trade Unionism, the Capitalist is quite unnecessary in any business organization and does nothing except draw illegitimate profits. The remedy for this, according to conventional Socialist theories, is to abolish him and hand over the business organization to the State. But, suggests Dr. Inge not unreasonably, why should not the Trade Unions themselves take over such a business? The probable explanation is that, while quite willing to draw the profits of industry, they are unwilling or unable to face its losses. Or possibly they are unwilling to give proof of incapacity. For to show themselves incapable of running a business efficiently would be to proclaim a truth which Trades Unionism officially refuses to recognize—namely the value of the able organizing brain, as distinguished from mere work with the hands.

The Communists: As in Russia, where peasant farming is the only industry which has survived the wreckage of the old regime.

P. 134. *Bowed the knee to Baal*: i.e. began to worship the false gods of a mechanical civilization. Baal was the chief deity of the people of Phœnicia and Canaan and is thus, throughout the Old Testament, regarded as the chief of the false gods opposed to Jehovah, the true God of the Jews. On several occasions, in the course of their history, the Israelites turned away from Jehovah and temporarily worshipped Baal. One such occasion occurred while they were on their long journey to the Promised Land, and this defection was repeated several times after they had settled there.

Erewhonian: The policy advocated in Samuel Butler's social satire *Erewhon*. See note on page 171.

P. 135. *The remedy may be partly in our own hands*: Desirable though Dr. Inge's suggestions may be in theory, yet it is doubtful whether they could ever be practicable under existing conditions. The following points may be mentioned as obstacles: (1) the enormous weight and momentum of accumulated habit. Our mechanical civilization, such as it is, has absorbed and determined the greater part of our life. To stand against it, in the sense of deliberately rejecting what it has to offer us in the shape of goods, would demand a degree of strength which few except the resolute enthusiast would possess; (2) normal human nature dislikes oddities of any kind, and this would seem to be an insuperable obstacle in the way of any reform of dress along rational and economic

lines; (3) such changes as Dr. Inge advocates would, if universally adopted, throw immense numbers of the population out of work, or, if they did not do that, would necessitate the learning of entirely new handicrafts and home industries by thousands who have never had such training, who have no natural aptitude or desire for such work, and who probably would not be able to find anyone to teach them, even if they had the desire; (4) setting back the clock of history has never proved practicable. When civilization leaves an oasis and sets forth into the desert, it has never been able to find salvation by returning to the favoured spot which it has left, but must needs go on along the path which it has chosen in the hopes of coming to some new oasis on the further side. The only hope for mechanical civilization would seem to lie in so far perfecting and developing it that human assistance will be less and less needed in its operations, and that the energies of men will be thereby released for higher and more congenial work.

P. 136. *Man the toolmaker* : Man as distinguished from the rest of the animal creation by virtue of his use of tools. "Intrinsic progress" here, as previously in this essay, means the improvement of human nature, as distinct from improvements in human environment.

***Lord Avebury* :** Sir John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury) (1834-1913), Anthropologist, Sociologist and Naturalist. He is familiar to most readers chiefly by the rather conventional moralizing of his books on the *Pleasures of Life* and the *Use of Life*. He writes of the "slave-holding" ants in his *Ants, Bees and Wasps* (1882). These are to be found in many ant communities, the slaves being members of other ant tribes captured when young. The extreme form of slave-holding ant, the *polyergus rufescens*, is only kept alive by the service of its slaves.

***Progressive functional atrophy* :** i.e. the gradual loss of his various powers or functions owing to disuse.

***Atavism* :** Reversion to type. In the case of the British "sub-men" referred to by Dr. Freeman, such reversion would be to an extremely primitive type, belonging historically to the early ages of humanity—a type upon which even the West African negroes would (anthropologically) be considered a marked advance.

***Homo sapiens* :** "Man the Wise."

***Diagnosis is not the same as cure* :** Nevertheless a true diagnosis must be available to point out the line of cure. Unfortunately, in the case of the modern social disease, we have any number of able diagnoses; but none of them seem to indicate any line of cure which is at all capable of coping

with the immensity of the malady. The probable explanation of this is that none of the physicians has the courage to go to the root of the trouble. So long as the fundamental impulses of human nature are *selfish*, it is unlikely that any re-arrangement of social conditions can effect a real change for the better; and the only force capable of touching this basic selfishness is a spiritual force. That is probably why, in the last sentence of this essay, Dr. Inge gives up the problem as hopeless from any human point of view and hands over its solution to some spiritual agency as yet unrevealed. Perhaps, in the light of what has been said, there is a higher wisdom in finding the problem insoluble than in any of the conventional attempts to solve it.